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The focus of this thesis is local government reform in Kosovo. The perspective of 
local decision-making, allocation and enforcement, as well as numerous 
internationally-driven reforms presents the political scientist interested in Kosovo’s 
transition to democratic statehood with a complex and pertinent research portal. 
The core puzzle of this thesis is that whilst the realm of local politics has, since the 
collapse of Yugoslavia, been subject to numerous structural reforms - mostly as a 
consequence of externally-pursued state building initiatives - weak institutional 
capacities appear to remain. This is manifest in what appears to be persistent levels 
of poor implementation of the legislation and the failure of existing structures to be 
transformed. How can this be explained? Which factors determine progress and the 
pace of change? What does this suggest about the reforms, the international 
intervention, and the particular case of Kosovo? 
Policies aimed at reforming the local level emerged onto the political agenda due to 
the uncertainties of national statehood and the need to secure basic services after the 
1999 war. When and where it has occurred, decentralization and local government 
reform in Kosovo is the product of conditionality pressure from the international 
community. In the context of a weak central government with limited bureaucratic 
capacities and contested authority and jurisdiction, the international community 
was able to cast an external shadow of hierarchy at the local level. In general, the 
reforms have often been sudden and ambitious and not based on a particular 
blueprint or a particular Western model (Ebel and Péteri 2007). The common 
denominator of all of the local government reforms has been an emphasis on good 
governance, open and inclusive decision-making and accountability measures for 
intergovernmental relations (Tansey 2009). The EU has been a critical player in 
driving local government reform, introducing as part of its wider assistance for 
Kosovo a range of initiatives for opening up local decision-making processes and 
facilitating a closing of the gap between citizen and state institutions. Thus, the 
perspective of local government reform provides a valuable lens on the impact of 
international intervention in general, and the initiatives of the EU in particular.  
 
1.1.  Reforming local administration in Kosovo 
The basic governmental structure of Kosovo has its roots in the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, where local authorities exercised formal municipal 
functions as an extended arm of national government control (Ebel and Péteri 2007). 
In federal Yugoslavia of 1945-1991, local government was based on a model of self-
management socialism and planning was decentralized (Sörensen 2009, 7). The 
Communist Party, however, remained powerful and local elites were loyal 
representatives. Under the Yugoslav system Kosovo was an Autonomous Province 
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with the Socialist Republic of Serbia. After the abolishment of Kosovo’s autonomy in 
1989, local services were managed by a centralized administration under the 
Albanian-led parallel system separate from the Serbian-led government (Sörensen 
2009, 190-193).1 At the point of Yugoslavia’s disintegration, the territory of Kosovo 
was divided into five regional districts and 30 municipalities (komuna / opština) 
including the capital city of Prishtina2
Following the end of the war in Kosovo in June 1999 until the Declaration of 
Independence in February 2008, local administrations were faced with a rapidly 
changing set of responsibilities and a change of direction in local government 
reforms. Between 1999 and 2002, the newly established UN Administration in 
Kosovo (UNMIK) led a phase of recentralization of authority, which stripped 
municipalities of the little authority they had enjoyed in the pre-1989 Yugoslav 
period. Violent inter-ethnic clashes between Albanians and Serbs in March 2004 
brought decentralization back on the political agenda and UNMIK promoted 
devolution of powers to the local level as a mechanism to encourage the 
participation of isolated Kosovo Serbs in local institutions (KIPRED 2004). After the 
Declaration of Independence in February 2008, Kosovo authorities, under 
international pressure, adopted decentralization as one of the main mechanisms for 
diffusing inter-ethnic tensions between Albanians and Serbs and integrating the 
Serbian population in the socio-political environment (Burema 2013, 101). 
.  
Between 2000 and 2009, legislation delineating local competences, restructuring of 
local administration, reforming local elections, changing the authority of local 
mayors and new territorial arrangements was modified almost annually by UNMIK 
and later on by the Prishtina authorities.3
                                                 
1 A more detailed overview of the institutional structure during Yugoslavia is presented in Chapter 3. 
 In May 2013, the Kosovo government 
approved the establishment of two new municipalities bringing the total number of 
local government units to 40 (OPM 2013). The post-Independence legal framework 
introduced further reforms of local government and added seven new 
municipalities to the municipal structure in June 2008 with the new Law on 
Administrative Boundaries. During these changes in local competences, local 
authorities have slowly progressed towards accepting greater responsibilities. This 
occurred amidst many challenges due to the ever-changing and vague delineation of 
local competences as well as limitations of local capacities to implement new 
legislation and fulfill increasing obligations. 
2 For Serb-majority municipalities, I use both the Albanian and Serbian name together whereas for all 
other municipalities the official Albanian names are used. 
3 Legislation changes directly impacting the structure and competences of municipalities were adopted in 
2001, 2004, 2005, 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2013. The relevant legal framework is listed in the References 
section. 
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It is imperative to keep emphasizing the broader political context in which local 
reforms have taken place. This thesis highlights that Kosovo is a particularly unique 
situation where limited state authority and contested legitimacy at the central level, 
locked down power at the local level. The international community’s reforms and 
assistance agenda further reinforced this. Thus the challenge becomes relinquishing 
some of the captured power at the local level while not completely stripping away 
the autonomy of the local level. At the central level, devolving power to local elites 
was highly contentious because it was interpreted as an attempt to undermine the 
central authorities and thus thwart attempts at independent statehood. At a time of 
state formation and national uprising, power is most likely to be centripetal rather 
than centrifugal. Any attempt to reconfigure the balance of power under such 
circumstances is likely to be highly controversial and meet a high level of resistance. 
This was indeed the case in Kosovo: by 2003, local reforms were being pursued at 
the same time as the gradual withdrawal of UNMIK from executive decisions at the 
national level necessitated the central government to take on more responsibility. 
However, the authority of the central government was contested due to weak 
institutional capacities and the government’s failure to bridge the ethnic divide 
between the Albanian and Serbian population in Kosovo. Internationally its 
authority was contested by the lack of a final political status. 
In terms of the democratic transformation of local decision-making, the reform 
process involves more than just the devolution of power. What is also required is 
the establishment of access points for other non-state actors to engage with the 
decision-making process. Thus, in examining local governance in a context of 
transitioning democracies, local government reform is seen as embodying three 
critical elements. Firstly, there should occur a process of power re-distribution 
involving a vertical devolution of authority from central to lower tiers of 
government (Hohe 2002). Secondly, there should be evidence of increased openness 
of local governance, defined in terms of a shift in relations between state and non-
state actors and thereby a horizontal distribution of power (Marks and Hooghe 
2004). Thirdly, good local governance is enabled when institutionalised mechanisms 
are in place securing accountability within local structures as well as between 
central-local levels (Newman et al. 2004). 
This study starts from the premise that local governance reform is likely to 
constitute a much greater challenge than reforming decision making at the national 
or central level. The extensive involvement of international agencies in the country 
since 1999 and the frequent legislation changes altering functions of local authorities 
add to Kosovo as a notable and valuable context for further study. The thesis 
examines the degree to which a transformation is occurring under the impact of 
international agencies and what are the particular constraints in establishing good 
governance at the local level. The main question raised is the extent to which good 
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local governance can emerge in a context of limited statehood and high involvement 
of external agencies. Scholars have pointed out that local governance reform can 
only occur in the context of an effective and capacious state, able to cast a shadow of 
hierarchy (Héritier and Lehmkuhl 2008). Consequently, an environment of limited 
statehood (Risse 2012, 702) where the central government fairs weak both in terms 
of bureaucratic capacities and its contested authority challenges progressive change 
at the local level. On the contrary, the overriding position that this thesis advances is 
that local governance reform is possible under such conditions, but what emerges is 
likely to reflect the specific circumstances. 
The analysis is not based on a normative assumption that more local autonomy and 
authority vis-à-vis the central government is always desirable. Rather the 
fundamental premise is that a post-conflict environment requires a reconfiguration 
of state authority at the local level. Case studies are selected in this thesis in order to 
explore the levels of empowerment within the local context and the configuration of 
power between state and non-state actors, international / external and internal 
actors. The empirical sections particularly examine the progress in establishing and 
implementing new mechanisms of cooperation between state and non-state actors in 
the field of heritage, youth, environment and social services and the extent to which 
these have introduced and sustained a new decision-making process at the local 
level. The aim of the case studies is not to measure the outcomes of particular 
initiatives or the success rate of schemes in a particular area (e.g. the rise in youth 
employment or improvement of environment protection) but rather to evaluate new 
activities, partnerships and networks in the local governance sphere. The research 
findings show that the voice of the local in Kosovo remained unheard despite the 
increase in local competences to the local level. The international community 
involvement was crucial in promoting policy changes for local government reform, 
and at times its role clashed with local interests. The research findings substantiate 
the view that reform at the local level constitutes a highly complex process requiring 
due attention and thus cannot be considered at a subordinate state in connection to 
central government reforms. 
 
1.2.  Research Questions and Hypotheses 
The overarching research question of the thesis is to what extent has there been a shift of 
power at the local level during Kosovo’s transition process? The dependent variable 
explored embodies the devolution of power and the openness of decision-making at 
the local level. Emerging from the overarching questions are two core questions of 
this study: (i) To what extent has local government reform evolved in Kosovo? and (ii) 
Which variables and factors explain the shift towards more open and inclusive decision 
making at the local level? Through mapping of institutions, legislation and actors in 
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several policy areas, this research seeks to explain the drivers of progressive change 
towards democratic local governance and more open decision-making. The large 
number of international initiatives in the country may suggest progress but the 
empirical data presented in this thesis show that despite the substantial amounts of 
assistance allocated to democracy promotion efforts, the impact has been mixed, 
varying from one case to another. Led by the proposition that externally driven local 
government reforms have had a limited impact on the distribution of power and 
resources at the local level, this study explores the extent to which this is true on the 
ground. With the aim to further advance the research into international democracy 
promotion and good governance the study also examines external initiatives for 
reform and the models of governance promoted. These initiatives must embody two 
dimensions in order to achieve an impact on local governance, namely advocate for 
stronger intergovernmental relations and vertical accountability as well as 
strengthen horizontal modes of cooperation. These factors are likely to be reflected 
in the reforms implemented at the local level. The overriding position that this thesis 
advances is that local governance reform is possible under such circumstances, but 
what emerges is likely to reflect the specific circumstances. 
Kosovo authorities have witnessed multiple changes of legislation and 
administrative restructuring which have impacted upon government institutions at 
central and local levels. Territorial reorganization of municipal boundaries has 
rearranged institutional structures and transformed executive power in the hands of 
political elites. These changes have undoubtedly confronted the expectations of the 
local administration in serving citizen and cooperating with non-state actors. 
Historic legacies of state authority remain a factor in the functioning of the local 
administration. Institutions of decision-making and policy-enforcement are largely 
outmoded and slow to change, particularly at the local level. Current decision-
making processes are constrained by previous institutions. Whereas legislation may 
be adopted swiftly and altered frequently, institutional change is gradual and 
evolutionary (Easterly 2008, 95). 
The study thus pays particular attention to new legislation and institutional 
structures established during local reforms to enforce new bridges between state 
and non-state actors raising the question to what extent do formal and institutional 
changes lead to a change in local decision-making? This thesis provides commentary on 
how, or whether new laws, initiatives and policies governing local decision-making 
are working and functioning. It looks at the situation on the ground and considers 
whether formal and institutional change make an essential difference. According to 
Crook and Manor (1998, 302-3), establishing solid institutions and mechanisms will 
develop a “culture of accountability” which is necessary for democratic local 
governance. Institutionalisation is also critical to secure the sustainability of these 
initiatives and to embed these in the local political culture.  
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Decentralization reforms require the central government to relinquish control to 
lower tiers of government. Establishing and enforcing effective mechanisms of 
accountability and oversight between the center and periphery ensures the 
successful implementation of policies at the local level. In understanding the 
intergovernmental dimension of reforms, this begs the question to what extent does 
the central government exercise a steering role over local governance?  
At the local level a series of agencies with varying levels of power may facilitate or 
obstruct reforms. The case studies selected in this thesis show the dynamics of 
power, the balance of resources and the lines of accountability and authority 
between the center and local level. The intention is to explore the domestic factors 
that may enable shifts towards democratic local governance to occur, including 
identifying which actors establish themselves as the leading agents of change and which 
agencies act as gatekeepers? 
Recognizing the vital role of domestic actors as agents of reforms, the study also 
addresses the importance of participation and an active civil society in engaging in 
local decision-making. Participation of domestic actors in policy reforms is critical, 
particularly civil society actors (Jackson and Scott 2007). Strong networks of civil 
society organisations increase their chances of accessing municipal institutions and 
exercising an impact on the decision-making process. Hence, it is worth addressing 
the question to what extent is a shift in power at the local level contingent upon the 
presence of an efficacious civil society? 
Through answering these questions, the study aims to contribute to the wider 
discussion on political change and democratic transformation in the Western 
Balkans, where post-conflict Kosovo arguably represents the final and most difficult 
challenge following the collapse of the Yugoslav federation. The transformation of 
Kosovo involves dealing with compound legacies (statehood, post-socialism, 
conflict and contested sovereignty); reforming local decision making and power in 
such a context has thus far received the least scholarly attention and yet represents a 
particularly profound challenge. 
 
1.3.  Key concepts for studying local government reform in 
Kosovo 
The most obvious and relevant concept for this study is that of governance. When 
studying the local level, a governance perspective allows for an exploration of 
drivers of change amongst state and non-state actors, as well as at different levels of 
power and authority (international, national, local, community-level etc.). In a post-
conflict environment, a myriad of actors compete for survival in the new reality and 
may resolve to capture power to influence the outcome of policies (Woodward 2002, 
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19-20). This is particularly so at the local level where political elites remain powerful 
even if the state itself is weak. Disentangling power, understanding how it is being 
exercised and by whom is made more difficult where there is a myriad of actors, 
internal and external, local and national, state and non-state, public and private. As 
a framing concept, governance acknowledges the potential legitimacy and efficacy 
of each (Rosenau 1999). 
In this thesis, the ideas of governance are important as they help us locate power 
amongst the multitude of actors involved in local government reform in Kosovo. In 
particular, governance acknowledges that non-state actors should have a say in 
decision-making (Hill and Lynn 2005). Kosovo as a contested and emergent state 
represents a complex and unique context in which to study governance and shifts in 
decision making. It is a context in which the state apparatus is weak, and the 
challenge is not just to reconfigure the power of the state but to also reconstruct the 
relationship between the central and local levels (Risse 2012, 7). The normative 
benchmark for this relationship is one where central government steering ensures 
compliance of local authorities as well as inclusion of non-state actors. In order to 
secure a shift towards ‘good’ or ‘new’ governance at the local level, there should be 
evidence of the integration of local actors within a broader network of multi-level 
governance. That is, we seek evidence of local elites and civil society actors 
becoming integrated within national and, potentially, regional decision making 
networks. It is vital to recognize that such a shift will not diminish the role of the 
state. Indeed, the notion ‘bringing the state back in’ (Evans, Rueschemeyer, & 
Skocpol, 1985, 3) can be applied to this context as the central level authority needs to 
be strengthened through regulated interactions with other government tiers. As 
Charles Tilly argues, “no democracy can work if the state lacks the capacity to 
supervise democratic decision-making and put its results into practice” (Tilly 2007, 
15). 
As already noted, despite its significance as a marker of reform, there has been little 
scholarly analysis of governance reform at the local level in Kosovo. The literature, 
such that it exists, comes mainly from Prishtina-based non-academic policy centers 
and think-tanks. These include reports by the RIINVEST Institute for Development 
Research (2000), the Kosovo Institute for Research and Development – KIPRED 
(2004; 2009), the Kosovo Local Government Institute (KLGI) (2010, 2011) and the 
Kosova Democratic Institute (2009). Baskin (2004) conducted one of the first in-
depth studies on local governance in Kosovo to evaluate local democracy, including 
the local institutions, elections and local economy. The study provided 
recommendations for international organizations and local authorities in further 
advancing local democratic decision-making (2004, 7). This was followed by two 
larger studies by Ebel and Péteri (2007) and Hajnal and Péteri (2010) which provided 
a comprehensive review of local governance in Kosovo. The latter studies were 
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funded by the Kosovo Foundation for Open Society funded and FORUM 2015 
respectively. 
The second important concept for this study is that of state-building. The externally 
driven local level reforms that have taken place in Kosovo have been pursued as 
part of a wider objective to transform political authority and bureaucratic capacities. 
Such intervention has taken place under the guise of ‘state-building’. State-building 
has been a dominant, though controversial, approach to studying post-conflict 
transformations (Caplan 2002; Chesterman 2004; Fukuyama 2004; Zaum 2007). In 
addition to mapping power and reform at the local level, this study seeks also to 
contribute to our conceptual understanding of state-building as a framework for 
examining intervention and what often appear to be non-democratic interventions 
by external actors in domestic politics (Gilbert 2012). This study aims to bring 
further insight into the bargaining process between international and domestic 
political elites (Woodward 2007, 18-20). It also intends to highlight the tension in the 
design of power sharing arrangements in divided societies (Bieber 2004, 6). 
Critics of state-building, however, are too dismissive of the impact of international 
agencies on enabling good governance (Chopra 2002, 981; Richmond 2008; 14). 
Debates on international state-building and democracy promotion have tended to 
focus primarily on the transformation of central government institutions and the 
interaction between state and non-state actors at this level (Fukuyama 2004; 
Rothchild and Roeder 2005; Paris and Sisk 2007; Tansey 2009; Bliesseman de 
Guevarra 2010; Zürcher 2011). Although local institutions, organisations and 
contexts are not ignored as such, the emergence of good local governance is 
implicitly predicted to occur at a later stage, once reforms have been established at 
the core and hierarchical structures are set up. A critical assumption found in this 
literature is that there will occur a trickle-down effect whereby innovations at the 
central government level (e.g. new institutions and procedures) will eventually 
strengthen local structures and practice (Manning 2003). The reality on the ground, 
however, suggests a far more complex picture, with reforms not easily permeating 
the local level.  Over the last decade, comparative analysis of post-conflict countries 
has drawn attention to the local level looking at the impact of local governance 
reform in social reintegration and economic recovery (Woodward 2002, 17-29) and 
decentralization policies as a viable instrument for stability after conflict (Monteux 
2006). Contributions by Manning reveal the local challenges in implementing peace 
agreements during the 1990s and the need for broad inclusion of stakeholders 
throughout government tiers when negotiating sustainable political arrangements 
(Manning, 2003). Other studies by Pickering (2007, 2010) bring attention to the 
impact of externally-led local government reforms on communities and highlight 
citizen evaluations of these reforms. It is argued that people’s idea of good 
governance is closely related to visible infrastructural improvements in their 
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communities, which do not necessarily coincide with western liberal models of 
governance being promoted in the Balkans by international donors (Pickering 2012, 
567). 
The collection of different types of data is needed to make sense of the quality of 
local governance and of how and why a host of factors interact to explain the impact 
of internationally led initiatives for reform. The following section explains in detail 
the methodology used to inform the aforementioned hypotheses. Building on the 
literature on governance and state-building, chapter two develops a conceptual 
framework to situate the research within existing academic debates. 
 
1.4.  Methodology 
To answer the research questions, an exploratory case study research design is used 
here to allow a process of discovery amongst multiple events and agents (Stebbins 
2001). This study used qualitative within-case methods of analysis and its process 
tracing method developed by George and Bennett (2004). Process tracing involves 
exploring the observable implications of hypothesized causal processes within a 
single case and accepts new leads found within the detailed data (George and 
Bennett 2004, 205). The use of process tracing increases the number of theoretically 
relevant units of analysis through tracing sequences of events. This helps overcome 
some of the dilemmas of small N studies (King, Keohane & Verba, 1985). It is 
necessary to point out, nevertheless, that this research design explores illustrative 
cases studies and seeks only contingent generalizations that apply to other contexts 
similar to the ones being studied here. 
Yin’s (2009) guidelines on case study research were followed more precisely. For all 
cases explored, case study protocols were developed to ensure data reliability and 
maintain a target on the topic during data collection. As prescribed by Yin (2009, 80-
81), the case study protocol follows several key elements including: a) Introduction 
to case study and purpose of protocol; b) Data collection procedures; c) Outline of 
case study report; d) Case study questions and e) Evaluations. This process allows 
for the researcher to return to the very first step of theoretical discussions to review 
and redesign the propositions after the initial data collection. To encompass a wide 
range of issues, the cases are selected based on a set of criteria, i) cases represent 
different policy areas in different regions in Kosovo; ii) Minimum 3 different actors 
are involved – international agency, civil society/private sector with at least one 
public institution represented; iii) each one of the actors has a role in planning, 
decision-making and implementation and last iv) minimum institutionalisation in 
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the form of regular meetings and structured decision-making.4
Primary data was collected through interviews in Kosovo with key stakeholders. 
Qualitative interviewing based on semi-structured interviews provides rich in-
depth information revealing the interviewee’s point of view (Bryman, 2008). The 
advantage of using in-depth interviews rests in their capacity to reveal a great 
degree of insight into the issue being studied. Considering the extensive information 
gathered through the interviews as well as the suggestions raised for other people to 
interview on the matter, an interviewee may be considered as taking on the role of 
an ‘informant’ rather than a mere respondent (Yin 2009, 107). In this study, face-to-
face interviews were done with the majority of contacts established during field 
visits to Kosovo from 2011 – 2013. Instead of conducting a fixed set of interviews for 
a limited period of time, interviews were conducted in separate revisits to the field 
until a satisfactory number of contacts had been reached and the questions 
exhausted. The interview guideline, while based on a predetermined research 
framework, included a set of questions and topics to discuss with each interviewee. 
There was enough flexibility in the ranking and selection of questions depending on 
the interviewee’s position in the organisation and information revealed. This 
flexibility allowed to pursue more in detail certain issues during the interview 
process which the researcher deemed to be integral to the study. This discursive 
nature of interviews allowed for a continuous process of refinement. 
 The criteria were 
beneficial for the thought process and facilitated the collection of data. With each 
step of the research process, the data allowed to reflect on the initial research 
questions and further define the units of analysis. After the initial review of a broad 
range of policy issues, the data was screened for particular characteristics setting 
apart different policy areas. This allowed the development of new dimensions 
including the political contentiousness of a particular policy reform, centrality of 
policy area in central government agenda and high variation in state/non-state actor 
interaction. As this study is not based on a rigid hypothesis-testing model and the 
case studies are not a sample representative of a larger population but rather 
specific illustrative examples of issues, the challenge remains generalizing the 
results to a larger scale. To enhance external validity of the study results, a variety of 
policy issues were chosen. These remain illustrative case studies that may have 
salience for other issue areas in Kosovo at a time of rapid political and social 
transition. 
Selection of contacts to be interviewed was done with the aim of representing all 
institutions studied in each case. This included civil servants or political staff from 
                                                 
4 Similar criteria were used for the case study selection in the European wide research project: Multi-
stakeholder Partnership in Post-Conflict Reconstruction: The role of the European Union. 
http://www.multi-part.eu/  
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respective Ministries at the central government, officials from state agencies, local 
government officials, representatives or international organisations working with 
local government programs and civil society representatives. Priority was given to 
those institutional representatives directly involved in the development of a policy 
under study.5 After this initial stage of identification of all contacts for each category 
of institutions, a snowball method of interviews was employed whenever 
interviewees proposed a second person affiliated with the institution to be contacted 
due to their immediate involvement in a decision or their general knowledge about 
the topic at hand. In these cases, further interviews were organized with said 
officials and representatives. A total of fifty interviews were conducted with 
government institutions at (4) central level, (12) local government authorities, (2) 
state agencies, (17) non-state actors including civil society experts and organisations 
and (15) international organisation representatives working with local government 
programs. The full list of interviews stipulating their functions is on Annex 1A of 
this chapter.6
                                                 
5 Whereas the study refers to civil society broadly and encompassing the country as a whole, the case 
study analyses were conducted mainly with Albanian civil society organisations. This was primarily due 
to the data collection on municipalities with an Albanian majority population. 
 With the permission of each interviewee, interviews were taped. The 
language used in the interviews with representatives from Kosovo institutions and 
civil society organizations was Albanian.  Interviews with international 
representatives of organizations were conducted in English. Extensive notes where 
taken during the interviews. Each interview was transcribed soon after being held as 
to maintain all record of details and perceptions on discussion. Both interview 
transcripts and secondary data were coded with main categories matching the 
concepts important to the case explored. Qualitative data coding was used to 
systematically classify and examine the data. While mostly used for grounded 
theory, initial open coding and selective coding (Bryman, 2008) were helpful in 
examining the data and relating it to concepts explored. A list of the main coding 
categories is presented in Annex 1B. Secondary data consisted of country legislation, 
policy documents and official reports produced by Ministerial bodies, state agencies 
and the assembly, policy briefs, reports and evaluations conducted by international 
organisations in and outside Kosovo, analysis produced by civil society 
organisations throughout Kosovo as well as reports published by Kosovo-based 
think-tanks and research institutions. In few instances, media reports from local 
media sources were also analysed for content and further information. 
6 Despite the attention paid on the case study on youth participation, I was unable to conduct interviews 
with officials from the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports. The latter failed to respond to requests for 
meetings even after four different officials were contacted. Official documents produced by the Ministry 
of Culture served as data for informing on their policies regarding youth participation. 
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1.5.  Overview 
The following chapter constructs the conceptual framework and presents a detailed 
discussion on existing scholarship on governance and state-building, situating this 
research within current academic debates and analyses. The chapter begins with a 
review on the concept of governance, exploring in detail the emphasis placed on the 
diffusion of power and authority amongst state and non-state actors. In particular 
the chapter identifies the various principles of good governance, which is important 
to explain why the ideas of governance and its core principles are particularly 
relevant at the local level. The rest of the chapter reviews the state-building 
literature and the conceptualization of political and bureaucratic change during 
post-conflict and post-authoritarian transitions to democracy. Both literatures 
(governance and state-building), used in conjunction, are helpful in understanding 
the role of the international community in driving reform at the local level in 
Kosovo, and the variety of actors, institutions and initiatives that congregate at the 
local level, whether as drivers or impediments of change. 
Chapter three provides the reader with an outlook on Kosovo local government 
reviewing the main reforms that have taken place since the end of Yugoslavia. The 
second half of the third chapter examines two recent initiatives of international 
agencies designed to strengthen local government. This chapter closely examines the 
resulting mechanisms of decision-making implemented at the local level and the 
challenges encountered during the implementation of these initiatives.  
Chapters four to six present case studies from various policy areas based on 
extensive primary data collected in the field. In-depth analysis of four different 
policy areas provides revealing information on the impact of local government 
reform in setting up institutional mechanisms of cooperation between state and non-
state agencies. Chapter four focuses on heritage governance, presenting one of the 
most contentious issues in Kosovo politics in recent years. It examines the power 
clashes between a highly complex web of actors including international agencies, 
the central government, local authorities, civil society and religious communities as 
they each attempt to influence the mechanisms of heritage protection.  
In chapter five the case of youth participation at local level is analysed in detail. The 
case is chosen to illustrate the potential of local leadership in advancing youth 
policies through an active approach. At the same time, the case factors in the central 
government prioritization of policies supporting youth participation and its impact 
on the effective implementation of youth policies. 
The last empirical chapter explores two additional policy areas based on in-depth 
interviews with municipalities. In environmental governance an in-depth analysis 
into mechanisms of drafting local environmental plans gives insight into new modes 
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of cooperation between local authorities and civil society organisations. Looking 
into the welfare services case, the second part of the fifth chapter illustrates the 
factors contributing to successful collaboration schemes of service provision for 
persons with disabilities. In both areas, the research looks into the challenges of 
policy implementation and the approaches taken by local authorities and civil 
society organisations towards improving local governance. Finally, the concluding 
chapter sums ups the research findings and their implications for contemporary 
scholars and practitioners. 
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Appendix 1A. List of interviews conducted between 2011 – 2013 
Nr. Institution:  Function: 
01. UNMIK  Director of Office of Political Affairs 
02. OSCE   National Program Officer 
03. ICO   Head of Local Government Unit 
04. USAID / DEMI  Deputy Chief of Party 
05. EURED   Technical Assistance Key Expert 
06. EURED   Fund Advisor 
06. RDA   Director of RDA South 
07. UNDP   Manager, Support to Decentralization in Kosovo 
08. OSCE Prizren  Human Dimension Officer 
09. EU Office in Kosovo Decentralization Task Manager 
10. EC   Support to Decentralisation Project, Senior Expert 
11. Expert   Local Government Reform Expert Group in 2004 
12. KCSF   Program Director 
13. EC Ma Ndryshe Executive Director 
14. FIQ   Executive Director 
15. INPO   Executive Director 
16. HandiKos  Director 
17. HandiKos  Drenas Office, Programme Coordinator 
18. FOL   Executive Director 
19. Ministry of Agriculture Permanent Secretary 
20. MLGA   Head of Division for Monitoring of Municipalities 
21. MLGA   Permanent Secretary 
22. CHwB   Programme Manager 
23. ICO   Deputy Head of Community Affairs Unit 
24. MESP   Senior Legal Officer 
25. OSCE   Human Dimension Officer, Youth Projects 
26. OSCE Gjilan  Senior Human Dimension Assistant 
27. OSCE   National Programme Officer 
28. REC   LEAP Project Manager 
29. REC   Project and Information Officer 
30. Mitrovica  Municipal Environment Officer 
31. Prizren Municipality Director, Directorate of Spatial Planning 
32.  Prizren Municipality Engineer, Directorate of Spatial Planning 
33. KCCH   President 
34. University of Prishtina Professor, Faculty of Philosophy 
35. Kosovo LGI   Executive Director 
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36. YAC Prishtina  Chairman 
37. YAC Gjilan  Former Chairman 
38. YAC Ferizaj  Chairman   
39. National YAC  General Secretary 
40. Gjilan Municipality Youth Official 
41. Prishtina Municipality Youth Official 
42. MAR   Director 
43. Gjakova Municipality Spokesperson 
44. REC   Coordinator for Gjakova Municipality  
45. Podujeva Municipality Environment Officer 
46. EkoTrepca  Director 
47. Obilic Municipality Director, Directorate for Environment Protection 
48. Drenas Municipality Officer, Directorate for Health and Social Welfare 
49. KMDRI   Executive Director 
50. KMDRI   Project Manager 
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Appendix 1B. List of open and selective coding categories 
 
Open codes Selective codes / core themes 
Democratic decision-making 
Distribution of power 
Legitimacy  
Efficiency 
Improved services 
Economic development 
Inter-ethnic reconciliation 
 
 
 
AIMS 
Decentralization - Vertical 
Collaboration - Horizontal 
New contacts / partners 
 
 
PROCESS OF CHANGE 
Legacy 
Institutional history 
Cooperation 
New / old relationships between actors 
Formal / Informal mechanisms 
Short-term / Long-term 
Local government with civil society 
Local government with businesses 
Local government with central government 
 
 
 
INTERACTION & 
NETWORKS 
Intergovernmental relations 
Accountability 
Extensive involvement of international 
community 
Commitment to international community 
Obligations deriving from Ahtisaari package 
Unequal power between actors 
Volatile political context 
Improved conditions on the ground 
Aid coordination 
Enhanced capacities 
 
 
 
 
 
IMPACT 
Project design 
Transfer of knowledge 
Measures of success/failure 
Participation by all actors 
Role of municipal leadership 
Requirements by international community 
Requested by non-state actors 
 
 
INCLUSIVENESS 
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Leadership 
- Contact or cooperation initiated by local 
government official 
- Initiated by central government regulation 
- Initiated by CSO 
- initiated by international agency 
Strategizing (how to maintain cooperation) 
Role of businesses 
Role of core executive 
 
 
 
 
ACTOR AGENCY 
New legislation 
- Values attached More legislation is better 
- Perceived vagueness of obligations 
- Financial resources 
 
 
IMPLEMENTATION 
Oversight by central government 
Formal / legal recognition Acceptance by local 
authorities 
Acceptance by CSOs 
Central government role 
 
 
INSTITUTIONALISATION 
Financial resources (Lack of) 
Staff limited expertize 
Bureaucracy 
Political power (Lack of) 
Weak capacities 
Limited disciplinary actions 
 
 
 
 
CONSTRAINTS 
Ethnic conflict 
Ahtisaari 
Boycott 
Incentives 
Political clashes over policy reform 
Protests 
Ethnic division 
 
CONFLICTS 
Reform priorities on central government 
agenda 
Reform requests from local level 
Evaluation of success/failure 
 
 
POLICY AGENDA 
 
Ties with political elite 
- Personal networks 
- Allegiance to central government ruling 
party 
Political pressure for/against reform 
 
 
LOCAL POWER 
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2.  Clarifying the conceptual terrain 
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2.1.  Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to construct a conceptual framework for examining local 
governance in Kosovo and for assessing the various reforms instigated by the 
international community to transform decision-making at the local level. This will 
involve firstly defining the concept of governance and identifying what is generally 
understood by the term; particularly its emphasis on networks and the diffusion of 
power and authority amongst state and non-state actors. The discussion will explore 
different depictions of the concept as offered within the sub-disciplines of political 
science namely public policy, international relations and development politics. 
There will also be considerable discussion about the EU insofar as it offers and 
represents a particular model of decision making and governance that is both 
innovative and seemingly reflective of the principles of governance, namely 
diffusion of authority, networks and a plurality of decision-making powers. The EU 
is also, as a significant pillar of the international community in Kosovo, instrumental 
in trying to reform political authority and decision making in Kosovo. Their role in 
inciting domestic shifts is important considering Kosovo’s EU membership 
perspective. However, at this point in the thesis the EU will be considered primarily 
from the perspective of how the Commission understands governance and what 
lessons, if any, can we learn about multi-level governance from the EU model of 
decision making. In other words, this chapter will not be evaluating the role of the 
EU in Kosovo. 
However useful and relevant it is to discuss the concept of governance, it needs to 
be acknowledged from the outset that much of the governance literature has been 
written by scholars wishing either to describe the transformation of central 
government power and authority, or to map power beyond the state. The objective of 
this thesis is somewhat different and it is therefore important to explain why the 
ideas of governance and its core principles are particularly relevant at the local level. 
Thus, using the general governance literature, this chapter will identify what 
effective governance should look like and how it should operate at the local level. 
This chapter advances the position that the ideas of governance, though they 
usually refer to the transformation of power at the core, i.e. the central state or 
above, are nevertheless absolutely critical for successful democratic decision making 
at the local level. However, the thesis also accepts the premise that for effective local 
governance to occur, capturing all the normative ideals of subsidiarity, participation 
and deliberation, then reform at the state level is also vital - that is, one cannot exist 
without the other. ‘Good’ governance at the local level cannot fully occur, nor be 
sustainable without new modes of governance occurring at state level. 
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However, in order to construct a comprehensive framework for discussing and 
researching local governance reform in present-day Kosovo, it is necessary to delve 
into additional literatures. The literature on state-building is particularly important 
as it offers a critique of international intervention designed to restructure, recreate 
and transform political power and authority. The vast literature on this subject is 
used here as context for understanding the role of the international community in 
driving local governance reform, and for appreciating the extent to which externally 
driven initiatives can clash with domestic institutions. In other words, in assessing 
local governance in Kosovo we need to be aware of the fact that many of the 
initiatives have come about as a result of international or external intervention and 
may thus not be properly embedded or institutionalised, not to mention accepted by 
the population. 
Nonetheless, building local governance and transforming political authority at the 
local level in Kosovo does not just entail understanding the role of the international 
community in the process. It also necessitates a discussion as to the extent to which 
the Prishtina government has limited and contested authority over a proportion of 
the physical territory of Kosovo. In developing an inclusive conceptual framework 
this chapter considers what scholars understand by limited statehood (both in terms 
of bureaucratic capacities, and in this case also contested authority) and discusses 
the question of whether, and how, local governance reform is affected by such 
scenarios. Scholars have pointed out that local governance reform can only occur in 
the context of an effective and capacious state, able to cast a shadow of hierarchy 
(Héritier and Lehmkuhl 2008); others argue that new modes of governance can 
emerge in cases of limited statehood (Risse 2012). The study of Kosovo will shed 
light on the extent to which this has occurred on the ground considering the 
challenges these limitations impose on the local level. 
 
2.2.  Defining governance 
This study uses the governance definition provided by Thomas Risse to denote 
governance as the institutionalised modes of social coordination set ‘to produce and 
implement collectively binding rules, or to provide collective good’ (2012, 700). The 
review of literature reveals definitions including one or both of two dimensions. The 
first one is structure and concerns the architecture of multiple actors, the various 
formal and informal set of rules and practices and the plurality of decision-Centers. 
The second one is process and concerns the modes of coordination between levels in 
hierarchy and the various actors in networks characterized by a dynamic nature and 
a continual interaction and fluid, never-ending decision-making process (Levi-Faur 
2012).  
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The increased interconnectedness of countries during economic globalization 
brought about new paradigms of cooperation and coordination on a global scale. At 
the national level, public sector reforms in various countries brought about inter-
organizational networks between the different government levels and across the 
state-society divide (Kjaer 2011). Recognizing these shifts, scholars demanded 
serious consideration for a new way of looking at the state, the changing nature in 
which states were dealing with issues and working with each other. Early attempts 
at defining governance focused on distinguishing governance from government. 
Scholars pointed to governance as separate from government. This distinction 
pointed to the multiplicity of actors and a broader set of rules over social matters. 
Most importantly this implies governance covers areas in which ‘networks and 
markets, not directly under the authority of the government, replace the 
government’ (Lynn 2010). This interpretation refers to what Rhodes called the 
“hollowing out” and decline of the state (1997a). The latter’s definition of 
governance aligns with networks and refers to ‘self-organizing, inter-organisational 
networks characterized by interdependence, resource-exchange, rules of the game, 
and significant autonomy from the state’ (Rhodes 1997, 15). For other scholars, 
governance implies the process of steering the economy and society and reaching 
collective goals (Pierre and Peters 2000). In reiterating the distinction between 
government and governance, Bevir (2010, 3) points out that governance refers to 
processes of rule wherever they occur whereas government is directly linked to 
political institutions. 
An important element in the definition of governance was the diffusion of power 
and authority amongst state and non-state actors. Governance presented a notion 
challenging centralized authority and thus promoted a dispersion of power among 
formal and informal institutions at various levels. These shifts mark the opening up 
of the decision-making process to extend access to non-state actors (Hill & Lynn 
2005). Governance thus implies a ‘plurality of decision centers’, operating under 
unclear hierarchy and decision structures consisting of networks (Benz and 
Papadopoulos 2006, 2-3).  
A fundamental part of these discussions on governance was the inclusion of 
informal norms and practices. According to another scholar, governance thus refers 
to ‘the formation and stewardship of the formal and informal rules that regulate the 
public realm, the arena in which state as well as economic and societal actors 
interact to make decisions’ (Hyden 1999, 185). Thomas Risse’s definition, on the 
other hand, places more importance on the systems of rules, regimes of laws and 
practices, and thereby the institutionalised modes of social coordination (2012a, 
700). 
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Other scholars define governance as ‘the general exercise of authority’ (Michalski, 
Miller, and Stevens, 2001, 9), where authority refers to systems of accountability and 
control. It includes global and local arrangements, formal structures and informal 
norms and practices, and spontaneous and intentional systems of control 
(Williamson 1996). Lynn (2010) defines governance in a government related frame 
as ´the action or manner of governing –- that is, of directing, guiding, or regulating 
individuals, organisations, or nations in conduct or actions´. 
To further explore the use of governance both in theory and in practice, it is 
important to look at the different depictions of governance across three sub-
categories of political science literature. Firstly, within international relations, 
governance deals with the state role in influencing issues and policies whose impact 
is far larger than only the state itself. On a global scale, the state is no longer the only 
actor to influence or solve problems. Within international relations, two main 
branches developed in literature regarding the interpretation of governance vis-à-
vis the power of the state. Whereas the state-centric standpoint upholds the state as 
the principal actor (Pierre and Peters 2000), the society-centric approach maintains 
that ‘the state relies upon non-state actors to fulfil its duties’ (Robichau 2011, 117).7 
On the society-centric front, James Rosenau was forthright in his assertion that the 
state was no longer necessary for governance to ‘prevail’. He defined governance as 
systems of rule and control mechanisms which can exist without the formal 
authority of the state.8
                                                 
7 Referencing Jordan (2008) 
 However, others dispute this view arguing that “trends in the 
forms and instruments of governance prove the adaptability, not the obsolescence, 
of traditional hierarchical/bureaucratic governance and confirm the historical path 
dependence of national institutions” (Lynn 2010). Other scholars support this by 
highlighting that the state’s ability to exert its shadow of hierarchy and implement 
new governance in fact leads to effective governance (Héritier and Lehmkuhl 2008; 
Börzel 2010). New governance includes a change of power play, yet this is not to be 
understood as the state relinquishing authority or decision-making primacy, but 
rather strengthening its steering role by accepting a shift towards new relations with 
non-state agencies, especially civil society. Promoting new modes of governance is 
in fact promoting new mechanisms of interaction between state and non-state 
agencies while preserving the state’s capability to enforce these new interactions in 
policy-making (Matthews 2012). New modes of governance entail a combination of 
hierarchy and networks, where non-state actors are significantly empowered and 
become part of networks whilst the shadow of hierarchy persists. 
8 Kooiman et al (2008) are on the same lines when they point out that governance is ‘post-bureaucratic’ 
and, in advanced democracies, signifies fewer boundaries between states and the institutions of civil 
society as the government’s role in societal guidance is reduced. 
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As the academic debate on governance evolved during the last decades, it also 
influenced policy implementation and the work of practitioners around the globe. 
This second school of thought refers to the use of governance in public policy. In 
analysing public policy-making, governance systems are scrutinized and compared 
in order to understand the design, adoption and implementation of public policies 
at different levels of government. Over the last four decades, the complexity of 
issues increased resulted in a crisis of governability due to government limitations 
to generate policies which fulfilled citizen’s complex and diverse needs.  
Governance is thus used to describe the changing nature of the policy process in 
recent decades and the versatile terrains and actors involved in the policymaking 
process (Richards & Smith 2002). Governance stresses a focus on the implementation 
side of the policy process.9
At this stage it is important to note the distinction between the normative 
perspective and the empirical approach to governance. According to Risse and 
Lehmkuhl (2006), governance entails both a normative quality as it represents 
certain standards in political authority, rulemaking, security, welfare; as well as an 
analytical quality for analysing actors, modes and goals of governance. This 
normatively- laden approach has had a tremendous impact on international aid 
programs designed by developed countries for the Third World. 
 In German academic literature, the concept of steuerung 
is used as a synonym of governance (according to Mayntz 1993, 11) which covers 
both governance and governing. Under this characterization ‘the role of the 
government is to steer rather than to row (Osborne & Gaebler 1992). The Dutch 
literature on governance defines it as 'directed influence of social processes' covering 
all mechanisms of guidance that are connected to a public policy process (Kjaer 
2004, 41).  
The third strand of governance use can be found in development politics. The donor 
community, led by the World Bank in the 1990s, attached certain values to the term 
governance and as such it became a driving force for evaluating how other countries 
function and how they should be functioning. Democracy promotion and state-
building are based on normative values and all fall in this particular use of 
governance as they embody particular policies of international organisations and 
direct financial and technical assistance to countries outside of the developed world. 
However, at this point, there is a detachment between the normative position 
promoted by Western democracies and the reality and context in target countries. 
This imposition of practices and structures of governance has led to warnings that 
‘changes in governments have tended to become, at least partly, externally 
                                                 
9 According to Kjaer (2011) depending on which definition of governance is used, policy analysis varies. 
For example, when choosing the narrow definition of governance as networks, then types of network i.e. 
public-partnership become the focal point of analysis. 
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determined’ (Doornbos 2001, 4). By using the terms governance and good 
governance international donors ‘seem to imply and favor a certain de-politicization 
of political processes’ (Doornbos 2003, 5).  
Before moving to the next discussion specifically on local governance, it is important 
to clarify the notion of multi-level governance used to capture political and 
economic developments at supranational and subnational levels. Multi-level 
governance includes a web of dispersed authority and decision-making power 
across a wide range of actors. 10 Marks and Hooghe differentiate between two types 
of multi-level governance. The first type refers to a limited number of jurisdictions 
operating at different territorial levels (national, regional, local) that do not intersect. 
The second type of multi-level governance, however, refers to a large number of 
fragmented and specialized jurisdictions operating on specific policy areas. The 
latter type is more flexible and jurisdictions adapt or leave way for others to be 
created, as governance requirements change (2003, 236). In it jurisdictions are 
flexible and task-specific, ‘there is no up or down, no lower or higher, no dominant 
class of actor; rather a wide range of public and private actors who collaborate and 
compete in shifting coalitions’ (Marks and Hooghe 2004, 20-21).11
 
 The focus is on the 
process and interaction between actors at the local level and new norms introduced 
including accountability, transparency and openness. 
2.2.1. Local Governance 
During the process of opening up decision-making, the role of the local level is 
crucial (Bolleyer and Börzel 2010). This section identifies how effective governance 
operates at the local level. This study uses the definition of local governance 
provided by Goss (2001, 11) as the “emerging new forms of collective decision-
making at local level which lead to the development of different relationships, not 
simply between public agencies but between citizens and public agencies”. 
According to Andrew and Goldsmith, local governance encompasses the role of 
local decision-making in promoting democracy through the enhancement of 
citizenship and participation by the individual (1998). As a model, local governance 
                                                 
10 The initial use of multi-level governance was to study developments of European Union structural 
policy in early 1990s (Marks 1991, 1993). The concept is also a referral to the implications of an increased 
interdependence between governments and non-state actors across the various levels (Bache & Flinders 
2004). 
11 In addition, Bolleyer and Börzel (2010) argue that multi-level systems within and beyond the nation-
state offer ‘a wide repertoire of modes of policy coordination to solve collective problems non-
hierarchically’ for lower-level governments (provinces, regional governments, or member states) 
operating in multi-level systems. The resulting outcomes vary over government’s willingness and 
capability to enter agreements. 
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includes mechanisms, processes and institutions through which citizen and interest 
groups can articulate their interests, exercise their rights and by which relations 
between local authorities, civil society and the citizen are continuously improved 
(UNDP 2004). 
The European Charter of Local Self-Government (1985) lays out the rights of local 
authorities to govern their own affairs: 
Local self-government denotes the right and the ability of local authorities, 
within the limits of the law, to regulate and manage a substantial share of 
public affairs under their own responsibility and in the interests of the 
local population.… The basic powers and responsibilities of local 
authorities shall be prescribed by the constitution or by statute. However, 
this provision shall not prevent the attribution to local authorities of 
powers and responsibilities for specific purposes in accordance with the 
law. … Local authorities shall, within the limits of the law, have full 
discretion to exercise their initiative with regard to any matter, which is 
not excluded from their competence nor assigned to any other authority. 
Countries within the EU have opted for local government reform in attempts to 
improve efficiency and service delivery. In an illustrative case study, the Local 
Governance Research Program in British local government was designed with the 
aim of transforming local government into a system of local governance involving 
complex sets of organisations drawn from the public and private sectors. What was 
intended as market reform in effect resulted in the emergence of new flexible 
networks involving actors across the state and non-state sphere (Rhodes, 1999). 
Empirical research into local governance implies that despite the fragmentation of 
power, networks are contributing to efficient service delivery that is more 
responsive towards the needs of the users as compared to only government 
institutions (Kjaer, 2004).  
The increase in networks in policy implementation may be best observed at the local 
level, where most service delivery takes place (Kjaer, 2004). To enhance their 
chances of guiding society towards politically defined goals, local, regional and 
national political elites can all forge coalitions with private businesses, voluntary 
associations and other societal actors. This way they can mobilize resources across 
the public-private border (Pierre and Stoker 2000). A recent study of local 
government performance supports this claim by looking at municipal efficacy across 
municipalities in Bulgaria concluding that municipal efficacy grows with the 
increasing involvement of social and economic actors in the policy-making process 
(Petrova 2011). On the other hand, other scholars highlight the potential opposition 
of evolving governance actors. Cases of privatization or delegation of tasks in public 
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service provision are sometimes opposed by local community members (Börzel 
2010). 
In order to achieve high performance in policy-making and representation of local 
interests, local government reform policies often include decentralization or some 
form of devolution of power from the central level to the local governments. 
Decentralization can provide varying degrees of services and benefits appropriate 
for and based on local constituent preferences (Hooghe & Marks, 2003). This would, 
consequently, present different provisions in comparison to the more uniform levels 
of services provided under national direction. Areas such as environment 
protection, waste management or urban planning should be locally or regionally 
dealt with (2003). Others argue that decentralization policy may be limited by 
insufficient local capacities - government units that are too small are expected to 
suffer from lack of competence and expertise, but also from lack of resources. Allen 
and Tommasi argue that in addition to ethnic issues, ‘the administrative capacity of 
subnational governments, and the administrative and compliance costs of 
decentralization must be taken into the account when assigning expenditure among 
levels of government’ (Allen and Tommasi 2001, 74). 
Scholars and practitioners have also agreed on decentralization as a mechanism for 
conflict resolution. Devolving authority to the local level empowers communities 
and eases tensions in divided societies emerging from conflict (Brinkerhoff 2005; 
Siegle and O’Mahony 2007; Gjoni, Wetterberg and Dunbar 2010). The Western 
Balkans, however, have shown the opposite to be true as decentralization has 
entrenched ethnic divisions. The case of Bosnia) and Macedonia point to the risks of 
decentralizing along ethnic lines as this may result to making formal decision-
making dysfunctional and inefficient (Bieber 2004; Monteux 2006). 
 
2.2.1.1.  Opening up of local decision-making processes 
Within the concept of local governance, participation in local decision-making 
processes constitutes a criterion for enhancing democracy at the local level. The 
assumption in democracy literature is that bringing in non-state actors will boost 
democratization. Encouraging participation is hereby defined as taking part in 
processes of formulation, passage and implementation of public policy (Wilson 
1999). According to Fung (2006), participation serves three fundamental democratic 
values: legitimacy, justice and the effectiveness of public action. At the local level, 
municipalities also improve their output and quality of policy-making by utilizing 
the expertise of local civic organisations. As Petrova states ‘local governments seek 
to enhance local state capacity and consequently improve government efficacy by 
devolving parts of their authority to societal actors through civic participation in the 
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different stages and aspects of policy-making’ (2011, 776). Civil society contribution 
is valuable as it provides citizens with institutionalised leverage for relating to the 
state and pressuring the state to protect their interests (Petrova 2011). This type of 
horizontal cooperation between state and non-state actors enables horizontal 
accountability, which operates ‘in the shadow of hierarchy’ and thereby does not 
substitute hierarchical accountability (Schillemans 2008). New formal mechanisms 
of cooperation facilitate learning between the different agencies through knowledge 
transfer. Critics of traditional accountability models have called for a ‘more 
dispersed’ regime of accountability (Bovens, 2005; Braithwaite, 1999) and a model of 
‘de-centered governance’ (Fung, 2006). 
Other scholars echoing these propositions make the case for a shift towards 
collaborative governance enabled by public participation mechanisms. Newman et 
al. (2004) argue that the expansion of new mechanisms of state-citizen engagement 
is evidence of a new form of collaborative governance that can respond to more 
complex and diverse societies. Representative democracy which at instances may be 
hierarchical and bureaucratic must be complemented with new mechanisms of 
participation. Constitutional forms of parliamentary democracy must be 
supplemented with institutionalised forms of participatory governance. The latter is 
based on the capacity of citizens as stakeholders (Olsen 2003). In ‘traditional’ modes 
of decision-making, dialogue between the voters and their elected representatives is 
limited with political elites and strong interest groups capturing the process. In 
order for new mechanisms to succeed, institutionalisation is key. This is enabled 
through elements of compulsion in the form of demonstrating requirements for 
participation in bids for funding (Newman et al. 2004, 206). New forms of horizontal 
and vertical coordination bring the relevant and affected actors from the public and 
private sectors together in processes of negotiated governance and concrete problem 
solving (Piattoni 2009). Deliberative forums such as youth forums and area-based 
committees are useful means of encouraging a more active, participating mode of 
citizenship. Once-off participation will not produce the desired effects of change in 
the decision-making process. Thus participation must be reiterated over time and 
supported by institutional rules, norms and procedures (Skelcher and Torfing 2010, 
79). According to Newman (2005), it is this process of fostering new forms of state-
citizen relationships and remaking of governance that shapes our understanding of 
politics, changing the ways in which citizens engage with political power (Newman, 
2005).  
At the local level, openness of decision making and citizen participation in local 
policy is largely promoted with the underlying assumption that if citizens become 
actively involved as participants in their democracy, policies emerging from this 
process will be more effective (Irvin & Stansbury, 2004). Benefits resulting from this 
process impact both the government and citizens by increasing acceptance of 
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government decisions, thereby easing their implementation and empowering 
informed and involved citizens. Local governments may have various motives for 
introducing participatory policy making. The main argument is that involving 
stakeholders and (groups of) citizens at an early stage of the policy process rather 
than consulting them immediately before the implementation phase, can create a 
broader support for policy decisions and, therefore, make government policy more 
effective and legitimate (Michels & De Graaf, 2010). 
Many developed countries have institutionalised mechanisms of participation and 
established collaborative governance, citizens’ advisory committees, and 
participatory budgeting. There has been an increase in using direct democracy 
mechanisms across developed countries (Dalton, Scarrow, & Cain, 2003). To further 
develop this trend, the OECD released a practitioner’s guide designed for use by 
government officials for building robust frameworks for informing, consulting and 
engaging citizens during policy-making. Strengthening government-citizen 
relations, according to the organization, results in better public policy, greater trust 
in government and stronger democracy (OECD, 2001). Both the EU White Paper on 
European Governance (European Commission, 2001) and the EU White Paper on 
Multi-level Governance (CoR 2009) emphasized citizen participation as part of the 
EU’s core values in addition to openness, accountability and effectiveness. The 
principal reason for enhancing citizen participation in any area of governance is that 
the authorized set of decision-makers is somehow deficient. They may lack the 
knowledge, competence, resources or legitimacy to command compliance and 
cooperation. Promoting participation mechanisms thus provides legitimacy of 
policy actions (Fung, 2006). Thus, enabling active citizen engagement will produce 
relevant policy outputs, ‘a better aggregation of relevant interests, ideas and 
resources and a better integration of the relevant and affected actors’ (Skelcher & 
Torfing, 2010). 
Lowndes and Sullivan (2004) refer to structured mechanisms for cooperation 
between local authorities and non-state actors as local partnerships. These can 
include forums for discussion amongst local government and community members 
for debates and information sharing as well as policy-making forums or contractual 
relationships with civil society organizations for service delivery. While local 
partnerships may not directly deliver enhanced public participation, the authors 
claim that when public participation is designed into local partnership mechanisms, 
they serve to enhance efficiency, integration in a multi-stakeholder setting and 
accountability of local authorities. The main aim of local partnership ‘is about 
sharing responsibility and overcoming the inflexibility created by organizational, 
sectoral and even national boundaries (Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002 referenced in 
Lowndes and Sullivan 2004). Wilson (1999) highlights that participation at the local 
level is valuable due to its practical implications considering that services most 
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important to citizen are at the local level (environment, planning, education and 
housing). In addition, participation is important for democratic reasons namely that 
citizens are most likely to feel a sense of concern for and involvement in the life of 
their immediate community. 
The UK is an often-cited example of reforms initiated to develop central-local 
relations, which recognize the role of community leadership at the local level and 
enhanced public participation policies (Mckenna, 2011; Sullivan, Knops, Barnes, & 
Newman, 2004). The government made it a statutory duty for local authorities to 
consult widely when producing community plans. By strengthening the legitimacy 
of the local government, citizen participation strengthens the government’s 
authority with regards to establishing partnerships with local agencies (Sullivan 
2001). Yet, even in advanced democracies, state institutions retain considerable 
influence over the power of key agents of local governance. Hence, the capacity of 
local actors to act in their own interests is supported by the opportunities presented 
in a multi-level governance environment (Sullivan et al., 2004). 
Some scholars argue that certain countries, such as Scandinavian states, are more 
prone to employ participative strategies for citizen involvement at the local level as 
the state tradition includes a consensual character (Beukenholdt-ter Mors & Noppe, 
2000). In the case of Hoogeveen municipality in The Netherlands, municipal 
authorities joined forces with the police, housing corporations, welfare organisations 
and citizen representatives to enforce a new system of decision-making on housing. 
The core idea was to give local residents decision-making power in designing their 
own environment with local council and civil society professionals adding to the 
policy (Geurtz & Van de wijdeven, 2010). Yet, these processes are not without 
challenges. Scholars have argued that constraints on public participation in the local 
policy process include citizen apathy towards local politics and a general public 
disengagement from formal politics (Pratchett and Wilson 1996). Complex 
bureaucracy and formal rules of local government institutions also deter citizens 
from approaching formal local decision-making (Pratchett 2004). Michels and De 
Graaf (2010) also posit several key assumptions on citizen engagement in local 
decision-making, including that citizen involvement is limited to providing 
information and ideas rather than as co-producers of policy and that local 
governments are drivers of the process taking initiative and leading the cooperation. 
Evaluating these issues in The Netherlands, they demonstrate that civil servants and 
businesses participating in local partnership forums believe that citizens lack the 
necessary knowledge to participate, and are highly critical about the value of the 
information and suggestions provided by citizens. Despite the openness of decision-
making processes, the authors maintain that civil servants hold most of the power in 
decision-making. Their innovative approach in pushing forward participatory 
governance is pivotal in the process. If civil servants do not act, citizens have a 
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harder time entering the decision-making process regardless of their interest 
(Michels & De Graaf, 2010). On a similar line, Lowndes and Sullivan (2004) point to 
weaknesses of mechanisms of broad local partnerships including the unequal power 
between local governments, businesses and community representatives. The 
different resources available to each stakeholder and the varying level of capacities 
influence their power in the discussion table. 
Good local governance embodies an advanced state of open and efficient decision-
making and service delivery with formal and functioning accountability measures 
in the horizontal and vertical structures of governance. In examining local 
governance in a context of transitioning democracies, good local governance should 
embody three critical elements: firstly, power should be distributed involving a 
vertical devolution of authority from central to lower tiers of government (Hooghe 
and Marks 2003). Secondly, openness of local governance is defined by a shift in 
relations between state and non-state actors, whereby participation of non-state 
actors in the decision-making process is enabled and encouraged. This presents a 
horizontal distribution of power amongst state and non-state actors (Schillemans 
2008; Skelcher and Torfing 2010; Lowndes and Sullivan 2004). Finally local 
governance change is critical when institutionalised mechanisms are in place 
securing accountability of the local level to higher hierarchical state structures 
thereby reinforcing the role of the state in steering broader development (Newman 
et al. 2004). 
 
2.3.  European conceptualisation of governance 
As one of the most important international actors in post-1999 Kosovo, it is 
important to look at the EU conceptualisation of governance. This offers a 
perspective of particular models of state-society relations and shifts required of 
decision-making processes Kosovo. The EU is part of the international community 
in Kosovo and its pursuit of democracy is according to its own understanding of 
democratic governance, instrumentalised through its aid programs and Instrument 
for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA). 
The EU foreign policy engagement demands of target countries to adopt governance 
reforms and is driven by general principles of good governance. This is also evident 
in its democracy promotion efforts, when its programs promote normative 
objectives. The 1991 Agreement Establishing the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development explicitly includes a commitment to democracy as a condition of 
membership.12
                                                 
12 See "Agreement Establishing the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development," 
http://www.ebrd.com/pubs/insti/basic/basicl.htm. 
 Ten years later the EU White Paper ‘European Governance’ (2001) 
 
32 
 
was a clear attempt to define the Union’s conceptualization of governance. The 
document was a policy looking inward, inside the EU structures at possibilities and 
demands for change and improvement rather than a look at how it can promote 
governance outward. It is worth noting the normative value attached to the 
European concept of governance considering that these influence the way its actors 
and institutions perceive of the concept. The EU principles of good governance, as 
noted in the White Paper include openness, participation, accountability, 
effectiveness and coherence. The EU White Paper does also note two additional 
important principles, namely proportionality and subsidiarity. These concern 
decisions, on design as well as implementation of EU policy, which should be taken 
at the appropriate level (from EU to local level). At the EU level, the EU White Paper 
remains a broad vision rather than a specific policy request for change. It is based on 
this broad normative vision that EU promotes good governance principles, rather 
than on a particular model of one EU member. At the European level, European 
governance is about setting up the political rules of operation and about ‘regulating 
hierarchies, networks and markets’ at all levels (Kjaer 2004, 100). General 
descriptions declare that European governance includes both formal and informal 
institutions as well as the rules which enable actors from all levels to influence the 
decision-making process. As Kjaer states ‘EU regulation is as much about the ‘old’ 
as about the ‘new’ governance, in the sense that there is as much top-down steering 
as network coordination’ (2004, 112). 
The European Union as a system of governance offers a particular model or 
interpretation of multi-level governance. The European multi-level ‘political system’ 
represents a distinct governance model including intensive ‘trans-
governmentalism’, merged regulatory powers in the EU community and a growing 
importance of private actors in policymaking. EU multi-level governance posits that 
‘decision-making authority is not monopolized by the governments of the Member 
States but is diffused to different territorial levels of decision-making – the sub-
national, national and supranational levels’ (Kohler-Koch & Rittberger 2006). Multi-
level governance thus signifies the interdependence of actors while ‘governance’ 
refers to the ‘growing importance of nonhierarchical forms of policy-making such as 
dynamic networks which involve public authorities as well as private actors’ 
(Hooghe and Marks 2001). This policy model enables competence sharing between 
actors across the different levels as well as bargaining between the networks. In 
2009, the EU Committee of the Regions published the first White Paper on multi-
level governance promoting a mode of governance which involves local and 
regional authorities in the formulation and implementation of Community policies 
(2009, 46). This document emphasizes multi-level governance as a stepping stone for 
the EU as it undergoes a process of change and evaluation of its own role in the 
global arena. The White Paper highlights the need for protecting the regional and 
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local level during times of financial crises when ‘attempts could be made to 
renationalise common policies and centralize resources’ (2009, 8). 
At the EU level, the Principle of Partnership promoted through the EU Cohesion 
policy includes new innovative modes of governance to engage in multi-level and 
multi-actor type of governance ‘regardless of the given country’s past experience 
with regionalism, subsidiarity and regular dialogue with stakeholders’ (Dezséri and 
Vida 2008a). Nonetheless, Central and Eastern European countries (CEE), 
characterized by a ‘bigger shadow of hierarchy’ and weaker non-state and sub-state 
actors’ were still subject to promotion of new modes of governance which focused at 
strengthening central state capacities (to ensure economic freedoms) rather than 
empowering non-state and sub-state actors (Dezséri and Vida 2008b, 1). This 
Europeanization process of CEE new member states brought to the surface many 
issues such as management of funds, absorption capacity of economies, institution 
building etc. as these countries were adapting to new governance structures and 
processes, issues possibly caused by the legacy of the past in the new member states, 
in terms of public administration, societal structures and economic systems’ 
(Dezseri and Vida 2008, 2). During the integration process, there was a general lack 
of consideration and undermining of local government. Many ‘institutional 
experiments’ were undertaken at the sub-national level in the 1990s. Whereas in 
Czech Republic and Hungary, the central state government was the main actor in 
few cases of institutional experimentation, in Poland, actors from the region were 
the main drivers of series of institutional redesign or restructuring (Dezséri and 
Vida 2008a). In Poland, institutionalised cooperation between state and non-state 
actors was common and there was devolved authority to the regional level whereas 
in Czech Republic and Hungary, local governments were weak and fragmented. 
Central government policies to devolve power, restructure the economy or deal 
with market problems were terminated or removed once the crisis was over.  
Regional development programming was done without having regional actors as 
beneficiaries or without their involvement in the design and implementation of the 
program. With a weak ‘vertical accountability’, sub-national actors failed to make 
effective demands on the central state. For Central and Eastern European countries 
the adoption and implementation of these new elements facilitated their path 
towards EU integration by securing ‘more efficiency, transparency and legitimacy’ 
(Dezséri and Vida 2008a, 1-3). 
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2.3.1. EU, Europeanization and governance promotion outside 
the Community 
The EU role in democracy promotion is relevant for the Western Balkans due to the 
latters EU membership perspective. The EU is thus regarded as a leading agent 
inciting reforms of political structures and processes. The literature on EU 
enlargement and Europeanization in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) is relevant 
for further deconstruction of the role of the external in Western Balkan countries 
aspiring to join the EU. Whereas earlier work on CEE focused on the positivist 
rational-choice overtones namely that EU conditionality effectively transforms post-
communist states, recent studies in the field offer insight into the importance of 
domestic factors (Börzel 2010). While this thesis is not a study of Europeanization, 
this literature is important as it helps explore the constellation of these domestic 
factors. 
For targeted countries in the Western Balkans, it is absolutely necessary to reach EU 
standards and to ´transform weak states, mitigate the political, economic and social 
legacies of conflict and socialism´ (Fagan 2010, 2). Within the international 
community, the EU is regarded as a key player in promoting institutional reform 
and development of new modes of governance outside its member states.13
Contemporary scholarship recognizes the importance of the domestic context and 
the power of domestic agents to sabotage or facilitate substantial reforms in their 
country (Börzel 2010). Recent scholars contest the argument that EU membership 
 Its 
actorness is tested through various indicators including, amongst others, its foreign 
policy programs i.e. the Neighborhood Policy, the Instrument for Pre-Accession 
Assistance of the EU Regional Policy, funds allocated for democracy promotion, 
integration or Europeanisation assistance, the role of EU conflict prevention and 
conflict management missions etc. In the agency approach of transition theory, the 
EU presents an additional external factor in the process of transition influencing the 
choices available to the political actors involved. Through political conditionality the 
EU encourages aspiring countries to adopt of democratic rules and practices in 
exchange for financial assistance (Schimmelfennig and Scholtz 2008). The 
Copenhagen criteria adopted in 1993, which include stability of institutions 
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for all protection 
of minorities; the existence of a functioning market etc., provide the EU with a set of 
norms and expectations to promote in aspiring countries (Börzel 2005). 
                                                 
13 The European Council of Minister’s defines democracy promotion as “the full range of external 
relations and development cooperation activities which contribute to the development and consolidation 
of democracy in this countries … (and) all measures designed to facilitate development” (European 
Council of Ministers, 2006). 
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offered to the Western Balkans is a “golden carrot” to encourage implementation of 
reforms. In Kosovo’s case where the EU has had extensive involvement for more 
than a decade new studies downgrade their role to a mere minor importance in the 
reform process (Petrov and Papadimitriou 2011).  Furthermore, despite the major 
financial and technical assistance contribution of the EU towards reconstruction and 
institutional capacity building, its hesitation to deal with settling territorial conflicts 
has been to the detriment of statehood in the Western Balkan countries. Börzel 
argues that ‘Europeanisation has remained largely shallow giving rise to formalistic, 
short-term and technocratic reforms rather than sustainable and transformative 
domestic change’ (2011, 9). 
Accession countries face great difficulties in restructuring their economic and 
political institutions in order to meet EU membership requirements. Weak states 
often lack state capacity to enforce policy changes thus the state shadow of 
hierarchy is not applicable or successful at all times. Non-hierarchical modes of 
steering, which involve private actors in policy-making might be more appropriate 
to ensure the implementation of acquis (Börzel 2005). Weak state capacities and 
ethnic conflicts have reduced the willingness and capacity to implement EU 
requirements (Börzel 2011). Moreover, considering the long legacy of authoritarian 
regimes and centralized administration, non-state networks and collective self-
organisation processes cannot survive in weak states (Risse and Lehmkuhl 2006). 
The time variable is important when assessing government and governance reform 
considering that state capacity is built up over longer periods of time and the 
hierarchical authority distribution is established over time. Consequently, 
assessment of reforms and shifts towards governance need consider the conditions 
in place to elevate government to ‘new heights’ (Goetz 2008).  
In comparison to the CEE pre-accession period, South East European countries 
remain behind major political and economic reforms. In the same comparison, 
Western Balkan countries have all experienced problems of limited statehood and 
are deficient in some form of state capacity over their own territories. The approval 
of EU legislation and policies requires state capacity, which in most cases is 
concentrated at the central level. However, Börzel acknowledges that capacities to 
implement EU policies are mostly needed at the decentralized level of government 
(Börzel 2011, 9). A big challenge, similar to CEE, is the prevalence of informal 
structures and ‘rule-inconsistent behavior’, which are detached from changes 
occurring in the formal institutions. 
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2.4.  The ideal state of Good Governance 
The discourse on good governance grew together with policy analysis and 
practitioner’s input in analyzing international organisations role in assigning 
benchmarks for aid programs for developing countries (Smith 2007; Rothstein 2011). 
International agencies and their democracy promotion programs tend to lean 
towards Western normative conceptualisations of governance assuming ‘the 
modern Western nation-state is the model for good governance’ (Risse 2012, 703). 
The World Bank definition of good governance14
The traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised 
for the common good. This includes (i) the process by which those in 
authority are selected, monitored and replaced, (ii) the capacity of the 
government to effectively manage its resources and implement sound 
policies, and (iii) the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions 
that govern economic and social interactions among them. 
 (Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-
Lobatón 2000, 10) reads: 
Good governance, understood purely on a normative basis, as the aspirational and 
overarching goal of international mandates, has often been criticized for being too 
idealistic and presenting a benchmark too high to reach for post-conflict societies. 
Scholars debate whether the academic discourse translates into practice and point to 
issues that arise from the analysis of governance. Grindle (2007) challenges the 
credibility of the good governance approach contesting its ability to grasp the 
evolution of institutions and their capacity within a transitioning country. Attention 
should be focused on what she terms ‘good enough governance’. This framework of 
analysis ‘directs attention to considerations of the minimal conditions of governance 
necessary to allow political and economic development to occur` (Grindle 2007, 554). 
Good enough governance requires aid organisations and international interventions 
in general, to be tailored to conditions of individual countries. A ‘Good Enough 
Governance’ agenda would be based on a more nuanced understanding of the 
domestic institutions and government capabilities thus presenting a workable 
agenda for the international actors to engage with target countries. The latter, 
however, will prioritize the opening up of the government to promote an inclusive 
decision-making only when the states are institutionalised and functioning (Grindle 
2007). Institutionalisation of open decision-making mechanisms thus becomes 
pivotal in the political transition of a country. 
 
                                                 
14 The World Bank Governance Matters Indicators evaluate countries based on their rule of law, control of 
corruption, voice and accountability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality and political instability 
and violence (Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobatón 2000). 
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2.5.  Governance under Limited Statehood 
Bearing in mind that the governance discourse is largely based on developed, 
democratic and modern nation-states, Thomas Risse and Ursula Lehmkuhl (2006) 
caution against the limitations of exporting notions of (good) governance to 
developing, transition or failing states where there are areas of ‘limited statehood’. 
In fully functioning states, the government, or the general state apparatus has the 
ability to enforce political decisions and thereby conduct hierarchical steering. In a 
limited statehood setting, the state apparatus has limited resources and legitimacy, 
thus serious deficiency in its sovereignty to control and exercise its authority in 
implementing decisions (Risse and Lehmkuhl, 2006). Furthermore, central 
government limited capacities reinforce their unwillingness to engage in substantive 
reforms (Börzel 2010, 11). 
The limited statehood concept is based on Max Weber’s conceptualization of 
statehood as an institutionalised rule structure with the ability to rule 
authoritatively and to legitimately control the means of violence (Risse 2012). 
Consolidated states embody domestic sovereignty15
those parts of the country in which central authorities (governments) lack 
the ability to implement and enforce rules and decisions and/or in which 
the legitimate monopoly over the means of violence is lacking, at least 
temporarily (ibid.) 
 in which authority structures 
ensure ‘a society that is peaceful, protects human rights, has a consultative 
mechanism, and honors a rule of law based on a shared understanding of justice’ 
(Krasner 2004, 88). States thus retain the option of hierarchical steering if only to cast 
a “shadow of hierarchy” (Risse 2012). The absence of a consolidated state 
necessitates the recognition of limited statehood. To clarify, limited statehood, is not 
restricted to failed states and Risse draws attention to the fact that most developing 
and transition states encompass areas of limited statehood ‘as they only partially 
control the instruments of force and are only partially able to enforce decisions, 
mainly for reasons of insufficient political and administrative capacities (2012, 702). 
Areas of limited statehood are then defined as: 
Governance without government cannot occur in states with weak governments. 
Governance without government occurs in liberal democracies, where according to 
Börzel (2010), it is least needed. When government fails civil society and business 
organisations do not have the capacity or the autonomy to step in and contribute in 
the provision for the common good (Börzel 2010). Governance thus requires a 
                                                 
15 Domestic sovereignty is defined by Stephen Krasner as ‘the formal organization of political authority 
within the state and the ability of public authorities to exercise effective control within the borders of 
their own policy’ (Krasner 1994, 4). 
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functioning hierarchy to exert authority in order for networks to function. Areas of 
limited statehood, however, are defined by weak “shadows of hierarchy” (Risse 
2012, 709). In this context of limited statehood, external or international actors play a 
significant role in setting up the rules of the game. According to Börzel, 
international agents cast an external shadow of hierarchy through their involvement in 
domestic reforms, (Börzel 2010, 19). This allows for the international community to 
partially substitute the authority of the state and ensure higher conformity from 
domestic state and non-state actors under the standards of good governance. The 
involvement of international actors thus contributes to the establishment of multi-
level governance in Kosovo considering their contribution to public services (Risse 
2012, 709). 
Governments require autonomy; resources as well as efficiency in order to ´produce 
a credible shadow of hierarchy´ (Börzel 2010, 14). The existence of hierarchy is only 
possible when actors have the ability to coerce others.16 Governance structures do 
not determine but rather promote specific modes of coordination. Government 
actors have incentives to compromise for reforms or certain decisions as a result of 
‘the perceived threat of a unilaterally imposed decision’ from the higher ranks of the 
hierarchy. Governance is thus presented as an institutionalised form of political 
coordination. EU policy making, as an example, relies on the strong shadow of 
hierarchy cast by supranational institutions17
International agencies ultimately strive to set up authority structures which are 
capable of providing security and designing policies for serving their citizen. There 
is an evident need for help that badly governed states require considering they ‘will 
not fix themselves because they have limited administrative capacity, not least with 
regard to maintaining internal security’ (Krasner 2004, 86). Whether this presents an 
imperialist position is highly doubtful. The imperialist criticism rose from a group of 
scholars who condemn intrusive mandates and the international usage of veto in 
pushing forward policies. The ‘excessive’ executive authority according to Chandler 
(2006; 2010) does not contribute to strengthening domestic institutions and weakens 
sovereignty of countries controlled by international missions. It imposes Western 
models of state governing without the consent of domestic actors. This ‘Empire 
Light’ labeling (Chandler 2006), however, portrays a rather unidirectional relation 
 (Börzel 2007). However, at the global 
level, due to the lack of a world government to provide for a legitimate monopoly 
over the use of force, ‘global governance has to rely solely on non-hierarchical 
modes of steering’ (Risse 2004). 
                                                 
16 As Börzel puts it: “Only those actors that have the capacity to enforce collectively binding decisions 
against the resistance of those who have to bear the costs or whose preferences are not accommodated 
can cast a credible shadow of hierarchy" (2010, p. 14). 
17 Private self-regulation and public-private co-regulations are rarely to be found at the EU level, while 
they exist at the national levels (Börzel 2007). 
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between external and domestic institutions and actors. As this research will verify, 
domestic structures, both formal and informal, are important actors who can both 
initiate and drive change. 
This study takes into consideration the issues raised by Grindle, Risse, Lehmkuhl 
and Börzel and acknowledges that governance is not inherently a liberal concept. It 
also recognizes that structural reforms promote a model of governance that 
embodies enhanced democratic principles. In the Kosovo case, overcoming the 
challenges of limited statehood, limited resources and legitimacy, presents a move 
towards reinforcing the role of state authority as well as introducing new 
mechanisms of vertical and horizontal links. This marks a shift towards the standard 
of developed, democratic and modern states. To explore what governance looks like 
in an environment of limited statehood, a series of case studies in Kosovo are 
explored where the state is weak and unable to exert its shadow of hierarchy.  
Governance literature offers models of opportunities for actors to engage in. The 
emergence and successful implementation of open governance is tempered by the 
context. The assumption in the literature is for actors, both at local and central level 
to utilize the opportunities available in governance structure to shift towards new 
governance modes. However, the extent to which these shifts can occur, if these are 
in fact successful or not, is heavily influenced by the context. Certain meanings of 
governance serve as a framework for analysing institutional evolution in fully-
developed democracies, which some scholars consider inappropriate for 
understanding governance in ‘immature and struggling democracies emerging from 
autocratic rule and having only rudimentary democratic and administrative 
institutions’ (Lynn 2010, 3). Nonetheless, when considering the context of limited 
statehood, the governance concept is useful for analysing policies and politics 
because it helps in acknowledging the role of international and non-state actors 
involved (Risse 2012, 711). To complete the conceptualization of governance in a 
post-conflict environment, the following section reviews state-building literature 
discussing its approach on reconstructing state power after conflict. Embedded in 
this literature is the understanding that international actors are an integral part of 
the country’s politics and decision-making scene (Tansey 2009). 
In the context of limited statehood, we may expect peculiar forms of governance 
that bear resemblance to multi-level governance in so far as they appear to include 
empowered non-state actors. However, this may be rather superficial. Modes of 
governance may appear new but on closer inspection are strongly hierarchical and 
centralized reflecting communist structures. Hence the local level allows for a clear 
identification of the modes of governance emerging on the ground and the factors 
enabling these shifts. Local agents are thus influenced by both the limitations of a 
weak central government and the intense involvement of the international 
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community. Under the microscope the local level is a particularly interesting field 
because of the shared power between the international community and the central 
government, both lacking in either legitimacy or capacity to exert a shadow of 
hierarchy. 
 
2.6.  International role in state-building and democracy 
promotion 
In this study, the international community, with its extensive involvement and 
countless activities, is inevitably an important dimension in the transition process 
and must be factored into the research. When international administrations are 
vested with executive powers, overruling of national legislation or enforcing new 
legal frameworks is within their authority.18
Terms referring to international involvement, state-building and democracy 
promotion are discussed extensively in the literature of democratization and regime 
change in post-conflict societies. The concepts, state-building and democracy 
promotion, do not merge into one whole but can neither be split entirely into 
independent parts. The common denominator is the broad aim proclaimed by 
external agencies or drivers of change to achieve an environment of functioning 
governance structures with democratically elected representatives and clear lines of 
accountability across state institutions and civil society organized units. Scholars 
sometimes refer to state-building as an extreme form of democracy promotion due 
to the authority of international agencies to assume state functions and executive 
authority. This dimension has been long criticized for impeding ‘home grown’ 
democracy and obstructing domestic involvement in the transition (Chandler 2006). 
However, this interpretation is opposed by others as insufficient and lacking the 
process-oriented dimension of continuous dialogue and interaction between 
 Nevertheless, there is a danger that 
mandates and roadmaps of international agencies are taken too literally. Their 
potential to succeed in reaching their objectives of complete transformation of post-
conflict environments must be taken with caution. 
                                                 
18 These executive functions are not predominant in international administrations. For studies on 
international administrations see: Caplan, R. (2002). “A New Trusteeship? The Administration of War 
Torn Territories”, International Institute of Strategic Studies Adelphi Paper 341; Caplan, R. (2005). 
“International Governance of War-Torn Territories. Rule and Reconstruction”. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press; Berdal, M. and Caplan, R. (2004) “The Politics of International Administration”. Global 
Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organisations, 10(1); Chopra, J. (1999). 
“Peace-Maintenance: The evolution of international political authority”. London: Routlege; Chesterman, 
S. (2004). “You, The People. The United Nations, Transitional Administration and State-Building”. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press; Zaum, D. “The Sovereignty Paradox. The Norms and Politics of 
International Statebuilding”. Oxford: Oxford University Press. In this study, references to the 
international community or international agencies, encompasses a larger set of agencies than solely the 
UN administration. 
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international and domestic actors in strengthening institutions and civil society 
organizations (Narten and Zurcher 2009; Bliesemman deGuevara 2010). State-
building is also defined to include political and economic reconstruction efforts in 
the immediate aftermath of conflict to differentiate it with democracy promotion 
which covers all development assistance and support for consolidating democracy 
once domestic liberal processes are already underway and institutions and formal 
procedures are in place. 
 
2.6.1. State-building: The battle between international and 
domestic reformers 
In the time period 2000-2009, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
(SIPRI) recorded some 600 multilateral peace operations, both UN and non-UN 
deployed worldwide. In their most intrusive form, international administrations 
present “a formally constituted international body that has been entrusted 
temporarily with responsibility for the principal governance functions of a state or 
territory” (Caplan 2009, 359). This international authority temporarily assumes some 
or all powers of the state (Chesterman 2004). In the 1920s and 1930s the League of 
Nations occasionally exercised administrative powers in various territories. These 
included the city of Memel (now Klaipeda in Lithuania), Danzig (now Gdansk in 
Poland), the district of Leticia (a disputed territory between Colombia and Peru) and 
the Saar territory bordering France and Germany (Willingen 2009). In the aftermath 
of the second World War, the United Nations were the leading organisation in 
interventions assisting decolonization processes in the African continent (Congo), 
transitions to independence (New Guinea, West/South Africa-Namibia) as well as 
operations in Cambodia, Often these operations have been labeled as 
peacekeeping.19
Empirical studies conducted by Doyle and Sambanis (2000) show that multilateral 
UN peacekeeping operations do make a positive difference in ending violence and 
are positively correlated with democratization processes after civil war. The 
international presence is usually established with a short-term mandate with the 
main overall objectives of fostering the transition to a status of rule of law and 
supporting the consolidation of governing institutions. Nevertheless, their presence 
is often extended due to prolonged political and ethnic issues within the country. 
Hence, a key objective is creating a ‘multi-ethnic’ environment in conditions of 
 In recent decades immediately after the Cold War, the United 
Nations was again in the frontline of missions involving intervention in Cambodia, 
Somalia, Eastern Slavonia and East Timor. 
                                                 
19 The concept is explained further down in the text. See also: United Nations Department of Public 
Information (1996), The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping. New York: United 
Nations.  
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deeply divided societies and promoting participation. Needless to say, proclaiming 
these objectives is easier than achieving them in reality. The international 
administration does not have an intrinsic formula for success. The lack of a 
blueprint for these initiatives allows for interpretations of mandates and alterations 
of process while increasing the risk of failure. These general goals have been 
criticized for their vagueness, but also for being driven by the dominant Western 
perception of democracy. The harshest critics have termed this as Western 
imperialist interests aspiring at implanting Western conceptualizations of 
democratic states and good governance upon other societies (Chandler 2006; 
Ignatieff 2003). 
A string of international military engagements in conflict societies in the last two 
decades has drawn attention to the challenges faced during state-building while re-
instating functioning institutions. The growing academic literature has gradually 
shifted the discourse from advocating intervention in conflict regions towards 
evaluating the impact of external involvement in state-building. A series of scholars 
agree that there has been an important shift in peacebuilding strategy, which now 
incorporates elements of rebuilding of institutions and governance (Chesterman 
2005, Chandler 2006, Fukuyama 2004, Paris and Sisk 2009). Together with the 
actions taken and the expectations of an intervention, a shift also occurred in 
terminology. What used to be peacekeeping is now often referred to in different 
concepts, peacebuilding, nation-building or their substantive agendas:  
democratization and liberalization. It is thus not surprising that international 
administrations are commonly preoccupied with “governance of a comprehensive 
nature” (Caplan 2005, 21). Certain modes of governance are thus prioritized by 
international administrations’ work i.e. democratically elected institutions and 
minority protection as well as policy reforms to open up the economy. Governance, 
good governance and democratic governance are all entangled broad concepts 
guiding this extensive involvement serving both as the means and end goals of their 
mission. 
‘Blueprints’ for internationally led governance reforms must be viewed with caution 
as they do not necessarily present concrete steps taken on the ground. Strategies of 
international agencies are repeatedly redesigned and altered during the course of 
their mandate thus deviating from initial reforms intended. Initiatives and actions 
are highly influenced by the politics on the ground and the negotiation between 
international and domestic actors, be they central, local, state or non-state is a 
continuous process during the entire course of transition. External efforts may also 
be influenced by the approaches (beliefs, interests and models) of the different 
actors participating in the international administration. These concern Western 
oriented viewpoints on democracy and institutional structures with the conviction 
that establishing a certain set of institutions will facilitate development and stability 
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and resolve the roots of conflict in the country being administered. The same applies 
also for expectations of foreign actors that they will help state-society relations 
(Doornbos 2008). External efforts are also charged with the mission to generate 
political legitimacy for the (new) set of state institutions being built (Brinkerhoff & 
Azfar 2006). 
Influenced by Western-democracy models, reforms in a post-conflict context include 
policy changes for a market-oriented economy (privatization, tax laws, fiscal 
control) and enhancement of civic democracy (minority protection laws, civilian 
control of military etc.). By forming a coalition with domestic elites external actors 
strive to influence the choices or alternatives at hand. In order to achieve certain 
standards of governance ‘at times implies changes in political organisation, the 
representation of interests, and processes for public debate and policy decision 
making’ (Grindle 2004, 525). External ‘forces’ can only come to existence if they 
operate in tandem with domestic influences and as such need to convince the 
domestic leadership that ‘change is a good idea’ (Jacoby 2006, 625).   
In attempts to evaluate international involvement in guiding post-conflict transition, 
scholars draw attention to various risks including holding early elections (Caplan 
2004), mal-coordination and lack of commitment (Chesterman et al 2005; Chandler 
2006), creating political and aid dependency (Bieber 2002), lack of local ownership 
and inclusion of local actors (Reich 2006) etc. As one of the most vocal critics, David 
Chandler (2010, 6) protests against external involvement in setting up new 
governance structures stating the following: 
Rather than legitimize policy making on the basis of representative 
legitimacy, post-liberal frameworks of governance problematize autonomy 
and self-government, inverting the liberal paradigm through establishing 
administrative and regulatory frameworks as prior to democratic choices. 
This process tends to distance policy making from representative 
accountability, weakening the legitimacy of governing institutions in 
Southeastern European states which have international legal sovereignty 
but lack genuine mechanisms for politically integrating society. 
This conception of an external imposition, scholars argue, may foster public mistrust 
of democratic institutions and the ‘gap dividing elites from the public [may] become 
a troubling political liability’ (Belloni 2008, 177). In studying international 
intervention in the African context, Doornbos (2010) draws attention to the risk of 
donors bypassing the autonomy of state structures through partnerships with 
private stakeholders or direct funding of NGOs. These factors increase the state 
society gap thereby increasing the propensity for state failure (Doornbos 2010). In 
decentralization policies, donor preferences for privatization and non-governmental 
initiatives undermine the role of the state institutions ‘occasionally leaving questions 
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as to which bodies would theoretically still be responsible for guarding the common 
interest’ (Meynen and Doornbos 2004, in Doornbos 2010). 
Scholars have boasted the assumption that international actors possess a stronghold 
over the entire process of transition and are in ‘unequal partnership’ with domestic 
counterparts (Chandler 2010). Scholars who argue that this approach amplifies the 
power of the international actors contest this approach. If this were the case, then 
the international administration successful completion of its mission would have a 
direct correlation with its establishment in a post-conflict country. It would reach its 
objectives and would solely depend on the coordination of actors and funding. 
International administrations and organisations in general do not possess an inert 
ability for success. A crucial factor to consider is that these governance interventions 
are not introduced in a vacuum where power and resources of the domestic factor 
are nonexistent. There is some sort of existing (even if low) capacity on the domestic 
front (Grindle 2007). Domestic actors including organized political entities, 
government officials, elected members of Parliament as well as political parties, 
associations and interest groups with political activities (such as war veterans or 
mobilized ethnic groups) have their own aspirations during the transition period. 
The realization of existing domestic interests and domestic conceptualizations of a 
state is important and must be considered when engaging with various actors 
during the transition (Bliesemann de Guevara 2010). Assuming that the domestic 
actors uphold their interests, externally introduced ideas will be ignored, 
interpreted or rejected as a consequence of local conditions and interests. Given the 
big and deeply embedded differences between foreign and domestic actors, it seems 
only natural that strategies will meet some form of local resistance and that policies 
will retain distinctly national traits (Eriksen 2007). The effects of state-building are 
thus anything but the one-dimensional results of intended, top-down practices by 
international actors (Bliesemann de Guevara 2010, 116). Domestic political agency 
should not be underestimated and must be factored into any analysis of post-
conflict transition. 
The economically weakened, institutionally rundown and ethnically fragmented 
societies with which the international community is involved are politically and 
administratively complex. The post-conflict context requires swift and decisive 
political actions, which in turn cause a dilemma (or even clash) between efficacy and 
legitimacy (Jarstad and Sisk 2008). International actors often push the domestic elites 
into taking swift actions that weaken their legitimacy due to the lack of 
consultations with societal groups (Zürcher et al. 2009). Mansfield and Snyder (2002) 
point out that institutional mechanisms for accountability must accompany the 
opening of the political sphere which enables wider participation. 
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As Zürcher rightly notes, ‘a democratic peace brings with it norms and rules of good 
governance that restrict the ability of power-holders to reign, extort, and expropriate 
arbitrarily (2011, 85). Thus it must be noted that domestic elites may use the 
international presence as an opportunity to gain or at least preserve their own 
power and existence in these new conditions. They attempt to steer the international 
authority in a particular direction in favour of their own interests. Baskin (2006) 
supports this claim by noting that it is ‘the interaction of international commitment, 
or its absence, with local capacities and factional hostility that shapes the prospect 
for successful peace-building’ Narten and Zürcher (2009; 2004b). Collaborating with 
certain groups may also prove to be challenging for the international officials 
engaged in facilitating financial and technical support. 
On the one hand, international actors are key negotiators, proposing, advocating 
and when endowed with executive powers imposing key solutions to the political 
challenges faced during the transition period. This involvement has many facets. 
According to Tansey (2009) this is done through advice, persuasion and 
conditionality to achieve international norms of democratic governance. On the 
other hand, domestic actors aim to preserve power, exercise influence and represent 
their constituents. Consequently, neglecting local elites can decelerate and even 
spoil the process of improving governance. International and domestic actors 
present various reactions, cooperating or resisting, depending on the power they 
have in altering the outcome (Narten and Zürcher 2009). This way the transition 
process becomes a political market, as Woodward calls it; or a contest for power 
‘over who rules, who gets to define policies for their group or goals, and above all, 
the very rules over who rules’ (Woodward 2009). 
With regard to other levels of government, Barnett and Zürcher (2009) argue for a 
need to analyze tensions between state elites and sub-national elites and the need 
that international implementers address their interests separately. Under the 
assumption that elites are against governance reforms which may lead to 
democracy, scholars state that reforms implemented during a transition to 
democracy undermine elites’ power (Zürcher 2011). Moving toward a more 
democratic regime would imperil the very foundations on which political authority 
in many of these post-war countries rests—an elaborate system of informal 
governance, of which widespread patronage and corruption are common features 
(ibid.). Informal governance structures may also exist as a result of societies’ and 
communities’ self-organisation. This also applies to particular services, which 
informal governance structures may continue to provide until a common legal 
framework is (re)established. 
Ignoring existing structures and aims of domestic leaders endanger the stability of 
the country. Thus, institutional legacy is important for explaining the process and 
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success or failure of externally promoted governance reforms. In his study of 
transition of former-communist countries, Eriksen (2007) highlights former 
administrative traditions and legacies from the past as an additional factor 
influencing successful transition towards democracy. However, literature reveals 
different weights of importance given to the value of path dependency in 
governance transformations in post-conflict areas. Disagreements exist over the 
issue whether change towards Western models of governance is possible in non-
Western societies due to their institutional legacy and social values inherited from 
former authoritarian governing. Chandler notes ‘the argument within EU is still 
often repeated that many states in the SEE region lack sufficient capacity and suffer 
from historical ´path dependencies´ which have undermined the relations between 
states and their societies’ (2010, 7). Consequently, international actors allocate 
resources in supporting the few domestic ‘drivers of change’ they can find. Recent 
analysis of particular policy areas suggests that in successor states of former 
Yugoslavia capacities of elites and non-state actors vary, but are generally perceived 
to be low (Fagan, 2010, 2011; Elbasani et al 2012). Nevertheless, their potential for 
enabling incremental change remains realistic. 
In the Western Balkans, former Yugoslav countries are important examples of 
international involvement in guiding political reforms as well as complex power 
constellations among governance structures. For this particular region, scholars 
have drawn attention to the politics of state-building (Chandler 2006; Bieber 2005, 
2006; Paris & Sisk 2009), the dynamics of international-domestic interactions during 
the establishment of new governance structures (Narten & Zürcher 2009; Willingen 
2009), the impact of democracy assistance on civil society participation in 
governance (Fagan 2011). International involvement in the Western Balkans is often 
drawn in parallel to the role of external agents in post-communist Central and 
Eastern Europe. Literature suggests that democratization efforts in Central and 
Eastern Europe were already underway, facilitating the work of international donor 
agencies. The political elite and civil society showed readiness to comply with 
reforms as compared to Western Balkans where institutions and civil society 
organisations are weaker and state administration is less effective. This gives the 
appearance of higher intrusion by international agencies to foster new structures 
and strengthen civil society’s role in reforming institutions (Elbasani, 2012; Fagan, 
2005). 
Kosovo is a particular case where the international community’s protracted 
presence involved an array of activities and mandates of international agencies 
which changed over time. The international administration in Kosovo, led by the 
UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), mandated to maintain peace and security and re-
establish government institutions. The European Union was part of this mission 
charged with economic reconstruction. Mandates changed over time as the political 
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issue of Kosovo’s final status remained in limbo. Both the UN and EU continue their 
presence today after Kosovo’s declared independence in 2008 with the EU 
mandated to oversee Rule of Law and strengthen the judiciary whereas the UN has 
reduced its mission to concern mainly the North of Kosovo. 
The variety of international organisations involved in Kosovo as well as ever-
changing political situation brought about many actors and a wide range of 
influence in the process. Accountability and partnership lines between actors, 
international-domestic, central-local, and state-non-state are blurred. A valuable 
dimension is clearly delineating who are the main leaders promoting governance 
reforms and endorsing changes in institutions and rules of the game. As Ebel and 
Péteri highlight ‘when too many authorities are involved in the same tasks, none of 
them is really accountable’ (2008, 54). The power distribution among these actors 
also influences the dynamics of interaction between modes of governance hence the 
necessity to map out the power distribution and locate the main conduits of change. 
The transition process includes stakeholders at different power positions which are 
strengthened or shaken due to the impact of state-building (re)distribution of power 
resources (Bliesemann de Guevara 2010, 116). The opening of doors for certain 
groups or elites often means the closing of opportunities and power routes for 
others (ibid.). Interests of domestic parties may be challenged or threatened by new 
governance structures and processes of decision-making. New modes of governance 
may present a threat to the survival of networks and power bases of elites. This may 
lead elites to ‘cultivate ties with a subset of society in order to make an implicit 
bargain- political support in exchange for state jobs or targeted public good’ 
(Zürcher et al. 2009). 
 
2.7.  State-building at the local level 
In a post-conflict context, establishing self-governing and decentralized structures is 
critical to restore the presence of the state, to ensure stability, demilitarize politics in 
divided societies and increase interethnic cooperation (Lister and Wilder 2005). 
Civic engagement in local decision-making builds the foundation for democratic 
governance at the local level and ensures sustainability of the governance structures. 
Local government is the first body of public authority the citizen turns to for solving 
their immediate social problems. It is ‘the level of democracy in which the citizen 
has the most effective opportunity to actively and directly participate in decisions 
made for all the society’ (Sisk 2001, 15). However, in order to secure sustainable 
democratic local governance, it must be ‘integrated into a much broader network of 
autonomous institutions that function according to basic, agreed-upon political 
values and the principles of democratic political and social organisation’ (Baskin 
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2004). This does not undermine the vital role of central government to supervise and 
assist the change of ways of doing politics.20
As explained earlier, literature on state-building suggests that central authorities 
remain a key agent for the international community. The underlying assumption, 
both on the academic as well as practitioner’s level is that of a trickle-down effect by 
concentrating efforts at strengthening central government institutions (Manning 
2003). Theory suggests that sub-national tiers of government are weaker in claiming 
changes and asserting their influence on the political developments bearing in mind 
that few countries transitioning towards democracy have a long-standing tradition 
of local self-governance (Teune 1995). Post-socialist societies entail characteristic 
institutional and structural modes of governing and state-society relations. When 
introduced to ‘Western’ concepts, the political culture is not particularly conducive 
to new means of participation and lines of accountability. Importing and 
implementing new modes of governance is therefore a daring political process. 
Some mode of governance continues to exist, even in environments of weak central 
states as governance may occur at multiple levels of societies. Existing and possibly 
embedded structures of power and authority will be encountered (Eriksen 2007) and 
interests of political groups will impact the potential and pace of reforms. 
Supporting local governance by opening up local decision-making to non-state 
actors improves the capacity of the state to exercise its sovereignty and serve its 
citizen. 
  
Results of an empirical study on local governance in Mexican municipalities show 
that the dynamics of the decentralization process are influenced by the hierarchy 
structures of the country (Grindle 2009). Hooghe and Marks (2001) argue that the 
dispersion of governance across multiple jurisdictions is both more efficient and 
normatively superior to centralist states (Hooghe and Marks 2001). This goes in line 
with the subsidiarity principles of the European Charter of Local Self-Government 
(1985) under which ‘public responsibilities shall generally be exercised, in 
preference, by those authorities, which are closest to the citizen. Allocation of 
responsibility to another authority should weigh up the extent and nature of the 
task and requirements of efficiency and economy’. 
Despite the existence of a considerable body of theoretical and empirical studies 
conducted on the international involvement in the Western Balkans,21
                                                 
20 Hence, policies introducing a devolution of power to local authorities or establishing regional layers of 
multi-level governance present only a fraction of the bigger picture and should not be treated as a 
de/facto governance shift. 
 the bulk of 
literature factors only the central state under the assumption that it is the sole driver 
21 The international community has been involved with a variety of international missions in four 
countries: Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH 1995), Croatia/Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES 1996), Kosovo 
(UNMIK 1999), Macedonia (EUPOL 2001). 
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of change. Recognizing its importance in pushing for reforms, this study seeks to 
identify additional streams of power among organized units, state as well as non-
state driven. Literature on the state-building transition process does not address 
local governance beyond the function of service delivery to its citizen. The process 
of promoting change and negotiation between the relevant state and non-state 
actors at the local level is of paramount importance to successful reforms. Most 
studies stop at ethnic issues, territorial organisation or factors such as efficiency and 
accountability in local service provision. The local level is important in the 
democratization process as it is a key player in the constellation of actors involved in 
introducing, promoting or challenging forms of governance. Thus reforms 
concerning local governments must incorporate a broader understanding of state-
society relations. 
Local governance, being ‘larger’ than simply the provision of local services, 
incorporates the establishment of ‘space for democratic participation and civic 
dialogue’ and ‘facilitating outcomes that enrich the quality of life of residents’ (Shah 
2006, 2). Clear and functioning intergovernmental relations between the institutions 
are crucial to ensure that governance structures enable participation and 
accountability. Active involvement of citizens in local decision-making is the best 
practice for attaining the attributes of good governance. Electoral participation and 
engagement in decision-making processes embrace actions based on certain values 
and beliefs which need to be instilled in the culture of the community. This is 
especially challenging in post-socialist environments and post-conflict contexts 
where state-society relations were never democratically established or have been 
broken. Chopra and Hohe warn that that ‘exclusion of the people from any aspect of 
state-building will continue to cause costly interventions to founder’ (2004, 303). 
Jackson and Scott argue on the same lines of the dangers of the transition process 
turning into a vicious circle ´where participation is low, so is ownership and 
government legitimacy, which further reduces participation´ (2007, 18). Quick-fix 
approaches, ignoring local capacities and institution-building, can lead to 
dependency (Brinkerhoff and Mayfield 2005). In addition, low inclusion and 
ownership of local stakeholders, both state and non-state actors, in the decision-
making process of drafting main policies will reduce the chances for sustainability 
and legitimacy of governments through providing services to citizens. 
In order to understand and evaluate external impact on local governance, the multi-
dimensionality of governance reform must be taken into account. The conditions set 
by each party involved and interplay between domestic and international actors are 
interconnected, thereby creating a complex process of transition. This research 
unfolds this complexity through an analysis of formal and informal structures of 
governance as well as through tracing the interaction between both horizontal and 
vertical links between actors as they exercise power over the process of transition. 
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For pluralist competitive politics, strengthening local governance serves as a device 
for deepening democracy or for opening closed systems to give interest groups 
space in which to organize, compete and otherwise assert themselves (Manor 1999). 
Focusing attention only on central institutions risks leaving local governance 
structures weak and may contribute to new patterns of disconnection, opposition, 
authoritarianism, fragmentation, and violent conflict (Jackson & Scott 2007). As 
studies on Afghanistan indicate, the sub-national administration is often overlooked 
or neglected by the international community although it ‘both shapes and is shaped 
by complex political dynamics and is part of a broader political process’ (Lister & 
Wilder 2005, 39). The local level is ‘where the political settlement has the most 
immediate impact on the lives of ordinary citizens’ (Manning 2003, 36). Establishing 
central government institutions which are legitimate in the eyes of the citizen is a 
crucial factor in state-building. Moreover, a strong local governance within the reach 
of the population and at the same time valued by it, is also of great relevance in post 
conflict reconstruction (Hohe 2005). Thus the emphasis of reforms should be on the 
local level ‘as this is where the peace settlement happens’ (Jackson 2002, 1-2). 
Neglecting local governance weakens democracy at the grass-root level and as such 
endangers the democratization of the country as a whole. Supporting local 
governance by opening up local decision-making to non-state actors actually 
improves the capacity of the state to exercise its sovereignty. Studies of municipal 
performance in South East Europe confirm that municipal efficacy grows with the 
increasing involvement of social and economic actors in the policy-making process 
(Petrova 2011). Experience of reform pressure in Central and Eastern Europe shows 
the impact of policies that lack consideration of and undermine local government. 
Dezséri and Vida (2008) point out that central governments gave away power to 
restructure the economy or deal with market problems only to take it away the crisis 
was over. In the context of CEE where a centralized governance regime was 
prevalent, new modes of governance were conceptualized as ‘layering’’ (Dezséri 
and Vida 2008b 2) and reforms did not successfully ensure sustainability of these 
modes of governance. 
 
2.8.  Conclusion 
This chapter introduced the main concepts to construct the framework for 
examining local governance in Kosovo and for assessing the various reforms to 
transform decision-making at the local level. Whereas governance is the overarching 
framework, this study is situated in a particular angle of governance research, which 
focuses on governance in a post-conflict context where the international community 
plays an important role in ‘substituting’ for limited central authority. 
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The chapter advances the position that the ideas of governance, although commonly 
used to identify the transformation of power at the central state, are nevertheless 
critical for successful democratic decision making at the local level. For effective 
local governance to occur, capturing all the normative ideals of subsidiarity, 
participation and deliberation, then reform at the state level is also vital and as such 
local governance must be embedded in multi-level governance with effective and 
accountable institutions. At the local level, this means effective local governance 
embodies an advanced state of open and efficient decision-making and service 
delivery with formal and functioning accountability measures in the horizontal and 
vertical structures of governance. In examining local governance in a context of 
transitioning democracies, good local governance should embody three critical 
elements: a vertical devolution of power from central to lower tiers of government, 
openness of local governance defined by a shift in relations between state and non-
state actors and institutionalised mechanisms must be in place securing 
accountability of the local level to higher hierarchical state structures thereby 
reinforcing the role of the state in steering broader development. 
The conceptualization of governance by international agencies, in particular the EU, 
was discussed extensively to emphasize their approach to governance and the way 
international agencies promote principles of good governance in developing 
countries. In addition, the literature on state-building provides a more tailored 
approach to the context of post-conflict transformations through understanding the 
potential of the international community serving as an external shadow of 
hierarchy. To complete an inclusive conceptual framework, this chapter also 
considers the concept of limited statehood, in terms of bureaucratic capacities and 
contested authority, and the impact these limitations may have on local governance 
reform. Considering the state limitations, the role of the international community is 
enhances as substituting for the weak central state. This framework paves the way 
for an exploration of the local government reforms in Kosovo, the extent to which 
the international community has influenced these reforms and the factors enabling a 
shift towards multi-level governance. 
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3. Local governance in Kosovo: A domestic or 
external drive for local government reforms?
                                                 
 An earlier version of this chapter is published as “Decentralisation in Kosovo: Challenges of reforming 
the local level” in LSEE Research on South Eastern Europe, Papers on Decentralization and Regional 
Policy, 2014. 
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3.1. Introduction 
This chapter introduces Kosovo presenting a brief background to the country and 
highlighting the key dimensions of local governance in the country. It is structured 
in two parts. The first part provides the reader with a basic outlook on Kosovo. It 
presents a detailed review of the trajectory of the main local government reforms 
undertaken in Kosovo. This also includes an account of the main agencies involved 
in promoting reforms at the local level. The second half of the chapter looks 
specifically at evidence from two recent international initiatives designed to enhance 
local governance practices and promote democratic decision-making at local level. 
The cases identified in this chapter focus on two external agencies heavily involved 
in local governance reform: EU and USAID. Semi-structured interviews with donor 
agencies and representatives of the international community in Kosovo, including 
the UN Mission in Kosovo, OSCE and International Civilian Office, provide insight 
on the trajectory of reform in Kosovo and their role in pushing forward strategies 
for good local governance. 
 
3.2. Local governance in Kosovo 
Kosovo uses a two-tier government system in which municipalities (komuna/opština) 
are the basic territorial unit of self-government.22 The country’s 2008 Constitution 
ensures minority communities’ right to representation at the local level23, the right to 
local self-government and the country’s respect for the European Charter of Local 
Self-Government. The map below presents the current 37 functional municipalities 
in the Kosovo territory of 1.8 million inhabitants.24
                                                 
22 Constitution of Republic of Kosovo, Article 12.1. 
 
23 Ibid. Article 62. 
24 This map does not portray the municipality of North Mitrovica which was not functional under Kosovo 
authorities but managed through a presence of the remaining UNMIK mission.  
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Figure 1. Map of Municipalities in Kosovo 
 
 
 
Source: US Embassy in Kosovo (2012) 
 
The Kosovo population is 90% Albanian and the largest minority is Serbian (est. 7%) 
living in various municipalities throughout the country. Other smaller minorities 
are composed of Roma, Bosniaks, Turks, Gorani, Ashkali, Egyptians and Croats 
(KSA 2011). The 2011 census in Kosovo failed to include the municipalities in the 
Nortȱȱȱǰȱ³Ȧ°ȱ ȱ³Ȧ°ǯȱȱ¢ȱ
of North Mitrovica, although announced as a new municipality under the new 2008 
legal framework, was not fully established at the time of this research. The 2011 
census failed to provide complete information regarding the existing population in 
the northern part of the country. The map below provides the only official atlas of 
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ethnic communities in Kosovo published by the Kosovo Statistics Agency in 
December 2013. Blue refers to areas composed of more than 90% of the Albanian 
ethnicity. The red dots depict the Serbian ethnicity with each dot representing 1% of 
the population. The Serbian population is concentrated in the municipalities of 
	³Ȧ	²ȱǻȱȱȱȱPrishtina), Partesh/Parteš, Ranillug/Ranilug 
and Kllokot/Klokot. The green areas show the Turkish population mainly in the new 
municipality of Mamusha. 
 
Figure 2. Map of ethnicities  
 
 
 
Source: Kosovo Statistics Agency (December 2013). 
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Decentralization reforms in Kosovo are fairly recent policies primarily driven by the 
international community due to political developments in the country. Local own 
source revenues remain low and local authorities depend on central government 
grants and international donors to deliver all services required by law (IMF 2011). 
Between 2006 and 2013, Freedom House rated local governance in Kosovo with an 
average 5.2 score (Freedom House 2013).25
Formal structures of local administration in Kosovo were inherited from the 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Under Yugoslavia, Kosovo had 28 
municipalities and a defined capital city of Prishtina. The territory was divided into 
five regional districts called ċǱȱ Ȧǲȱ Ȧ°ǲȱ 	Ȧ	ǲȱ
ȱ Ȧȱ ǲȱ ȱ ºȦȱ ȱ ȱ ºȦiǯ
 In order to understand this current 
situation at the local level, it is important to first look into the historical 
developments in Kosovo.  
26 In the 
1950s Yugoslavia, a system of socialist self-management was introduced throughout 
the federation that involved the devolution of government functions to the federal 
republics. The unraveling of these changes throughout Yugoslavia was gradual and 
the introduction of self-management extended from 1952 to 1965.27
Within Serbia, Kosovo’s status was upgraded in the 1974 Constitution and it became 
an Autonomous Province within the Socialist Republic of Serbia and thus became a 
ȱȱȱȱǯȱǰȱȱȱ°ȱǻŘŖŖŗǼǰȱȱlf-
management system was ‘destroyed by the political supremacy of the League of 
Communists, the only political party allowed, which was fully centralized up to the 
republican/provincial level’ (2001, 421). Government institutions, including the local 
and regional bodies, were in fact controlled by the provincial level (Péteri and 
Vaillancourt 2007). The communist party remained in control, exercising a 
significant role through active interference through the political leadership and 
 In this system 
municipalities gained a set of administrative and fiscal competences including 
setting their own taxes and managing own source revenues. Local authorities 
received earmarked taxes linking charges to specific areas of expenditures. 
Property-related taxes and fees were the most significant source of revenues. The 
provincial level shared the tax revenues with local governments through fixed 
transfer mechanisms (Péteri and Vaillancourt 2007, 22-23).  
                                                 
25  Freedom House Nations in Transit ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest 
level of democratic progress and 7 the lowest. 
26 The UNMIK Administration continued the functions of district courts as the only remaining district 
institutions in Kosovo. UNNMIK Regulation 2000/45 recognizes only municipalities as a unit of local 
government. 
27 This was followed by a period of self-managed market socialism (1965-1974) when market mechanisms 
were utilised in many areas, focusing on the activities of the Socially Owned Enterprises operating in the 
market (Estrin and Petrin 1991). 
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managers and directors of enterprises at the local level (Mulaj 2009, 15). Ebel and 
Péteri (2007) have argued that local authorities exercised formal municipal functions 
as an extended arm of national government control. Local authorities lost control 
over municipal property and municipal public enterprises became locally managed 
and state-owned enterprises during the nationalization of local assets under the 
Milosevic government (Péteri and Vaillancourt 2007, 22). 
This period of institutional progress was short-lived within Kosovo and did not 
reach the advanced institutional development and economic benefits as compared 
ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǻ°ȱ ŘŖŖŝǼǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
constitutional framework, municipalities in Kosovo had the same powers as their 
counterparts in other republics. However, their development was contingent upon 
the broader progress in Kosovo. Development in Kosovo lagged behind the other 
constituent parts of the Federation, mostly as a result of focusing investments in 
extracting natural resources in the territory (Palairet 2007)28
Kosovo inherited a formal decentralized local government structure but it also 
inherited traditional structures and clientelist networks (Sörensen 2009). During the 
1990s Kosovo required a centralized mechanism of administration as the main 
services, education and health were delivered through a parallel system separate 
from the Serbian led government. Networks of social, political, union, health-care, 
media and cultural associations provided a lifeline for Albanians in Kosovo in a 
period of mass dismissals, unemployment and general Serbian repression and 
discrimination. Thus reliance on clientelist and traditionalist forms of social 
relations outplayed the role of institutions (Sörensen 2009, 183-193). 
. Resources at the local 
level in Kosovo remained limited under these circumstances. The rise of Albanian 
mobilization and political reaction against the Serbian regime in 1981 was followed 
by the abolition of Kosovo’s autonomy in 1989 and signaled the end of the self-
management socialism period in Kosovo. 
This centralized institutional legacy has been continuously identified by both 
domestic and international agencies as a challenge to state administration and 
successful implementation of reforms. Centralized hierarchy and weak civic 
engagement with authorities prevailed for many decades, inhibiting the re-
establishment of citizen-state links after 1999. The formation of sub-municipal units 
called local communities (bashkësia lokale/mesna zajednica), a semi-formal scheme of 
organization, may have largely influenced a distant relationship with the state (Ebel 
                                                 
28 The resources invested through the Federation Fund for Inducing a Faster Development of the 
Underdeveloped Republics and Region of Kosovo did not succeed in speeding up development in 
ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ǻȱ ŘŖŖŝǼǯȱȱ ȱ ° (2001) the Kosovo GDP in 
Yugoslavia ‘although permanently increasing in absolute terms, when measured per head had fallen 
from 47 to 26 percent of the Yugoslav average in the WWII aftermath’ (2001, 102). In 1981, unemployment 
in Kosovo was 26 percent and reached 59 percent in 1989 (Rogel 2003, 167).  
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and Péteri 2007).29
The non-state realm has also undergone dramatic changes in their approach to state 
institutions and the local government. Under Tito’s leadership of Yugoslavia, civil 
society groups organized along national or religious lines were curtailed. Tito’s 
death in 1980 brought back an association of civil society with larger socio-political 
ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǻċȱ ŗşŞşǼǯȱ  the political 
situation deteriorated in the 1980s and 1990s, civil society in Kosovo was associated 
with the broader national movement for equality and human rights within the 
Federation of Yugoslavia. Consequently, civil society was closely linked with the 
civil mobilization and resistance of Kosovo Albanians for independence (Clark 2000; 
Agani 2012). The post-1999 period in Kosovo changed the understanding of civil 
society as non-governmental organizations increased in number and took a 
significant public space as aid recipients.  
 The decades long culture of parallel institutions, ‘a rejuvenation 
of a Kosovar tradition of local governance and self-management’ (Kostovicova 
2005), further contributed to local governance functioning outside of central state 
hierarchy and guidance. 
Following the establishment of a broad international presence in Kosovo in 1999, 
local government has been subject to a range of reform strategies over the years. 
Reforms have often been sudden and ambitious, as the process of reforms is not 
based on a blueprint of a particular Western model (Ebel and Péteri 2007). The UN 
Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) abolished former Yugoslav structures and re-
established municipal authorities with a vaguely European-based legal framework. 
The international community excluded territorial division at the beginning of 
international administration of the territory and created a unitary institutional 
structure (Bieber 2004). The UN Security Council Resolution 1244 established the 
international civilian presence mandating it to perform basic civilian administrative 
functions and maintain law and order until domestic institutions were set up. 
Through the UNMIK Resolution No. 1999/14 ‘On the Appointment of Regional and 
Municipal Administrators’ UNMIK established the first institutionalised authorities 
across five regions on Kosovo. The mandate of the Regional Administrators 
included the control, discharge and supervision of functions entrusted to public 
services and local government bodies in the respective regions. Regional 
Administrators were granted the highest authority in approving decisions and 
initiatives of the local government administrations. Coordination of international 
assistance at the municipal level also fell within the competences of Regional 
Administrators. One lower level of authority consisted of Municipal Administrators 
for each municipality.  
                                                 
29 This structure operated under the legal framework of the Federation until the abolition of Kosovo’s 
autonomy in 1989 
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The framework for establishing the national level Provisional Institutions of Self-
Government (PISG) in Kosovo was laid out in the UNMIK Resolution No. 2001/9 
‘Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo’. This regulation stipulated 
that “Kosovo is composed of municipalities, which are the basic territorial units of 
local self-government with responsibilities as set forth in UNMIK legislation” 
(Article 1.3). Formally the UN Mission decided to abolish previous district level 
government authorities operating under the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and the 
UN administrators had no formal local counterparts in Kosovo (Report of the 
Secretary General S/1999/1250 par. 34). However, UNMIK as well as external 
international organizations used the pre-existing sub-municipal units, which had 
operated in former Yugoslavia, as a point of contact to help local citizens in 
implementing projects of reconstruction and development at the local level. After 
the first local elections in 2000, the international Municipal Administrators 
appointed local Chief Executive Officers and members of their Municipal Boards. 
The Chief Executive Officers, Department Directors and personnel were considered 
the provisional local government. Local Community Offices were established 
throughout Kosovo to enable UNMIK’s objective of having an “intermediary role” 
between individuals in minority communities and the local administration. The 
establishment of provisional institutional structures at both the central and local 
levels followed the first national and local elections held in 2000 and 2001 
respectively. As the local structures were established and functioning, consultations 
with domestic actors increased although final decisions were repeatedly taken by 
the international Municipal Administrators (Baskin 2004, 14). The UNMIK structure 
of directing local government administration existed until all municipal structures 
were established. 
A significant factor in the development of local politics was the establishment of 
local provisional institutions through the appointment of the strongest political 
parties in an illegitimate process. Choosing local ‘partners’ was under the discretion 
of international staff (Interview OSCE 2011). Confusion over municipal competences 
and clashes over political and economic power between old and new elites 
contributed to a charged political environment at the local level and damaged 
accountability.30 In the next national elections in October 2004 the Serbian 
community boycotted the national elections in Kosovo and refused to cooperate 
with the central government in Prishtina. The election boycott of the Serbian 
community further diminished the potential of the central government to 
implement local government reforms (UNSC 2004 S/1999/1250 par. 39).31
                                                 
30 Turnout in local elections dropped from 79 % in 2000 to 53.9% in the 2002 elections. 
 Concrete 
steps to decentralize authority, including fiscal decentralization, transfer of public 
31 Challenges posed by the refusal of Serbian community to participate in Kosovo’s local institutions are a 
separate component of the broader research project and are beyond the scope of this study. 
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property and reform of public services did not materialize (Hajnal and Péteri 2010). 
Despite initial de jure devolution of rights to local authorities, several competences 
were recentralized soon after by the UNMIK administration. In practice, the 
international administration recentralized particular competencies previously given 
to municipalities. Municipal Administrators retained broad reserve powers of 
intervention to ensure that municipal decisions are in compliance with UNMIK 
mandate. Municipal Administrators are also required to co-sign the budget once it 
has been through the Municipal Policy and Finance Committee and adopted by the 
Assembly. Each Municipal Assembly has a prescribed number of elected seats. 
Additional seats for appointed representatives of minority communities were filled 
at the UNMIK Special Representative’s discretion.  
Regulations on local competences and intergovernmental relations changed 
frequently making implementation of the legislation and policies a challenge. Local 
government reform, addressed in 2003/2004 with the Standards for Kosovo policy, 
aimed to introduce local governments to benchmarks of good governance through 
measures of democratic institutions, rule of law, local development and integration 
of minorities.  
Prior to the political status negotiations, in 2005, the UN Special Envoy Kai Eide 
recommended that decentralization should be addressed in a wider framework to 
allow for ‘a meaningful devolution of powers and enhanced competences at the 
local level. Such a framework could include a number of new municipalities 
where the Kosovo Serbs, in particular, would have a comfortable majority’ (UNSC 
2005). The violent March riots32
                                                 
32 The two days of riots in March 2004 claimed 19 lives, wounded 954 people, displaced 4,100 people, 
damaged 730 houses and burned, looted or damaged 36 Orthodox Churches, monasteries and other sites 
(Baskin 2004). 
 of 2004 were a major political shock and prompted 
the international community to initiate changes in their approach of negotiation 
with domestic stakeholders. In the Presidential Statement of the Security Council of 
30 April 2004, the UN called for “more effective local government through 
devolution of central non-reserved responsibilities to local authorities” (UNSC 
2004). UNMIK invited domestic stakeholders in Kosovo to embark on local 
government reform and develop concrete proposals for this reform after which the 
UNMIK Administrative Direction 2005/11 on Pilot Projects approved the 
establishment of Pilot Municipal Units within existing municipalities. The following 
Framework for the Reform of Local Self-Government in 2005 did not result in 
diminishing the disparity between central and local interests and local governments 
were largely evaluated to fail in achieving standards of good governance. The 
development of the Framework was a rare domestically owned process as it had a 
broad range of actors in the drafting process. Yet, it had no significant impact in 
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strengthening the role of local authorities by entrusting more political power or 
fiscal authority in managing local affairs as decisions continued to be made at the 
central level (Civil Society Member of Working Group for drafting of Framework for 
LG Reform, Interview 2011).  
One of the principal advancements towards democratic local governance was the 
UNMIK Regulation No. 2007/27 On Municipal Elections enabling the direct election 
of mayors in municipalities. This enabled measures to strengthen accountability at 
the local level and breach the embedded political allegiances of political parties who 
controlled local institutions. Whilst the introduction of direct election of mayors was 
unanimously welcomed, local leaders perceived the parallel introduction of a 
unified municipal structure through the new set of policies as a breach of municipal 
autonomy in decision-making. Annex III on Decentralization, of the Ahtisaari 
Comprehensive Status Proposal ensured a ‘final’ push for political, administrative 
and fiscal decentralization. The significance of power devolution to the local level 
initiated by the new legal framework adopted in 2008 was undermined by the 
political clashes between Albanians and Serbs. The advantages of enhanced local 
decision-making powers became more apparent to municipalities only recently as 
municipalities began to fully operationalize their aspirations of more competences. 
Additional municipal competences include enhanced autonomy in using municipal 
budgets, collection of taxes and enhanced rights for inter-municipal cooperation. 
Nevertheless, municipalities continue to be deprived of full financial support by the 
central government for enhanced competences they obtained through 
decentralization. This undermines the full implementation of fiscal decentralization. 
Inefficient tax collection by local authorities remained a strong motive for central 
government to withhold releasing full fiscal authority to local decision-makers. 
Progress in this particular area was made at the end of 2012 when the central 
government transferred fiscal powers to municipalities now in charge of setting tax 
rates and strengthening their most important municipal revenue, the property tax 
(Freedom House 2013).33
                                                 
33 The Kosovo Government approved these changes in its Decision 01/98 on October 29th 2012. 
 Despite the attention given to decentralization following 
the Ahtisaari Proposal, the central government failed to implement the 
decentralization policies in their entirety. These included devolving decision-
making to local authorities regarding higher education and the election of local 
police chiefs (Freedom House 2013). The most crucial failure was implementing 
decentralization in the Serb-majority municipalities in the North of Kosovo which is 
discussed in the following section. 
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3.2.1. Limited authority in the North 
The ethnic clash between the majority Albanian population and the Serbian 
minority has been one of the main political challenges since 1999. The Serbian 
community’s refusal to cooperate with the Prishtina government and integrate in 
institutions enforced a stark division between the Albanian and Serbian population. 
This was further exacerbated by a continued reliance on funds from the Serbian 
state to maintain operations of parallel structures and provide education, health and 
security services for the Serbian community. This ethnic division between Albanians 
and Serbs in Kosovo was further enhanced by the physical distinction between the 
communities as the Serbian was mainly concentrated in enclaves with limited 
communication between the ethnic groups. The ethnic factor complicated the 
political and administrative dimensions of local government reforms and largely 
rendered decentralization measures, amongst the population, as concessions to the 
Serbian population. Although the Northern municipalities are predominantly 
Serbian, this only accounts for 30% the total Serbian population in Kosovo. Kosovo 
Serbs living south of Ibër/Ibar river in Mitrovica, are scattered in different 
municipalities. Municipalities north of the Ibër/Ibar river, where the Serb 
community constitutes the majority, remain out of reach for Kosovo legal and 
security authorities. The political leadership in these municipalities is elected 
through elections authorized by the Serbian state and their health and education 
systems operate in parallel systems separate and uncontrolled by the Kosovo 
government. The Serbian community refused to participate in the initial local 
government reforms in 2002 led by UNMIK. The isolation from developments in the 
rest of the country was further enforced following their refusal to participate in 
establishing Pilot Municipal Units in 2005 under the Kosovo-government led policy 
to attract the establishment of minority-led municipalities. The Northern 
municipalities also politically and socially rejected the subsequent Ahtisaari 
proposal for highly decentralized units for Serb majority municipalities. Since 1999, 
Kosovo authorities have been unable to exercise rule of law over the Northern 
municipalities. Due to the prolonged international limbo over Kosovo’s political 
status the region remained volatile with several violent repercussions against 
international or Kosovo led initiatives to impose rule and order in that part. The role 
of NATO –led Kosovo Force (KFOR) troops in charge of securing the borders 
remained marginal as they awaited a political solution to define the borders. The 
international security forces concentrated on monitoring the territory up to the 
Ibër/Ibar river in the city of Mitrovica which divides the Albanian population in the 
South and Serbian population in the North. 
The Serbian community and the Serb political parties in the North, under significant 
pressure from Belgrade, have so far resisted integrating with Kosovo institutions. 
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Although funds flowing from Serbia to Kosovo parallel structures have decreased 
significantly after the international financial crisis of 2008, the Serbian government 
funds healthcare and education services in a number of Serb majority areas (Hajnal 
& Péteri, 2010; OSCE, 2008). After Kosovo’s declaration of independence in 2008, the 
Serbian government redoubled its efforts to influence the Serbian community in 
Kosovo allocating 500 million EUR to parallel structures in Kosovo. After Serbia’s 
2008 parliamentary and local elections, Kosovo Serb leaders in the North began 
setting up their own local institutions, including a parliament. Serbia committed 
about 42 million Euros for parallel structures in Kosovo the day after submitting the 
application for EU Membership in December 2009 (KIPRED 2009). 
As the Northern municipalities remained isolated from developments elsewhere in 
the country, reforms had no substantial influence on the Serbian community. The 
initial reform policies in 2005 aiming at including Serb citizens in new pilot 
municipalities failed. Subsequent decentralization efforts were undertaken 
throughout Kosovo, but failed to include the Serbian dominated municipalities, 
which remained isolated from these changes. Serbs boycotted Kosovo elections and 
resigned from government functions although some later agreed to cooperate with 
Prishtina. After Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence in 2008, the Serbian-led 
municipalities in the North refused to recognize the new political status. The 
Serbian community located below the Ibër/Ibar river, gradually accepted integration 
in Kosovo institutions and several political parties participated in elections to lead 
their new municipalities. Political developments in 2010 brought about a “Strategy 
for the North of Kosovo” by the International Civilian Office (ICO) in Kosovo 
proposing the opening a Kosovo government office in an ethnically mixed 
neighbourhood in the north at the same time as the UNMIK presence in the north 
was slowly drawing to a close. This initiative endeavoured to integrate the north 
and marginalize Serbian parallel institutions (Woehrel 2010). Serbia and local Serb 
leaders rejected the new strategy, which lacked international support from EU 
headquarters34 and the International Steering Group (KIPRED 2012). Kosovo 
institutions held local elections in November and December 2009, including most of 
the Serbian majority municipalities foreseen in the Ahtisaari plan. In some areas 
south of the Ibër/Ibar river, significant numbers of Kosovo Serbs participated.35
Establishment of new municipalities proved a great challenge for the Kosovo 
Ministry of Local Government Administration (MLGA) and ICO. The MLGA met 
with Serbian community members to assess their readiness for participation in the 
Municipal Preparation Teams and help establish new municipal structures with 
  
                                                 
34 The European Union quickly distanced itself from the strategy, despite the fact that the ICO 
representative is also EU Special Representative in Kosovo. 
35 ȱ ȱ 	²ȱ  ȱ ŘřǯŜŘƖȱ  ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ  ȱ ȱ
majority.  
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very little success. South of the Ibër/Ibar river, MLGA and ICO succeeded in getting 
cooperation from local Serbs and by 2010 established initial structures of new 
municipalities. Since 2010, 5 mayors have been elected belonging to the Serb 
community which either elected their own mayors or approved coalitions 
established between Kosovo Serb political parties and Albanian ones. Kosovo-Serbs 
are also represented by 33 seats in five Municipal Assemblies. The Kosovo Serb 
ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ǻǼȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ººȦiȱ
munici¢ǰȱŗŘȱȱ	Ȧ	²ȱȱŗŖȱȱȱȱȱ ȱinisters in 
Kosovo’s government (one serving as Deputy Prime Minister for Communities). The 
Serbian Party of Kosova and Metohija (SKMS) and Serbian Democratic Party of 
Kosova and Metohija (SǼȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ 	Ȧ	²ȱ
municipal assembly and the Serbian Citizen Association won the local elections in 
the new municipality of Ranillug (IKS 2011, 69).  
In 2012, the EU initiated a series of talks between the governments of Kosovo and 
Serbia mediated by the High Representative for Foreign Affairs Catherine Ashton. 
Albeit initially technical, the talks nevertheless included political issues between the 
two countries and resulted in an agreement signed by both Prime Ministers in 
Brussels on 19 April 2013. The ‘Brussels Agreement’ included the establishment of 
an Association for Serb Municipalities in Kosovo and required that the Northern 
municipalities be included in local elections under the helm of the Kosovo 
government. The OSCE Mission in Kosovo was tasked to oversee the election 
process in the Northern municipalities which was disrupted by violent attacks on 
the election staff. Partial re-votes were organized in mid-November and December 
(OSCE 2013). The results of this process were highly contested by the broad public 
in Kosovo who claim the Brussels Agreement further divides the ethnic groups and 
grants Serbs autonomy without having to recognize Kosovo institutions. 36
 
 
3.3. Institutions engaged in local governance reform 
In the immediate aftermath of the war in 1999, the international presence in Kosovo 
increased dramatically to tens of thousands of personnel including the military, 
diplomatic missions and civilians. An array of international organisations are still 
present in Kosovo, ranging from the UN and its agencies, European Union, NATO, 
OSCE and the ICO whose head also serves as the European Union Special 
Representative. At the outset of their mandates, the international community in 
Kosovo was mainly concerned with security and reconstruction. As mandates 
                                                 
36 In ¢ȱŘŖŗŚǰȱȱ ¢ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱǰȱȱ°ȱȱȱȱȱȱ
as new mayor because the documents bore the emblem of the Kosovo institutions (B92 News, January 
13th, 2013). 
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extended and a variety of donors became involved, activities and projects expanded 
to cover support for political reforms and economic reconstruction, assisting police 
and judiciary sector and capacity building of civil society. During the period 1999-
2007, Kosovo received EUR 3.5 billion in donor assistance, two thirds of which came 
from the European Commission and EU Member States (ECA 2012). 
With regards to local governance reforms, the selection and refinement of a local 
government model has not been straightforward as the process of reforms is not 
based on a blueprint of an existing Western model (Ebel & Péteri 2007). 
International agencies led by the European Union promoted principles of 
subsidiarity and inclusive decision-making to guide most local reforms. Most 
significantly, ethnic rights and safeguarding of minority interests became crucial 
elements of the local government reform process (Gjoni, Wetterberg, & Dunbar 
2010; Monteux 2006; Pickering 2006). Considering Kosovo’s European perspective, 
these structural reforms must be considered within the European integration 
framework. The European Union, as the largest donor in Kosovo, has had a key role 
pushing for reforms although often criticized for failing to maximize its 
conditionality power (Elbasani 2012; Papadimitriou Petrov, and Greiçevci 2007; 
Papadimitriou and Petrov 2012). 
Both European and American agencies funding local governance initiatives demand 
democratic principles as core foundations of (their understanding of) governance. 
USAID defines democratic local governance as ‘inclusive governing’ emphasizing 
democratic interactions between community members and local authorities. The EU, 
on the other hand, emphasizes development and defines local governance as 
follows: 
A process of decision making on matters of local/municipal development 
and the implementation and management of development plans and the 
provision of basic services through allocation of available resources in 
order to achieve agreed development goals and targets (Binder, Slits, 
Stoquart, Mullen, & Schubert 2008). 
In the promotion of external democracy, the European Commission’s approach to 
local government reform and decentralization varies from place to place 
corresponding to different levels of experience and evolution, in addition to the 
willingness and commitment of countries to decentralize (Binder et al. 2008). 
European Commission documents focus on local governance building and the 
principle that local matters are a responsibility of local councils and stakeholders at 
the local level. On the other hand, USAID documents on local governance 
emphasize improved local conditions for governing and for citizen satisfaction. 
They define local governance as ‘more effective governing, increased trust in 
government, improved services, more robust local economic development, and 
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greater involvement of citizens in civic affairs. The existence of the European 
Charter on Local Self-Government is another distinction with the ‘American’ 
approach as it is commonly used by European Commission projects as a guideline. 
In the Western Balkans, the EU strategy in member state-building is clearly 
recognizable considering the promotion of European models and values of local 
governance including the concept of regionalisation discussed later on the paper. 
The European Office in Kosovo in particular, focuses on acquis related issues and 
considering that ‘decentralization is not related to acquis, the European Union office 
does not take an official stance on it’ (EUOK interview 2012). According to European 
Commission representatives in Kosovo, the EU strategy is to work with streams 
separating work and establishing partnerships directly with municipalities in 
addition to collaboration with central government ministries. At the central level, 
the focus is on ‘changing policies which are hindering better services and 
implementation of good practices’ (EUOK interview 2012). EU officials are critical of 
USAID for steering away from general decentralization political processes by 
concentrating on technical areas such as waste and water management. In addition, 
EU officials face a general ‘passivity’ of domestic stakeholders stating: 
When it comes to EU, local and central governments will accept anything 
but the EUOK does not know what is best for Kosovo. We lack a strong 
counterpart for our work with regards to guiding donors and their funds 
where the government needs them most (EUOK interview 2012). 
This ambiguity creates an environment where international projects and initiatives 
are redundant and do not match domestic needs. In failing to secure proper 
implementation of adopted national legislations, government institutions are thus 
unable to effectively use the available donor funds. Furthermore, lack of clearly 
defined domestic priorities further enforces the incapacity to absorb new assistance. 
In the annual European Commission (EC) Progress Reports on Kosovo, local 
governance does not receive much focused deliberation and is mentioned 
superfluously, despite the exhaustive nature of the reports post-2008. The reports 
however do identify challenges to Kosovo’s local governance including weak local 
administrations and lack of cooperation between local and central level institutions, 
limited inclusion of minority communities, Serb parallel structures obstructing 
decentralization and a civil service vulnerable to political interference, corrupt 
practices and nepotism. Capacities to exercise local competencies and involve civil 
society organizations in decision-making remain obstacles after 2008. EC reports are 
critical of the government for lacking a strategic approach for interaction with civil 
society (European Commission 2008). To help identify its targeting of local 
governance, the table below presents a detailed look into EU financial assistance. As 
can be observed, local government reform and decentralization appear as 
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crosscutting issues instead of a major policy focus. The data shows an increase in 
financial assistance after the declaration of Independence in 2008 to its highest 
amount since 2003. Allocation of € 14 million to local infrastructure supports the 
establishment of new municipalities and implementation of the new 
decentralization framework. 
 
Table 1. European Commission financial assistance (numbers in € million) 
 
Source: Compiled by author from EC Annual Programs and Multi-Annual Programming Documents 
(MIPDs). 
 
                                                 
37 Assistance to the Association of Kosovo Municipalities reappears frequently as a channel for 
supporting local governance structures and strengthening the representation of local interests through 
this unified mechanism. 
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2003 49 - 5 - 1 1 Funds under LG designated for AKM 
2004 75.4 15 7 -  1 - 
2005 54 19. 6 11 6 - 1 PA funds include support for 
AKM 
2006 - - 8 - - 0.5 PA funds include strengthening of LG 
2007 68.3 - 5 - 12.4  LG funds incl. 4.4 for institution building 
& 8 for infrastructure 
2008 184.7 - 4 6.60 14 2.5 LG funds for municipal infrastructure 
2009 106.1 - - 7.8 6.5 4 LG funds for strengthening institutional 
capacity 
2010 67.3 2 5.5 - - - EC assistance significantly decreases. 
2011 68.7 65.83 20.35 - - - PA funds for 3 years 
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Another international agency working in parallel with central and local 
governments is the OSCE Mission in Kosovo. For a decade, its Local Governance 
Program provided training and capacity building for local authorities and facilitated 
cooperation with civil society organizations (Baskin 2004). The OSCE was a key 
agency for the administration of local and national elections since 2000. Its role in 
elections shifted after authority was transferred to the Kosovo Central Election 
Commission in 2008. The OSCE, nevertheless, remained involved, as it was set in 
charge of facilitating the election process for the Serbian community in North 
Kosovo.38
International agencies in Kosovo engaged in promoting decentralization in a flexible 
and unsystematic manner were/are heavily influenced by the political environment. 
A discrepancy between their objectives and the reality on the ground can clearly be 
observed in Kosovo. Previous studies have criticized the international agencies by 
arguing that they focused more on ‘the manageability and efficient control’ rather 
than real empowerment of local government units (Hajnal & Péteri, 2010). 
According to Grindle (2004, 18), there are considerable political payoffs to 
undertaking governance reforms oriented towards ‘tangible benefits in the short 
term’. Initiatives focusing on improving highly visible services such as garbage 
collection and security can build citizen trust in government. Nevertheless, the 
international agencies have approached activities of assisting socio-economic 
development and institutional capacity building through a central government 
spotlight; pressing for local government issues mostly for political stability reasons 
(EC 2005). Using the core executive as a source of state authority, for a decade many 
initiatives concentrated at the central level. 
 The OSCE remains a hub of information concerning local governance yet 
its presence on the ground as well as engagement to continue reforms has decreased 
since 2008.  
On the domestic front, the establishment of a Ministry for Local Government 
Administration (MLGA) in late 2004, after two local elections already took place, 
demonstrates the bleak vision of central government in guiding local governance. 
Unfortunately, its existence did not prove significantly valuable to reforms. Since its 
establishment, the MLGA has acted as an administrative hub for the implementation 
of local governance reform policies. Rather than initiating reform policies itself, 
most strategies were drafted in accordance with international donor initiatives 
providing assistance. Despite its self-perceived role as a leader in strengthening 
                                                 
38 The OSCE involvement in election processes in Kosovo is highly controversial. It’s mandate in Kosovo 
remains ‘status neutral’ as the organization does not recognize Kosovo’s independence. The organization 
has taken a mediating role serving as a facilitator between Kosovo and Serbia as the latter rejects the 
Prishtina authority and only accepts the OSCE to organize elections in the Serb-majority municipalities. 
This role was further complicated as the OSCE facilitated the 2012 Serbian parliamentary and presidential 
elections for Serb voters in North Kosovo. 
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local institutional capacities (Maxhuni, Ukimeraj, Vasolli, Ujkani, & Osmani, 2009), 
the weak capacity of central government to supervise local authorities, as well as 
‘contrasting interpretations of legislation on self-government’, often block 
cooperation between central and local authorities (European Commission 2010, 8). 
The MLGA potential to strengthen intergovernmental relations was not fully 
utilized and has, in fact, been damaged through the exclusion of municipalities in 
the drafting process of new legislation. The formal monthly meetings of the Local 
Government Administration Minister with all mayors have not improved relations 
between municipalities and central government. 
A key institution, which provides a platform for communication for municipal 
administrations, is the Association of Kosovo Municipalities (AKM). However, 
despite its long existence and broad membership, AKM was often marred by 
criticism of municipal delegates and international partners arguing that its lack of 
interest in advocating for local interests has weakened its role and made it a 
superficial actor (ICO interview 2011). The AKM has considerable potential to 
advocate for the interests of municipalities as well as acquire central government 
attention to issues pertaining to local governance yet this potential is not fully 
utilized. 
 
3.4. Case studies 
The second part of this chapter uses two case studies to critically assess the 
effectiveness of externally driven projects designed to strengthen local governance 
by opening up the decision-making process and enhancing relations between state 
and non-state acts. Utilizing primary research data, this section provides an in-depth 
look at the initiatives of the EU and USAID, analysing their objectives, trajectory of 
implementation, relations with central and local actors and identifying various 
constraints to their effectiveness. Factors addressed below include the design and 
implementation of international initiatives as well as the contextual complexities 
inhibiting change towards new modes of governance at the local level. The cases 
illustrate the limits of international engagement in promoting bridges between state 
and non-state actors from a bottom-up perspective. 
After the Declaration of Independence, both the EU and the USAID representations 
in Kosovo included local governance as an element of their strategies to support 
socio-political change in Kosovo. Both agencies highlight the importance of the local 
level in strengthening democratic institutions and ensuring links between 
government authorities and citizen. 
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3.4.1. EU Regional Economic Development – EURED 
The European Commission project for Regional Economic Development (EURED), a 
€ 12.4 million initiative, aims at promoting a new approach to development by 
supporting regional cooperation of municipalities and preparing Kosovo 
institutions for absorption of future EU regional development funds. Although 
regions are not a constitutional entity in Kosovo, the EURED approach to local 
governance is entirely dependent on its regional focus. EURED established Regional 
Development Agencies (RDAs) across five regions to instigate and coordinate 
economic cooperation between municipalities and private agencies and provide 
support for the local counterparts as they prepare funding applications. According 
to EURED officials, the initiative is based on the concept of local ownership. 
However, interviewee statements that the idea on RDAs was generated in the 
EURED headquarters contradict the ownership of local counterparts (EURED 
Interview 2011). This important component of the initiative is thus a result of 
external ideas produced in Prishtina headquarters.  
The RDAs, promoted as inter-municipal institutions, are registered in the host 
municipality as Non-Governmental Organizations. The status of NGOs for these 
agencies is a controversial factor considering that signatory authority of signing 
Inter-Municipal Cooperation Agreements is the respective mayor. Furthermore, 
mayors of participating municipalities in each region also serve as Board Members 
of the respective RDAs. This key aspect of EURED is at the same time its most 
perplexing point. The regional structures are temporary due to the lack of legal 
backing for regional operations. Cooperation is thus based on inter-municipal 
agreements signed between each of the municipalities to stimulate economic growth 
and develop capacities to absorb future international funds including EU IPA funds 
(EURED 2010). 
The aforementioned issues do not entirely undermine the accomplishments of the 
initiative. First, the focus on development is notable. The lack of a national strategy 
on development, at the time of EURED initiation, signifies Kosovo’s dire policy 
environment for which EURED attention to development policies is particularly 
beneficial. Through the additional Socio-Economic Audit Forum, local stakeholders 
drafted the Regional Economic Development Strategy and Implementation Plans. 
The Forum was beneficial in enhancing efficiency in drafting new proposals and 
strategic documents. RDA representatives confirm this by emphasizing that drafting 
of the Regional Economic Development Strategy and its accompanying 
implementation plans was “8 months of work for what usually takes 3 years” (RDA 
South interview, July 2011).  
The initiative also contributes to opening up local authorities by strengthening 
state/non-state cooperation. In terms of advancing new modes of decision-making, 
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the most important structures established include the Regional Economic 
Development (RED) platform encouraging local stakeholders to work together with 
other municipalities in their region, and the Core Partnership Group which 
assembles representatives of all municipalities to develop strategic objectives for 
economic development in their region. Participants include local authorities, 
business associations, civil society organizations and universities and, as such, 
provide a positive mechanism of contact and collaboration between diverse sectors. 
This inclusion of a wide range of actors is beneficial to the local environment as it 
strengthens communication between local government institutions and non-state 
representatives. In addition, inter-municipal cooperation is enhanced when local 
organizations, businesses and local governments jointly produce strategies for 
developing their respective municipalities. A common vision, in this case promoted 
under the umbrella of regions, is beneficial provided that it enables shared 
responsibility and commitment to achieve common benefits. Finally, the EURED 
grant scheme, which awards proposals developed by regional groups for economic 
development, enables a cyclical process benefiting participants. Municipalities have 
shown great enthusiasm in participating in the project, considering it a funding 
opportunity. Furthermore, this process of cooperation allows pooling of resources 
and enables a win-win situation for participating municipalities who ‘recognize the 
power of applying as a region as compared to an individual unit’ (RDA South 
interview 2011). EURED advisors consider this as “a free ticket to development” 
(Interview 2011). 
The inter-ethnic environment is another aspect in which EURED mechanisms of 
cooperation may influence the local level. According to EURED representatives, 
municipalities with non-Albanian majorities such as Zubin Potok (Serb-majority) 
and Mamusha (Turkish-majority) have shown exceptional performance in 
participating in regional forums (RDA South interview 2011). Challenges remain 
with the boycott of other Kosovo Serbian-majority municipalities especially in the 
Partnership Group, where other ethnic group delegates have participates. The 
EURED approach recognizes this challenge but does not entail any solutions or 
strategies for overcoming this challenge, declaring: “We do not have time to wait for 
anybody in this open process!” (RDA South Interview 2011).  
In the realm of the country’s political economy, the institutional legacy of a 
centralized regime combined with the current weak state constrains the work of 
local institutions. The changing nature of discussion and ‘sharing the spot-light’ 
with other stakeholders may constitute a threat to the political leadership whilst 
benefiting other actors. Interviewees argue that this process has cast a more passive 
role for municipal authorities, a role some mayors are struggling to accept (EURED 
advisor interview, July 2011). This suggests a tendency for local government 
authorities to resist accepting a stronger role for non-state actors. The case is slightly 
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different in host municipalities where RDA offices are located, where mayors tend 
to assume a stronger role in their regions (EURED advisor interview, July 2011). 
At the central level, the partnership with the Department for Regional Development 
and European Integration within MLGA, does not contribute to advancing EURED 
objectives, as the Department is not directly responsible for advancing the economic 
development dimension. One particular sign of embedding the regional 
development framework within Kosovo institutional structures has been the 
renaming of the former Department for European Integration into the Department 
for Regional Development and European Integration. This name change, however, 
does not significantly alter the limited role of the Ministry itself. Better suited for the 
development aspect are the Ministry of Economic Development and the Ministry of 
Trade and Industry which provide for stronger links between central institutions, 
RDAs and municipalities. At the local level, the leading partners remain the local 
authorities whose consent and participation is essential for the establishment of 
RDAs in the first place. RDA agencies also emphasize the importance of engaging 
with business organisation to enable a successful implementation of RDA objectives. 
This prioritization of business organisations over other non-state actors 
overshadowed the potential for empowerment of civil society organisations in the 
new structures. 
A major shortcoming of the project remains the issue of regions, namely aspiring to 
strengthen structures without backup from national level policies. Internal project 
deficiencies, including lack of strategies to integrate existing structures to overall 
development policies, establishment of new administrative layers for RDAs and lack 
of strategies to overcome challenges are apparent in the EURED case. The future of 
their already established structures and mechanism, including the RDAs, remained 
unclear as the project terminated in early 2012. The case study illustrates EU 
readiness to implement and invest on any venture under the broad aim of 
strengthening new modes of decision-making.39
On the other hand, all platforms established to facilitate meetings and 
communication between actors encourage municipal authorities to share the 
‘spotlight’ with other actors including the non-state sector. Acquiring the expertise 
and acknowledging the interests of other parties involved contributes to opening up 
centralized mechanisms of decision-making commonly used in municipal 
administrations. The collaborative work in designing economic development 
strategies for their regions strengthens capacities of both local authorities and non-
state organizations participating. Grants acquired by ECLO (now called EUOK) in 
awards for high quality projects reward this type of collaborative work 
 
                                                 
39 To integrate the currently administrative functions of RDAs into the larger development strategy, the 
Ministry of Trade engaged in discussions with European Commission only in 2012. 
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strengthening municipal commitment for the future. Furthermore, local authorities 
and actors from the private sector attain opportunities for inter-municipal 
cooperation, which is recognized and legally regulated. 
 
3.4.2. USAID Democratic Effective Municipalities Initiative - 
DEMI 
The second case explored is the USAID Democratic Effective Municipalities 
Initiative (DEMI) working towards strengthening local governance. USAID 
involvement in governance reforms has been consistent since early 2000s and its 
support for local reforms was particularly strong partly out of frustration with 
efforts to reform central government institutions (Carothers, 1999). The Agency is 
currently engaged in institutionalising mechanisms for incorporating citizen input 
and civil society organisations into local decision-making and government oversight 
(USAID Kosovo 2010). 
The DEMI initiative provides technical and financial assistance for carrying out 
municipal responsibilities. Project officials acknowledge that ‘Kosovo has passed the 
trainings and workshops phase’ and so focus on guiding local stakeholders (DEMI 
interview, July 2011). DEMI objectives include assisting local administrations in 
setting priorities for service outcomes, engaging citizens constructively in that 
process, and enhancing their ability to identify necessary improvements to their 
municipality’s systems, processes and human capacity. In order to address citizen 
participation, DEMI focuses on utilizing existing tools, which proves especially 
beneficial to the local circumstances. Frequent changes in local administration 
structures prohibit the creation of institutional knowledge and cause confusion 
among local officials concerning competences and lines of authority. The project 
focuses its work on assisting the Committee for Policies and Finances as the most 
important organ within the municipal administration. DEMI considers the 
Committee has dire need for advice considering ‘their scarce knowledge in how to 
involve citizens in the decision-making process’ (DEMI interview 2011). 
Despite the organization’s official stance on mentoring during processes of reform, a 
fundamental part of DEMI’s support for local governance is the establishment of 
two mechanisms to steer local decision-making processes into an open and inclusive 
model. These are the High Performing Organization model and the Service 
Improvement Action Plan (SIAP). Firstly, the High Performing Organization model 
promotes best practices within Kosovo and replicates them in another municipality. 
Its main objective is structuring existing municipal functions into novel 
organizational arrangements and inciting new ways of thinking about municipal 
services. Municipalities exhibiting high performance by meeting set-benchmarks of 
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service delivery are rewarded by the DEMI funding scheme. Secondly, the Service 
Improvement Action Plan (SIAP) facilitates plans for improving public services by 
including municipal administration together with businesses as well as civil society 
organizations. SIAP consists of a municipal team charged with developing plans for 
improving public services. After the mayor establishes the group, participants 
include businesses as well as civil society which focus on developing actions plans 
for certain municipal services. The SIAP team in Mamusha municipality has 
prioritized water supply whereas in Partesh/Parteš the team prioritized garbage 
collection. In the latter case, the municipality signed a cooperation agreement with 
the regional company in charge of garbage collection and has invited the civil 
society to monitor the service performance (DEMI interview 2011). The SIAP 
model’s shortcoming is its resemblance to existing Municipal Committees. 
According to the Law on Local Self-Government, Municipal Assemblies may 
establish the Committees on any policy area and invite non-state actors to share 
their expertise on the matter (LLSG 2008).40
Engaging civil society actors into the process of decision-making is another objective 
of DEMI activities. The Novobërdë/Novo Brdo municipality is a particular instance 
of increased citizen engagement and awareness concerning municipal policies. 
DEMI facilitated a Memorandum of Understanding enabling cooperation between 
the municipal mayor and the NGO Youth Voice leading to youth activists 
conducting a survey amongst municipal residents concerning the municipal 
budgeting process and priorities of the municipality. Survey results, presented to 
the mayor, showed low participation in budget hearings, low satisfaction with the 
work of municipal officials and fewer than half of those interviewed were informed 
about the budgeting process. For the local leadership ‘this is the first time that the 
municipality of Novobërdë/Novo Brdo has conducted a survey to consult citizens 
on budget planning process as well as the first time to outsource an NGO to increase 
citizens participation in budgeting process (DEMI 2011). These results are an 
example of new mechanisms being internalized into municipal administration 
practices. These cases however prove to be dependent on municipal leaders with 
political clout over executing new policies (DEMI Interview, July 2011). In practice 
however, most municipalities have not enabled these mechanisms. 
 Instead of strengthening the 
Committee’s existing functions, DEMI ignored the existing model for coordination. 
The Municipal Committees mainly utilize their mandate for oversight of the 
municipal executive branch. 
Similar to the previous case study, a grants scheme is a fundamental part of the 
DEMI project. The grants scheme is a continuation of the previous USAID project on 
                                                 
40 Despite AKM and OSCE resources invested in enabling these structures, Municipal Committees have 
been established in a limited number of municipalities and do not function on many policy areas. 
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strengthening local governance - EMI. DEMI awards municipalities for high 
performance and achieving set benchmarks for efficient public services. This has 
secured municipal participation in the program and municipalities actively engage 
in improving their services and designing innovative ideas for new projects. The 
grant scheme incentivizes municipalities to compete with each other and submit 
applications for each round of grants for improved performance. This promotion of 
the model of competition amongst municipalities has proven successful, fulfilling a 
key objective of USAID to encourage market-based reforms. However, domestic 
financial support for this model is scarce. The MLGA has declared that it will 
continue this model of incentives and rewards for municipalities in the future when 
USAID funds terminate. This is a rather difficult task considering the weakened role 
of the Ministry portfolio in the government after the majority of decentralization 
reforms passed the legislation phase. 
The institutional legacy within municipal administrations is another challenge for 
promoting new modes of decision-making. Institutional memory from the Yugoslav 
centralized administration remains with municipal civil servants, diminishing their 
commitment to new models of cooperation and including collaboration with other 
actors (DEMI Interview 2012). In the last decade, many municipalities see political 
figures remaining active in local politics and thus exercising their influence in 
various local issues. Former-mayors often persist in exercising political power 
within institutions thus hindering effective implementation of external initiatives. 
This persistence of political elites in the public discourse prohibits a change of elites 
and of the local political culture. 
Parallel structures in the Northern region were highlighted as the biggest challenge 
for the project to reach out to Serbian-majority municipalities. In 2011, DEMI 
supported collaboration between community leaders and the North Mitrovica 
Municipal Preparation Team41
                                                 
41 The Municipal Preparation Team (MPT) established by the ICO and the Kosovo government to set-up 
the foundation of a new North Mitrovica municipality, has been in a state of limbo for several years. 
 to implement a community project on cleaning the 
Ibër/Ibar riverbank. For larger-scale impact, the politically radical groupings 
amongst Kosovo-Serbs and the ever-strong parallel structures in the North were 
serious constraints bringing to a halt one component of the DEMI initiative 
(Interview 2011). By offering proper mechanisms for collaboration between 
municipalities DEMI intends to bridge these ethnic barriers. One example of this are 
the informative sessions for Serb-majority municipalities held by larger 
municipalities such as Peja and Ferizaj offering explanations on administrative 
aspects of municipal functions. 
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3.5. Conclusion 
Local governance and decentralization reforms in Kosovo present an interesting and 
highly complex case of rapid changes at the local level. Changes include 
restructuring the local administration and the role of the central government in 
oversight and control. Furthermore, local governance reforms in Kosovo are 
intertwined with the political situation and influenced by the clashes between the 
ethnic majority of Albanians and the Serbian minority occurring during Kosovo’s 
post-conflict transition. The reform cycles were not a direct result of the gradual 
growth of local government power and autonomy. During these shifts towards 
increased local authority, the local voice was largely unheard during the decision-
making level at the national level. Local authorities struggled with the rapid 
increase of competences and responsibilities for providing a range of services to 
citizens. The challenge in exercising these newly acquired competences was further 
exacerbated by the delay in fiscal decentralization, which meant that municipality 
functions were limited by insufficient local resources. Weak capacities to collect own 
source revenues further restricted effective service delivery. Lastly, except for the 
2005 drafting process of the national Framework for Reform of Local Government, 
non-state actors were not included in the policy-making process and most initiatives 
remained without civil society input. 
Challenges in exercising authority and enforcing rule of law in the Serb-majority 
municipalities further undermined the successful implementation of 
decentralization reforms. Lack of cooperation between municipalities in North 
Kosovo and the rest of the country enforced the isolation of the former and triggered 
further ad-hoc policy responses from the central government and the international 
community. The latter was a key player in setting up and promoting these shifts 
through its aid programs and democracy promotion initiatives. International 
agencies did not apply a unified approach to local reforms and the lack of a 
blueprint or model followed the various stakeholders engaged in various programs 
to strengthen accountability and enhance local capacities in service delivery.  
With regard to the two case studies analyzed in the second part of the chapter, five 
distinctive elements can be identified from the data on international engagement in 
promoting reform at the local level. First, both initiatives focus on the executive 
branch with the aim to strengthen core executives in local administrations. 
Emphasis on representation and participation of municipal officials in forums 
established with both state and non-state actors suggests the focus is on formal 
structures of authority, even if they do not exert leadership potential as compared to 
non-state actors. New mechanisms of coordination and decision-making are thus 
formalized through secondary legislation or formal decrees of municipal Mayors. 
New structures such as departments, working groups, forums or partnership units 
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are easily established and promoted as successes. The impact of these new 
structures is twofold. On one hand, formal state institutions are pushed into new 
realms of decision-making and coordination with non-state actors, modes 
significantly different from the pre-1999 institutionalised norms. On the other hand, 
this may lead to more layers of bureaucracy in an already heavily bureaucratized 
institutional setting with a ‘working group fatigue’. 
Second, case studies emphasize the clear objective of international initiatives to 
bridge the divide between state and non-state institutions by securing horizontal 
modes of cooperation. Civil society organizations and businesses are encouraged to 
participate in the process of dialogue with municipal representatives to embed open 
processes of decision-making including non-state actors. 
Third, utilizing features of a market model of governance, the external initiatives 
incite municipalities to compete amongst each other as well as with private firms. 
The aim is to enhance efficiency and instill a culture of competition for improved 
service provision. Financial incentives in the form of grant schemes are significant 
components of both external projects. Considering the lack of local resources in 
municipalities, donor funding proves to be a significant incentive for municipal 
actors to actively engage in improving local governance. In particular, the DEMI 
initiative, by incorporating several elements from previous USAID funded projects 
on local government, ensures continued interest of municipalities and their 
affirmation of ideas and mechanisms proposed through the project. By including 
financial rewards for municipal projects, both DEMI and EURED initiatives secured 
broad participation of local stakeholders.  
Fourth, the initiatives allocate insufficient attention to intergovernmental relations. 
Relations between local and central government institutions remain 
underdeveloped and have delayed progress in general. Local authorities continue to 
feel left out of major policies concerning essential local issues such as competences, 
functionality of local administration and local development. Local administrations 
continue to be weak, dependent on central government financing and often 
confused over the ever changing legal framework and its impact on their 
responsibilities and competencies. The frequent change of legislation, programs and 
activities, caused a pervasive confusion and municipal administrations were too 
often ‘left to solve their own issues’ (ICO Interview 2011). Considering the weak 
central state, this further reinforces the gap between government tiers, ignoring the 
significance of central government authority for guiding the local level into effective 
governance. Any attempt to bring new modes of decision-making and advance 
reciprocal support of institutions must incorporate mechanisms to bridge these 
divides. 
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Lastly, the cases illustrate a failure of international agencies to provide clear long-
term strategies for embedding these new modes of local decision-making. The lack 
of national development policies enables a strong presence of EURED principles and 
interpretations of governance. In addition, the lack of domestic mechanisms for 
rewarding excellent services offered by municipalities, enables local actors to follow 
guidelines and interpretations of good governance offered by USAID’s DEMI 
project instead. 
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4.  Heritage governance in Kosovo 
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4.1. Introduction 
This chapter presents an in-depth analysis of the complex decision-making process 
in Kosovo’s cultural heritage policy. Governance of cultural heritage in Kosovo 
involves a myriad of actors, which have repeatedly clashed over reforms. Heritage 
governance in a multi-ethnic society and a post-conflict environment is a highly 
contentious policy area as it entails a process of redefining notions of statehood and 
the role of the state. In particular, setting up the legislation on the Historic Center of 
Prizren is one of the most controversial issues involving the central government, 
local authorities, civil society and the international community. Focusing the 
analysis on this specific case study supports claims that cultural heritage always has 
a local dimension (Riganti and Nijkamp 2004). The cultural heritage case study 
provides a lens on local governance to investigate the polarization between 
stakeholders and the efforts of both international and domestic actors to influence 
the reform process. 
Heritage governance is a complex process including competing environmental, 
economic, social and cultural requirements and it involves a wide circle of 
stakeholders. Political elites often utilize conservation and interpretation of heritage 
as a vehicle for identity confirmation (Gregory John Ashworth & Tunbridge 2000). 
This enables political elites or leading organizations and interest groups to capture 
the decision-making environment (Wolferstan  2006). Economic interests also come 
to the forefront of heritage governance debates including issues such as tourism and 
commercialization of heritage. As a resource, cultural heritage can become a driver 
for development and, if properly managed, can enhance the livelihood of its 
inhabitants. Hence the importance of long-term management strategies and 
participatory management approaches (Roders & Oers 2011). 
Regulation of cultural heritage management in Kosovo is a recent development in 
the country’s post-war history. The trajectory of establishing heritage management 
structures is particularly interesting considering the provisions of the Ahtisaari 
Proposal and the numerous agencies involved. The opposing views between the 
Kosovo Albanian and Serbian population on the value of monuments and sites 
underscores the governance of cultural heritage in Kosovo. Cultural heritage poses a 
minefield in the country’s policymaking; its investigation allows us to shed-light on 
obstacles encountered during heritage governance reform. 
Designing and reforming the cultural heritage policy sphere in Kosovo was marked 
by a centralized decision-making process with extensive involvement of the 
international community but excluding non-state actors. The process of regulating 
cultural heritage management in Prizren developed into a complex and politically 
contentious debate lasting several years, involving actors from all layers of 
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government: politicians, bureaucrats, religious leaders and civil society 
organisations. Prizren citizens view themselves as a heterogeneous community, 
taking pride in the cultural landscape noted for linguistic and religious diversity. 
However, the process leading to the adoption of the new Law on the Historic Center 
of Prizren damaged state-society relations and polarized the local and central 
government actors. Pressure from the international community on the Kosovo 
government to adopt new legislation on the historic Center of Prizren raised the 
issue to the top of the political agenda. 
Legacies of conflict have left a deep mark on the cultural identity of the country. Its 
architectural heritage is frequently divided between “ours” and ‘theirs”, the latter 
being associated as ‘other’ or belonging to ‘the enemy’ leading to a rejection of its 
importance. Politics are thus intertwined to facilitate solutions in a deeply divided 
society. Weak state capacities in this policy field are manifested through weak 
institutional capacities to implement existing laws, lack of political will to halt illegal 
construction of buildings, and failure to employ mechanisms to include the Serbian 
clergy in decision-making. Mechanisms chosen to facilitate decision-making thus 
focus on getting political leadership on board. Progress in this regard came to the 
detriment of consensus based decision-making and inclusion of all affected parties, 
especially local administration and citizens. This led to further centralization of 
decision-making. Prizren, as the most ethnically mixed city, is a prime example of 
the politics involved in heritage management and serves as a crossroads between 
the varying agencies involved in regulating cultural heritage in Kosovo. Local 
heritage governance clashed with the interests of central government and 
international agencies. Both the central government and the international 
community made visible attempts to use cultural heritage as a means to satisfy 
various interest groups. 
Heritage governance reform in the context of Kosovo may be understood as having 
two goals. The first goal is to secure legitimacy. The central government intervenes 
to protect heritage in order to promote the state’s political and cultural legitimacy 
and to maintain its authority (Harvey and Braun 1996). On one hand the 
government requires recognition from the international community overseeing 
Kosovo’s transition process, that it has successfully implemented the Ahtisaari 
principles and can fully ensure the protection minority communities’ heritage. The 
government maintains a successful completion of Supervised Independence as the 
highest achievement since the declaration of independence in 2008 thereby 
requesting legitimation from its own citizens. Furthermore, the state aims to include 
the Serbian community in the new heritage governance arrangements. Extending 
authority over the minority population, through a formalized model of coordination 
and decision-making ultimately endorses the Kosovo state authority and 
consolidates domestic sovereignty. On the other hand, international agencies seek 
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legitimacy of their programs and strive towards the successful completion of their 
mandate (Kostovicova 2008). The international community in Kosovo has a political 
mandate therefore its particular use of heritage protection is embedded in the 
promotion of a multi-ethnic and peaceful post-conflict Kosovo (ICO 2011)42
With regard to the second goal, government institutions may obtain rewards from 
international organizations for complying and adopting its proposed models of 
heritage governance thus using cultural heritage protection as a condition for 
domestic institutions. At the central level, the reward for adopting new legislation 
on cultural heritage, specifically on the Historical Center of Prizren, is the removal 
of supervised independence. In its July 2012 Statement declaring the objective to end 
supervised independence, the International Steering Group specifically requested 
“to establish the councils foreseen in the Laws on Prizren and Velika Hoc ࡊa/Hoça e 
Madhe” (ISG 2012). This may be interpreted as legitimation of its authority and 
consolidated state capacity. Furthermore, local authorities obtain rewards from 
central government for adopting reforms. Allegiance to political party directives 
may bear rewards for mayors and local political party loyalists. Consequently, 
obstructing reforms and resisting certain policy changes is risky and may produce 
conflicts and further exclusion from decision-making. 
. 
Strengthening the legal framework to secure stability and decrease the likelihood of 
inter-ethnic clashes is part of this mandate. The European Commission has donated 
millions of euros through technical assistance to promote cultural heritage as a ‘tool 
for reconciliation and dialogue between communities’ (EC IPA 2008). Furthermore, 
protecting cultural heritage under the universality of human rights umbrella 
supersedes state sovereignty issues and thereby permits international organizations 
to act on behalf of protecting heritage sites in areas of conflict (Council of Europe 
2012). Concluding the work of supervising Kosovo’s independence, required by the 
Ahtisaari Comprehensive Status Proposal, is a landmark for the international 
community and its designated International Civilian Office (ICO) in Kosovo. 
To cover the role and interests of the broad range of actors, primary data was 
collected through semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders at the central 
and local level. Interviews were conducted with international organizations directly 
involved in reforming cultural heritage policies. This is complemented by an 
analysis of a wide range of secondary data including legislation, reports and policy 
briefs from international and domestic organizations and official transcripts of 
Assembly meetings. The following section provides a brief overview of studies on 
cultural heritage focusing on studies of post-conflict heritage management and 
                                                 
42 Acceptance and protection of Kosovo’s multicultural diversity is also promoted as a condition for 
Kosovo’s possible future integration into the European Union (Lehne 2013). 
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regulation. Insight into the historical background to cultural heritage in Kosovo 
prior to the 1999 war sheds light on reasons why cultural heritage remains a 
controversial issue. After an analysis of new political and legislative developments 
in the field following the 1999 war, the main part of this chapter focuses on the 
cultural heritage management of Prizren and the city’s Historic Center. This reveals 
the multilayered legislation drafting process and the interaction between local, 
central and international agencies. The last part recaps the important role 
international agencies have played in this process of regulating cultural heritage in 
post-war Kosovo.  
 
4.2. Cultural heritage management in divided societies 
A wide range of literature on heritage governance addresses the challenges of 
protecting and rebuilding architectural cultural heritage. Studies of Central Europe, 
on management of cultural heritage in cities such as Weimar, Kaliningrad in Russia, 
Gdansk in Poland or Eger and Budapest in Hungary, show the complexity and the 
influence of the region’s changing governments and ideologies (Ashworth & 
Tunbridge 1999). Countries also differ in their approach to identifying heritage as 
well as mechanisms chosen for protection. Many countries use all-encompassing 
laws for the protection of cultural heritage in the widest sense combined with one-
tier categorization of heritage so as not to discriminate between monuments. Local 
authorities bear the responsibility of identifying and protecting heritage sites 
through integrating heritage protection with local and regional urban and 
development plans, such as UK, Wallonia region of Belgium and Spain (Pickard 
2002). 
Cities with complex histories of social division have been examples of integrating 
cultural heritage management within overall development reforms. Heritage 
governance in Québec regulates authority for the municipal level and provides clear 
regulatory powers for the central government. The Cultural Property Act adopted in 
1972 regulates the authority of each institution. At the national level, the Minister of 
Culture, Communications and the Status of Women works closely with the advisory 
‘Commission des biens culturels du Québec’ in identifying and protecting Québec’s 
heritage. The Minister may not undertake any decision pertaining to protection of 
heritage without the Commission’s advice. At the local level, municipalities may 
also identify monuments or heritage sites on their own initiative through adoption 
of by-laws by the Municipal Council and after obtaining advice from the advisory 
committee as well. Citizens also have the right to request protection of historic sites 
or natural districts, which meet the legal criteria for protection. The role of the 
central government remains important. All interested parties must first obtain a 
municipal construction permit, after which the official permission from the Minister 
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is required. To date approximately 120 Québec municipalities have designated 
nearly 375 historic monuments (MCCCF 2007). This arrangement provides the local 
level with significant authority in assessing heritage sites and providing the 
adequate protection. 
In politically contentious areas in post conflict and divided societies it is especially 
challenging to protect and manage heritage where interest groups may have 
diametrically opposing views. Heritage conservation may be utilized to serve 
various political purposes such as constructing a (new) national identity as in the 
case of Lithuania wishing to part with its Soviet past (Munasinghe 2006) or Spain 
following the country’s civil war (Viejo-Rose 2010). In the case of Belfast, Northern 
Ireland institutionalised a neutral approach to cultural heritage to alleviate tensions 
in society (Livingstone and Morison 1995). Jerusalem’s Old City is another city 
entangled in the politics of heritage, used by the Israeli side to legitimize a specific 
Jewish historical perspective, and justify the current status of Israeli control and 
political authority (Calame & Charlesworth, 2009). Heritage protection policies in 
post-apartheid Johannesburg have introduced transformations of buildings and 
public space to change the predominant colonialist narrative (Delmont 2004). In the 
Balkans, the international community was influential in regulating heritage 
protection as in the case of Mostar in Bosnia. The Dayton Agreement established the 
Commission to Preserve National Monuments with member representation from 
both the Federation and the Republika Srpska. Nevertheless, scholars note that the 
heritage doctrine promoted in Bosnia by UNESCO and the Council of Europe was 
too reliant on the nation-state as the developer of collective cultural memory and 
identity, overlooking the significance of group identification in lower tiers of 
government in Bosnia and Herzogovina (Musi 2012). In this line, Wolferstan (2006) 
rightly points out that the local heritage discourse should be integrated in heritage 
governance in post-conflict societies in order to avoid alienating the public and to 
prevent top-down power structures. These various approaches reflect the 
complexities of heritage governance in societies using heritage as a means for 
authenticating their identity, dealing with collective memory and with social 
divisions. 
Studies of governance arrangements in protected areas consider heritage 
governance best practices those in which all stakeholders affected are involved, and 
which include mechanisms for civil society participation (Borrini-Feyerabend, 
Johnston and Pansky 2006). The last decades have shown a decreasing number of 
cases where the government is the sole manager of heritage areas and an increase in 
decentralization policies where protected areas have been created at sub-national 
level (as with the regional natural parks in France), by the private sector (South 
Africa) or assigned to be managed by NGOs (in Belize) (Ibid., 140). In the case of 
South Tyrol, the Special Autonomy Statute of South Tyrol gives the provincial level 
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the competences for protection and preservation of cultural heritage (Weller and 
Nobbs 2011). Protected areas established and managed at provincial, regional and 
local level can be simpler to declare, more flexible in terms of arrangements and 
budgeting and better suited to the concerns of the local actors. Furthermore, local 
governance arrangements are best suited for protected areas of limited size and 
specific local value. Local communities and indigenous peoples are far from ‘new” 
actors in the governance of protected heritage areas. Yet it is important to provide 
them with formal and explicit recognition of their roles  (Borrini-Feyerabend, 
Johnston and Pansky 2006, 122-138). With regards to the role of religious 
communities in heritage governance, UNESCO maintains that a sustainable heritage 
management is the responsibility of all stakeholders concerned and acknowledges 
the vital role of religious communities in preserving living heritage (UNESCO 2010). 
Throughout the Middle East and North Africa region, religious institutions own and 
manage the majority of religious sites thereby making them vital parts of heritage 
management (World Bank 2001). The World Bank Framework for the MENA Region 
(2001) emphasized the importance of targeting assistance to strengthen state 
capacities both at central and local level and to enhance institutionalised structures 
of cooperation between state and civil society. Thus, the international community’s 
role in heritage protection remains in promoting laws and conventions as a means of 
addressing threats to heritage which include lack of financial resources, economic 
and social changes, violence and political conflicts, and lack of or inappropriate state 
legislation (Rowan and Baram 2004). 
Arguing for increased collaboration between actors in cultural heritage 
management, Aas et al. (2005) maintain that engagement of all interested parties in 
the decision-making process allows them to take responsibility. Yet, the large 
number of actors, including authorities, donors, international bodies and interest 
groups at community level also embodies a conflict of concerns and values (Barakat 
2007, 29). Conflicting views about the definition of cultural heritage and the lack of 
voters’ information weaken the control on political representatives. Politicians may 
also suffer a shortage of information because of the specificity of the knowledge and 
expertise required to understand heritage issues. Reforms are thus easier to be 
promoted if decisions are taken by one decision-maker to avoid higher transaction 
costs which occur if an agreement has to be reached between different layers of 
government (Rizzo and Throsby 2006, 1002 – 1007). Nevertheless, when users or 
common citizens are involved in the new understanding of the use of space and 
their environment, their participation becomes an integral part of the policy-making 
process (Tas, Tas, and Cahantimur 2009). Two of the guiding principles in the 
Council of Europe work in cultural heritage are “the need to involve everyone in 
society in the ongoing process of defining and managing cultural heritage and to 
recognize the role of cultural heritage in the construction of a peaceful and 
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democratic society” (Council of Europe 2005). When dealing with historic units 
within cities, it is especially important to integrate the social discourse into the 
urban planning mechanisms. As local perceptions evolve over time, so the city 
accommodates the local understanding of heritage. Imposing strict protection 
mechanisms risks turning cities into spaces incapable of change (Hammond, 2005). 
On the opposite side of the spectrum, inclusion of non-state organisations or 
heritage NGOs is based on the assumption of their benevolence and contribution to 
heritage protection. The extensive involvement of these NGOs in the region begs the 
question of their downward accountability. 
 
4.3. Cultural heritage in Kosovo: A background 
For a relatively small territory of roughly ten thousand square kilometers, Kosovo 
possesses an extremely rich heritage. Its archaeological heritage dates from the 
Neolithic period onwards, with evidence from the Copper, Bronze and Iron ages, 
Roman Antiquity and Early and Late Mediaeval periods (Pickard 2008; UNESCO 
2005). According to UNESCO “the extraordinary concentration of cultural 
monuments from prehistoric to modern times attests to the historic continuity of life 
in Kosovo and to the artistic creativity of its inhabitants” (2003). Prizren, the second 
largest and most ethnically heterogeneous city, is home to a significant part of this 
rich heritage. Its population consists of Kosovo Albanians, Turks, Bosnians, Kosovo 
Serbs and Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian (RAE) communities.  
Occupied by various powers throughout history, its architecture was heavily 
influenced by the Empires and Kingdoms ruling it. During the medieval period, 
many Byzantine, Roman-Catholic and Serbian Orthodox monuments were built. 
Vernacular architecture such as traditional residential buildings including stone-
tower houses (kulla) and lodgings (konak), bridges, fortresses and urban Centers are 
part of the cultural heritage (UNESCO 2003). When the region was integrated into 
Serbia in the late twelfth century, Serbs proceeded to establish an extensive cultural 
and religious presence, including a number of important Orthodox churches, 
monasteries and palaces at Peja, Prizren and Visoki Decani (Herscher 2010). During 
the Ottoman rule, which started in 1495, Prizren developed as a cultural Center 
within Kosovo and benefited from its geographical position linking trade within the 
empire. In the centuries of Ottoman rule over the Balkans, a large part of the 
population in Kosovo converted to Islam. Dozens of mosques and monuments were 
built across the country, including many in Prizren (Gülersoy et al. 2008). After 
falling under the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the 17th century, Prizren was 
conquered again by the Ottoman Empire and in 1868 became the capital for Prizren 
vilayet (province) which included all of Kosovo proper as well as neighboring 
regions. In 1878, the Albanian National League was formed in Prizren also known as 
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the Prizren League (Malcolm, 1998). Prizren thus became an important 
establishment of an Albanian political and military movement to resist the Ottoman 
Empire. Throughout the 20th century, Prizren remained a politically important 
Center for Albanian nationalism in the struggle for independence after being re-
conquered by the Kingdom of Serbia under which Kosovo was annexed by Serbia 
(CHwB 2011). The latter lost control of the territory until 1945 during Germany’s 
occupation in the Second World War. Kosovo then became part of Serbia as an 
Autonomous region within the larger Yugoslav Federation. In socialist Yugoslavia, 
until the late 1970s, the role of the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) was drastically 
reduced and religious heritage sites received very little funding and attention. Out 
of the circa 3000 heritage sites identified in Kosovo in the period 1999 until 2005, 
only 425 monuments and sites were officially listed during Yugoslavia between 1947 
and 1990 (MCYS, 2010). One of these monuments, the Prizren League House later 
became a museum. Following its reconstruction after Serbian forces destroyed it 
during the 1999 war, the Prizren League House was a great income-generating 
source for the municipality as one of the highest earning tourist venues in the city. 
In the past, heritage protection in Prizren was a community obligation without 
proper detailed legislation and there were no plans for the development of the 
historic Center. As national institutions were established in the 1950s including the 
national Bureau43 for the Protection of Monuments and the Museum of Kosovo, 
preservation of cultural heritage was limited to individual buildings, including 
specific monuments or archeological sites. During the early stages of planned urban 
development, there was minimal understanding of the conservation of historic 
environments, which led to the decay and demolition of many important heritage 
sites (Pickard, 2008). The historical core of the city of Prizren was officially declared 
a protected area in 195644. Between 1968 and 1974, several specific studies and 
proposals were completed to document the protection and rehabilitation of the 
historic center. The 1974 Yugoslav Constitution45
                                                 
43 Often referred to in documents as ‘Institute’. 
 brought about improvements to 
the institutional structure in heritage management for Kosovo and allowed for 
developing local expertise through the newly established University of Prishtina. 
The state Bureau was established in Prizren in 1967 facilitating a link between the 
city and the higher ranks of the Yugoslav Federation. At the federal level the main 
legislation in force was the 1977 Law on the Protection of Cultural Monuments 
(Hoxha 2008). 
44 During the 1940s and 1950s, an education system was developed allowing for the use of Albanian 
language.  
45 Kosovo remained part of the Serbian Republic, but was elevated to a full constitutive element of the 
Federation with its own constitution and Assembly. 
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Regulations on heritage required the Urban Planning Department in the 
Municipality of Prizren to seek the Bureau’s consent for each intervention in the 
historic zone prior to issuing a permit. From the 1960s until 1981 the Bureau was the 
most important institution with regards to heritage in Prizren. The Provincial 
Institute for the Protection of Monuments existed in Prishtina, whilst at the state 
level the highest decision-making body was the Belgrade based Coordination Center 
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and of the Republic of Serbia for Kosovo and 
Metohija (UNESCO 2003). Throughout these ranks, confusion over regulatory 
responsibilities occurred between local and national institutions, weakening the 
implementation of heritage preservation (Pickard 2008). 
The historic Center in Prizren was nominated to the UNESCO World Heritage List 
in 1972, however the nomination process was not successful and the Prizren historic 
Center became dilapidated (CHwB 2002). In later decades, most of the monuments 
and sites in the heritage inventory compiled by these institutions included medieval 
monuments. The Serbian government focused their funding on maintaining 
particular Orthodox religion sites considering their proclamation as part of the 
Serbian identity and culture (Shoshi 2012).  
These mechanisms were in place until the late 1980s. The rise of Milosevic to power 
and an increase in Serbian nationalism led to restrictions on rights of Albanians 
(Sörensen 2009).46
[In] a political context in which identities and states are being reformed, 
redefined, and reconstituted, as well as borders redrawn, the case of 
Kosovo has been especially charged, serving as a catalyst or instrument of 
reformulations throughout former Yugoslavia and the wider region. 
 This political shift in Serbia enabled a stronger role for the SOC. 
The nationalist agenda built on the presence of the SOC in Kosovo as proof of 
Serbian supremacy and rights over the territory in Kosovo. This solidified the 
Church’s role as guardian of ‘endangered Serbs in Kosovo’ (Herscher 2010). Serbian 
Orthodox heritage throughout Kosovo became a significant part of the national 
rhetoric linked with Serbian identity and rights over the territory. Thus, heritage 
was utilized for political motives throughout the following two decades (Cultural 
Heritage Expert Interview, January 2013). As the Balkan expert Susan Woodward 
(2000) stated in an analysis of Yugoslavia’s decomposition: 
The Serbian government invested in building new Orthodox religious sites 
throughout Kosovo’s territory often to the detriment of local vernacular sites or 
Islamic monuments. Therefore, the Kosovo Albanian population perceived the 
                                                 
46 Political relations between Serbia and Kosovo are beyond the scope of this research. However, it 
suffices to note that Kosovo Albanian opposition towards the Serbian state preceded the Milosevic 
regime and was exacerbated during 1990s (Sörensen, 2009: p. 189). 
 
91 
 
expansion of Orthodox architecture as “colonization” and the churches being 
“political” rather than an expression of religious freedom. Albanian resistance to 
Serbian control included acts of vandalism against Serbian Orthodox churches and 
monasteries. “If architecture legitimated Serbia’s claim to Kosovo, then damage to 
that architecture became damage to that claim” (Herscher and Riedlmeyer 2000, 
111). With the revocation of Kosovo’s autonomy in 1989, the political situation in 
Kosovo deteriorated significantly. The expulsion en masse of Kosovo Albanians from 
public institutions and the abolishment of the use of the Albanian language in 
university education led to the establishment of a parallel education system. Lack of 
contact between the Albanian and Serb population became the norm as school and 
university buildings were prohibited for Albanians (Kostovicova 2005). Protection of 
cultural monuments was seized by the Serbian government as one of the pretexts for 
its decision to impose direct rule on Kosovo (Herscher and Riedlmayer 2000). 
Exclusion of Kosovo Albanians from state institutions prohibited knowledge flow 
and advancement in their training in cultural heritage (Pickard 2008). Within the 
heritage management structures, such as the Institute for Protection of Monuments 
and the regional institutes in different cities, a number of Albanian staff did remain 
employed; however, not in leading or managerial positions. This division between 
those who “remained part of the system” and those expelled from it became a 
divisive issue amongst Albanians after 1999, hampering cooperation in the heritage 
policy field (Heritage Expert Interview, 2013). 
Closing access to university for Albanian students was a major hindrance 
preventing new generations from developing local expertise. The Department of 
Architecture at the University of Prishtina proved extremely valuable to the heritage 
field in Kosovo in the post-1999 period as they were continuously involved as 
technicians in excavations and studies of archaeological sites in Kosovo. As violence 
escalated in 1998 and war broke out in 1999, a large number of heritage sites were 
damaged or destroyed. Serb forces attacked mostly mosques and Islamic religious 
sites as well as old bazaars and historic monuments associated with Kosovo-
Albanians. Artifacts and objects belonging to the Museum of Kosovo as well as 
documentation of the Provincial Institute for the Protection of Cultural Monuments 
in Prishtina were taken during the withdrawal of Serbian military forces and state 
administration in June 1999 (UNESCO 2003). Together with the artifacts, a great 
body of knowledge and expertise was also drained from Kosovo institutions as 
Serbs were no longer included in the state administration after 1999. Retaliation acts 
of Kosovo Albanians, which led to the damaging or destruction of Orthodox 
religious sites, further damaged cultural heritage in the country.  
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4.4. Cultural heritage governance since 1999 
Following the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1244, the UNMIK 
administration annulled the discriminatory legislation enacted in Yugoslavia 
between 1989 and 1999. This included annulment of the 1994 Yugoslav Law on 
Cultural Property (Hoxha 2008). The lack of legal protection, left heritage sites bare 
and subject to attacks and damage through unregulated restoration or nearby 
building work. The international administration didn’t provide any replacement 
institutional framework after annulling the 1990s legislation. In 2001 UNMIK led a 
wave of recentralizing services from the municipal to the central government level 
and the regional Institute for Protection of Monuments in Prizren (IPMP)47
In the decade following 1999, the Council of Europe released declarations and 
conducted evaluation missions on Kosovo’s cultural heritage. Reports from the 
Council of Europe and its Parliamentary Assembly called for awareness on 
protecting endangered cultural heritage and recommended the decentralization of 
culture management responsibilities as a mechanism of enhancing peaceful 
coexistence amongst ethnicities (CoE 2001). UNESCO reports noted ‘a marked 
indifference towards the cultural heritage of the ‘other’ as a dominant phenomenon’ 
in Kosovo (EC/CoE 2004). Of particular importance, was the emphasis placed on the 
 came 
under the auspices of the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sport (MCYS). This 
centralization of authority obstructed the work of the IPMP by restricting its access 
and involvement in the consultation process at the local level (CHwB 2011). UNMIK 
retained cultural heritage protection as a reserved right, however later transferred 
authority at the policy level to the Ministry. MCYS was also in charge of cultural 
heritage in Prizren as there were no regional branches of the government mandated 
to deal with cultural heritage in the Prizren municipality. This management of 
cultural heritage excluded Orthodox religious sites, which were outside of Kosovo-
led responsibility since 1999. Whilst KFOR soldiers provided physical protection of 
these sites for several years, the religious buildings were managed by religious 
communities and by the Serb population living in enclaves (EC/CoE 2004). This put 
cultural heritage in a limbo state, on the periphery of national policy agendas and 
without proper attention from the central government. Considering the already 
weak local capacities, centralization of authority on heritage management made the 
situation worse. This was especially true for the city of Prizren where a large 
number of the heritage sites are concentrated and financial resources are urgently 
required to halt the deterioration of monuments and buildings. The division of 
decision-making authority, between the clergy of Serbian Orthodox Church and 
Serbian population on one side and the Albanian state authorities on the other, 
further damaged inter-ethnic relations. 
                                                 
47 Since 2010 called the Center for Protection of Monuments. 
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requirement to build local capacities where ‘a large number of dedicated 
professionals with great expertise, working in local institutions, have been isolated, 
undermined and under-funded for many years” (CoE/PA 2001, 1; CoE 2001). 
The outbreak of violent riots in March 2004 caused considerable damage to heritage 
sites throughout the country. In the riots 34 religious and cultural heritage sites 
(Orthodox churches, monasteries, cemeteries, funerary chapels and some traditional 
houses) were damaged or destroyed (CoE 2004). The riots confirmed cultural 
heritage as a national issue and further damaged inter-ethnic relations as a result of 
which the international administration maintained a centralized approach to 
heritage governance. Its management and authority over protecting heritage sites 
thus required more attention from the central government and received priority 
with international administration agenda. UNESCO increased its attention to 
heritage in Kosovo with its 2004 report after a fact-finding mission designed in 
cooperation with the Government of Serbia and Montenegro and UNMIK. The 
report stresses the role of cultural heritage ‘as a potent symbol of the identity of 
peoples and as a factor of reconciliation’ (UNESCO 2004).48
Following the March 2004 riots, access to Serbian Orthodox heritage sites was 
restricted with checkpoints guarded by the international forces KFOR (Wolferstan 
2007). This was a catalyst for international agencies in Kosovo to design mechanisms 
of communication between the Kosovo authorities and the Serbian Orthodox 
Church to enable conservation and reconstruction of damaged sites. The central 
government and UNMIK allocated financial assistance and many religious sites 
were reconstructed as an attempt to dilute the inter-ethnic tension. The 
Reconstruction and Implementation Commission (RIC) was established through a 
Memorandum of Understanding between the Kosovo Ministry of Culture, Youth 
and Sports, the Serbian Orthodox Church, Belgrade representatives of the Republic 
Institute for the Protection of Cultural Monuments to reconstruct 34 Orthodox 
religious sites damaged or destroyed during the riots. The SOC pulled out from the 
collaboration soon after but joined again in May 2005.
 The organization 
proposed enhanced international recognition of the country’s heritage through the 
inclusion of several monuments in the World Heritage List as a mechanism for 
deterring future attacks. 
49
                                                 
48 A permanent committee of UNESCO experts tasked with annual monitoring of cultural heritage in 
Kosovo is also recommended in the report. Another UNESCO mission visit in May 2005 specifically for 
Prizren with regard to the Church of Bdgorica Ljeviska showed the significance of Prizren heritage. 
 The RIC, led by the Council 
of Europe, remained the only existing mechanism where the Serbian Orthodox 
Church and Kosovo authorities formally discuss cultural heritage issues (ICO 
49 The first MoU was signed in June 2004 and the second MoU signed in May 2005. 
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2011a).50
As the new legal framework, drafted and adopted by Kosovo authorities and 
promulgated by UNMIK administration grew, definitions and regulations over 
cultural heritage management became clearer. Nevertheless, proper implementation 
of the legislation remained a big challenge. Cultural heritage was defined and 
protected by a legislative framework that includes the Law on Spatial Planning 
(2003-14) in 2003, Law on Cultural Heritage (02/L-88) adopted in 2006 and seven 
legal acts adopted by the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports in 2008. The 
Ministry of Youth, Culture and Sports developed a List of Cultural Heritage 
monuments and buildings in 2012. The Ministry List includes 930 protected 
buildings of cultural heritage, emergency interventions for 16 heritage buildings and 
rehabilitation of many other buildings with special historical values.
 The RIC, however, did not include other undestroyed heritage sites in the 
country and thus remained a separate mechanism from other heritage management 
structures. 
51 However, the 
document was never sent to the Kosovo Council for Cultural Heritage for approval 
and thus Kosovo remains without a national inventory (OSCE, 2012). Already in the 
Law on Cultural Heritage, it was made clear that requests for constructing buildings 
within a protected zone be submitted for consideration to the competent institution, 
which has a veto over granting such permission.52
The Law on Cultural Heritage also introduced a new institution into the governance 
structure, namely the Kosovo Council for Cultural Heritage (KCCH) as an 
independent agency serving as the highest professional organ to identify and value 
heritage sites, evaluate projects on heritage conservation proposed by other 
institutions and to integrate cultural heritage in spatial, urban and rural 
development plans. The Council’s late establishment, years after the adoption of the 
Law on Cultural Heritage, the delayed appointment of its members
 At this time, the competent 
institutions included the municipal spatial and urban planning departments. At the 
national level, the Institute for Protection of Monuments led by the Ministry of 
Culture, Youth and Sports, the Ministry of Environment and Spatial Planning 
remained the most important central government institutions in heritage 
governance. 
53
                                                 
50 The international community failed to broaden the scope of the RIC to include all of Kosovo heritage 
resulting in the ICO to search for future mechanisms of heritage management that include the SOC in 
decision-making. 
 and lack of 
51 According to the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework 2013 – 2015, (April 2012, 7). Furthermore, the 
Government Meeting Session of August 1st, 2012, states that Ministry of Youth, Culture and Sports has a 
Strategy for Protection and Promotion of Cultural Heritage 2012 – 2017 and a Strategy for Integrated 
Conservation 2012 – 2017. 
52 Article 7.17, Law On Cultural Heritage Law No. 02/L-88. 
53 Setting up of members of the KCCH was not regulated by law but by a decision of the Kosovo 
Assembly Committee on Education, Science, Technology, Culture, Youth and Sport in 2007 (Kosovo 
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renewed mandates for Board Members by the Kosovo Assembly damaged the weak 
protection of cultural heritage in the country. This showed a lack of professional 
expertise in treating the issue during political debates that ensued after Declaration 
of Independence. The KCCH role, nevertheless, remains advisory a factor which the 
ICO outlined in its reports on the implementation of heritage protection in Kosovo 
(ICO 2011). 
During the 2006 – 2007 Vienna negotiations on the Kosovo final political status 
between the Kosovo and Serbian government, protection of Serbian Orthodox 
heritage was a key issue in the agenda. Receiving broad national attention in 
Kosovo, the enhanced protection of Orthodox heritage sites was largely perceived as 
a political compromise to receive international support for resolving the political 
status. The resulting Ahtisaari Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status 
Settlement included a chapter on heritage protection, outlining tools for securing the 
requests of the Serbian community and their cultural rights. The main 
recommendations of the Ahtisaari Proposal concerned international supervision on 
enhanced decentralization to local authorities, minority rights and protection of the 
Serbian Orthodox Church. Addressing specifically the role of the Serbian Orthodox 
Church in Kosovo, state authorities are required to consult the SOC regarding the 
promotion of the Serbian Orthodox heritage for touristic, scientific, educational or 
any other public purposes (Annex V, Article 1.7). Furthermore, the establishment of 
Special Protective Zones prevents adverse development around Serbian Orthodox 
heritage sites. The agreement of the SOC is necessary for any activities in the Special 
Protected Zones including constructions, public gatherings or urbanization of land 
(Annex V, Article 4.1.2). The Ahtisaari Proposal also addresses specifically the 
establishment of a protective zone for the Historic Center of Prizren. Article 4.1.7 
assigns the task of establishing a protective zone for the Historic Center to the 
municipal authorities of Prizren in cooperation with the Implementation Monitoring 
Council - IMC. The Ahtisaari provisions do not address explicitly a requirement for 
a separate national law for Prizren, but does request increased protection of cultural 
and religious sites of minorities. To ensure these protection mechanisms are 
implemented with the interest of the Serbian Orthodox Church in mind, the 
Proposal stipulates the requirement for cooperation between the existing 
Reconstruction Implementation Commission and the new structure Implementation 
Monitoring Council (IMC) (Annex V, Article 5.6). 
Declaration of Independence in February 2008 and the adoption of the Ahtisaari 
Proposal by the Kosovo Assembly initiated a series of innovations concerning 
                                                                                                                              
Assembly, 2007). In 2009, 2 members of the KCCH (Enis Kervan of the Kosova Turkish Democratic Party 
ȱ ȱ 	°ȱ ȱ  ȱ ¢ȱ ¢Ǽȱ  ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ
representing a conflict of interest as the Assembly approves the KCCH Board and budget (KDI, 2009). 
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heritage governance. Monitored and steered by the International Civilian Office in 
Kosovo, the process of adopting the new legislation was fast-paced and largely 
blocked public debates on sensitive issues. However, as the Ahtisaari Proposal was 
recognized as the ‘price’ for Independence, its provisions were to a degree accepted 
by the public. The Kosovo Assembly applied Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure 
Work Regulation permitting an accelerated procedure for law approval.54
Cultural heritage became the Center of politically infused tensions with the 
adoption of the Law on Special Protected Zones in 2008. Its definition of Special 
Protected Zones (SPZ) received wide criticism from civil society who rejected the 
authority granted to the Serbian religious organizations as a de-facto endorsement 
of extraterritoriality. The ‘special’ character of the SPZ is to ensure communication 
between representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church and municipalities on 
decisions concerning constructions and activities in the protected zone (ICO 2011, 
14). The municipality, bearing responsibility for implementing the SPZ provisions in 
its territory, is required to seek the agreement of the Serbian Orthodox Church 
regarding Prohibited and Restricted Areas prior to issuing a permit. Adopting this 
particular clause may be considered a breakthrough in the political environment as 
it secures a role for the SOC in decision-making. Yet the cooperation of the Serbian 
Orthodox Church was not secured by the adoption of the Law as cooperation 
presupposes recognition of Kosovo-led institutions by the latter, a political issue 
which remains unresolved. 
 The rule 
was first enforced in February 2008 following the Declaration of Independence and 
repeatedly used until the new Constitution came into force in June 2008. Citizens 
were left out of this process with the government claiming that the new legislation 
was an obligation towards the international community to confirm Kosovo’s 
commitment to protection of minorities (GAP Institute 2010). The Kosovo 
Constitution was the only legal act which received public discussion through public 
debates organized throughout the country. 
Prizren Municipal Department for Urban Planning contributed in the drafting of the 
Law on Special Protected Zones, which includes many sites in Prizren. Early 
proposals of the Law were considered problematic considering the veto power 
given to the Serbian Orthodox Church. According to interviewees from the 
Municipal Department for Urban Planning ‘the Serb Orthodox Church was assigned 
authority to decide on construction in a large perimeter surrounding its premises 
which would block 1/3 of all conservation sites, even those not belonging to SOC’ 
(Prizren Urban Planning Department Interview, June 2012). The final adopted Law 
introduced 45 SPZ in the Kosovo territory, with most of them concentrated in South 
                                                 
54 With the new Kosovo Assembly Work Regulation adopted on April 29th 2010, the rule is now found 
under Article 84. 
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SPZs namely the Historic Center of Prizren and the village of Velika Hocࡊa/Hoçë e 
Madhe. 
Resulting from the Ahtisaari provisions, an additional key element of the Law on 
Special Protected Zones was the introduction of the Implementation Monitoring 
Council (IMC), in charge of overseeing the implementation of key cultural heritage 
legislation. The role of the IMC is specifically linked to the protection of Serbian 
religious and cultural heritage in Kosovo. It remains within the IMC mandate to 
facilitate a resolution of disputes between the SOC and the central or local 
authorities with regard to implementation of the law.55 This mandate includes 
oversight of the Historic Center of Prizren. The head of the ICO, the International 
Civilian Representative (ICR) is mandated to institute the Implementation 
Monitoring Council.56
Despite the existing legal framework on heritage, institutional weaknesses in 
heritage management continue to include limited coordination of stakeholders, 
weak capacities and lack of institutional cooperation (Hoxha and Thaçi 2012). The 
Kosovo government must provide for the necessary state mechanisms to ensure 
proper protection of endangered sites. This requirement is exacerbated by a lack of 
direct UNESCO monitoring. The latter’s role is diminished since heritage sites in 
Kosovo proper continue to be registered under the Serbian state authority. All these 
factors supported the claim of the central government led by the ICO that additional 
legislation specifically for preserving the heritage in Prizren would benefit heritage 
preservation. It also supported their approach to lead the process. The following 
section analyses in detail the characteristics of heritage in Prizren and the drafting 
process of the new law regulating the Historic Center of Prizren. Structures were 
designed to remove the authority of municipal authorities over cultural heritage 
management in Prizren due to the danger that other ethnicities (SOC) would be 
excluded from decision-making. 
 The IMC was formally established in 2011 to include as 
members the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports, the national Kosovo Institute 
for Protection of Monuments based in Prishtina, the Institute for Protection of 
ȱ ȱ ȱ ²ǰȱ ȱ an Orthodox Church and international 
stakeholders (OSCE 2010). Its functions have not been fully established bar a limited 
member consultation process. The ICO mandate concluded without the full 
functionalization of the ICO (ICO 2011) presenting a critical deficiency in securing a 
functional system of decision-making involving all the stakeholders. 
 
                                                 
55 Articles 4.1.1. and 4.1.2 of the Law on Special Protected Zones.  
56 Article 7.4, Annex V of the Ahtisaari Comprehensive Proposal. 
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4.5. The Historic Center of Prizren: A city within a city57
Cultural heritage in Prizren is unique as it embodies the diversity of its population. 
The historic zone in Prizren includes vernacular architecture, the Prizren Castle as 
well as Islamic and Christian religious sites. Initially, the historic zone as defined 
before 1999, covered most of what is protected today. Post-war illegal construction, 
as was the case throughout Kosovo, damaged a considerable part of the historic 
monuments. After the local Prizren Institute for the Protection of Monuments 
(IPMP) failed to receive support on its request for a moratorium on all construction 
in the historic zone, the municipality adopted a general Urban Plan of Prizren in 
2004 (CHwB 2011, 163). The Prizren Municipality Memorandum of Understanding 
with the expert organization Cultural Heritage without Borders (CHwB) initiated 
the process of establishing (or redefining) the Historic Center of Prizren in 2006. It 
was only in 2008, after the declaration of independence, with the adoption of the 
Urban Regulatory Plan for the Historic Center of Prizren that the city was finally 
equipped with its own set of regulations on the Historic Center. The municipal 
Regulatory Plan resulted from a four-year process of designing the Conservation 
and Development Plan for Prizren. This Plan standardized all construction types in 
the Historic Center including regulating preservation and permit issuance for new 
construction. The municipal Urban Planning Department was in charge of issuing 
permits after receiving the advice of the Prizren branch of the Institute for Protection 
of Monuments. Prizren municipality is the only city in Kosovo with a conservation 
plan integrated in their urban development strategy. Considering the lack of a 
national development strategy, this is considerable achievement for the local 
community. The CHwB declared in 2011 that the Historic Zone of Prizren 
“represents one of the most protected urban, architectural and historic cores in 
Kosovo” (CHwB 2011, 163). Nevertheless, during the last years international 
agencies lobbied for increased protection of the Historic Zone.
 
58
The drafting process for the new Law on the Historic Center of Prizren started in 
2008 with the establishment of the Inter-Ministerial Working Group. This elevated 
the Historic Center of Prizren to a higher legal status. Following a framework 
 
                                                 
57 The concept of a historic city, as noted by Ashworth and Tunbridge (2000, 9) entails “urban forms from 
the past that have survived into the contemporary city’. Historic cities are part of the citizen’s daily 
environment and thus integrated in their understanding of their space and surrounding. Within larger 
municipal units, historic Centers are regulated with specific legal acts enabling preservation of the past as 
well as securing adaptability with urban development. Construction restrictions are highly regulated 
within the space of historic cities as well as within a certain radius surrounding the sites. These 
mechanisms of regulating activities within and around historic Centers support the continuation of life in 
a historic Center without disturbances from modern developments, which might interfere with the 
preserved identity of the community. 
58 Upon the adoption of new heritage protection measures, the Albanian-ethnic group were vocal about 
‘losing out’ to the Serbian side. 
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document designed by the ICO, the Ministry of Environment and Spatial Planning 
officially led the drafting process with the ICO steering the entire process. The 
Working Group in charge of facilitating the drafting process involved both the 
central and local authorities. It was led by the Ministry of Environment and Spatial 
Planning and co-chaired by a representative from the Urban Planning Department 
of Prizren municipality. This mechanism included representatives of line Ministries, 
international organizations such as the ICO as well as UN-Habitat and the 
organization Cultural Heritage without Borders for its expertise on the field. The 
CHwB represented the only local based non-government organization working on 
cultural heritage invited to participate in the drafting process. 
The data suggests that several issues obstructed the drafting process. Obstacles 
included the collapse of the government in 2009 and a six-month institutional crisis, 
which left several ministries without leadership. According to the ICO it was as a 
result of this crisis that their organisation initiated the drafting process for a set of 
laws deriving from the Ahtisaari Proposal, arguing that “[their] leadership was a 
result of the government collapse and there was no partner on the other side” (ICO 
Interview, August 2012). In the government Inter-Ministerial Working Group, the 
ICO pushed forward the drafting process arguing that a higher level of protection is 
easier to implement if regulated, “if it’s not within a structure and legal system, it 
doesn’t exist” (ICO Interview, August 2012). This evidence suggests the crucial 
impact of the ICO in this process and the importance given to institutionalising 
mechanisms for heritage governance. Furthermore, despite recent developments 
towards decentralization and increased political powers at the local level, the ICO 
stance in the Working Groups had a clear inclination towards centralizing 
instruments for control over polarizing issues such as heritage. Interviewees from 
local counterparts referred to the ICO role as a ‘shadow leader’ closely monitoring 
the legislation drafting process and negotiating with the Minister of Environment 
and Spatial Planning whenever opposition arose within the Working Group  (CHwB 
Interview, September 2012). During the drafting process, the ICO particularly 
defended issues concerning the Serbian Orthodox Church, a politically contentious 
issue in the country considering their refusal to accept Kosovo’s independence. 
According to one member of the drafting team, “some issues were so political we 
could not get past them in the Working Group” (CHwB Interview, September 2012).  
According to interviewees, additional obstacles in the drafting process concerned 
lack of information sharing and coordination between the local and central 
government (CHwB Interview, September 2012). Furthermore, municipal officials’ 
lack of expertise was brought up by interviewees as another factor impeding 
adequate tackling of issues (CHwB Interview 2012). These presented major 
challenges, which marred the entire process from 2008 until the final adoption of the 
Law in 2012. Despite having a municipal official from the Urban Planning 
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Department Co-Chair the Ministerial Working Group, municipal officials, including 
the Prizren mayor,59 criticized the drafting process for lacking proper dissemination 
of information to all parties (MESP Interview, 2012). The CHwB admitted receiving 
pressure from civil society organizations in Prizren to reveal information about the 
undergoing process at the Working Group (CHwB Interview, 2012). Leaked 
information to the civil society, in the form of a draft law being discussed in the 
working group, finally drew the attention of national media, which broadcast 
continuous declarations from civil society organizations objecting to the content of 
the draft law being discussed. This affected the centralized mechanism established 
by the Ministerial working group. The latter developed into a reactive model of 
working in attempts to incorporate comments indirectly without addressing issues 
directly or attempting direct communication with the institutions and organizations 
voicing objections. These objections concerned a lack of transparency and a 
restricted law and policy-making process exclusive to civil society. Objections were 
also raised due to a feared ‘ethnicization’60
The new Law on the Historic Center of Prizren (Law on Prizren) introduced a new 
decision-making process on heritage in the municipality. One of the key innovations 
is the establishment of a seven-member Council for Cultural Heritage within the 
Historic Center to ensure representation of all groups of society. Civil society as well 
as religious communities in Kosovo, including the Catholic Church, the Serbian 
Orthodox Church and the Islam Council is represented in the Council for Cultural 
Heritage.
 of decision-making in heritage 
management with a bias towards the protection of Serbian Orthodox sites.  
61 Other minorities such as Bosnian, Turkish, and RAE communities are not 
referenced or represented. The Municipal Assembly appoints representatives of civil 
society within the Prizren community.62
                                                 
59 This may be attributed to the clashes between the Municipal Assembly, which refused to approve the 
new Law on Prizren and the Mayor who was under political pressure from his party, the PDK to approve 
the law. 
 Civil society was especially critical with 
regards to including religious communities in a decision-making body. Other 
religious communities in Prizren questioned the act of singling out certain religions 
over others. Despite the heavy criticism displayed, the establishment of a Council on 
Cultural Heritage may entail benefits, in bringing together actors from all sides of a 
60 Ethnicization refers to the establishment of boundaries and identification of cultural heritage as ethnic-
heritage. This has broader social and political implications in a society. 
61 Clarifying a misunderstanding by the media and civil society, MESP officials stated in the interview 
that religious organizations may appoint a representative from outside their organization as member of 
the municipal Council on Cultural Heritage. 
62 In April 2013, the Prizren Municipal Assembly appointed three civil society representatives to become 
the first members of the Council. The Network of Cultural Organisations in Prizren announced that these 
individuals were the only applicants to the Municipal Assembly and did not represent the civil society of 
Prizren (RROK, 2013). 
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fragmented society. This is particularly unique for religious authorities, which may 
be excluded from such institutions.  
State actors, on the other side, utilized the political stance of the Serbian Orthodox 
Church against recognizing the function of Kosovo-led institutions as validation for 
their argument that the inclusion of religious institutions harms heritage 
management in Prizren as a whole. The Ministry of Environment and Spatial 
Planning, although agreeing to the complexity added by including religious groups 
in the decision-making process, kept to the requirements resulting from the 
Ahtisaari Proposal arguing: “We had to include them in the council; and it is an 
obligation” (MESP Interview 2012). 
Regulating the process of decision-making, the Law on Prizren introduces several 
key steps involving a range of institutions to review requests and complaints 
regarding the Historic Center of Prizren. The key phases of decision-making are 
outlined as follows: 
1. All requests including construction, destruction or adaptation of property 
are initially submitted to the Municipal Urban Planning Department. A 
copy of the request is submitted to the Council for Cultural Heritage, which 
monitors the entire process. 
2. If one member of the Council does not agree [with giving the license to the 
requesting party], there is additional consultation between the parties 
involved.  
3. In the case where this consultation process fails to satisfy all members of the 
Council, the municipal Urban Planning Department requests approval for 
its decision from the Institute for Monument Protection in Prizren. 
4. The request is submitted to the Ministry of Environment and Spatial 
Planning whilst the Ministry of Culture and the Council for Cultural 
Heritage receive copies of the file. 
5. The central government must take the final decision. 
6. If the complaining party disagrees with the decision, the case is taken to 
court. 
Requests related to the Serbian Orthodox Church must be submitted to the 
Implementation Monitoring Council through the central government institutions, 
namely the MESP and MCYS. Complaints issued by the Serbian Orthodox Church, 
on the other hand, are treated by a separate mechanism. Since the SOC itself is a 
member of the Council for Cultural Heritage, their own complaints are directed to 
the Ministry of Environment and Spatial Planning and are also submitted to the 
Council for Implementation and Monitoring. This mechanism ensures fair treatment 
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of their requests and complaints. In the latter case, the MESP acknowledges it as a 
breakthrough that complaints are not directed only to the local Council for Cultural 
Heritage but must be sent to the central government as well. If the complaining 
party is unsatisfied, then the dispute goes to court. Prior drafts mandated the local 
Council for Cultural Heritage as the final decision-maker (MESP Interview 2012). 
This particular issue, settled under Article 18 of the new Law, was included as a 
final attempt of the MESP to ensure that objective procedures are put in place that 
respect the Ahtisaari proposal and do not undermine Kosovo institutions. 
International Civilian Representative Peter Faith finally accepted these amendments 
despite the initial resistance from other ICO representatives in the Inter-Ministerial 
Working Group (MESP interview 2012). From opposing organizations, such as the 
Prizren Coalition of NGOs for the Prizren Historic Center, these new mechanisms 
were perceived by Prizren civil society organizations as enabling a “City within a 
City” model. According to them, the new law will allow a model of decision-making 
that can be blocked at the heart of the Municipality with religious communities able 
to veto against the authority of elected representatives of the Municipality (Ceku, 
2012). The Kosovo Council for Cultural Heritage agrees that the new law on the 
historic zone creates a “special administrative unit within the municipality of 
Prizren” (KCCH 2011). This constrains functional and efficient local governance. 
The municipal government faces a great challenge in implementing a law which its 
Municipal Assembly has refused.  
In August 2011, the Kosovo Assembly processed the draft Law on the Historical 
Center of Prizren with an accelerated procedure. It was expected to pass it 
immediately after its first reading in the plenary session, as was practice with a 
number of laws related to the Ahtisaari Proposal. However, strong opposition from 
the functional Assembly Committee for Agriculture, Forestry, Environment and 
Spatial Planning in charge of proceeding the draft Law led to the draft law being 
refused. Members of the Committee accredited  part of their objections to the draft 
law the criticism they received from civil society organizations, associations and the 
Islamic community in Kosovo. Other objections related to the content of the draft 
law refusing to identify cultural heritage with one ethnicity. Lastly, MPs publicly 
addressed the political pressure of central government on the voting process and 
objected to ‘blind compliance’ to international community requests63
                                                 
63 During the session, one MP declared: “We have now entered this process, and it has turned into an 
obligation considering that it was even mentioned in the Progress Report”. The 2011 Progress Report on 
Kosovo of the European Commission noted that the two laws on Prizren and Hoçë e Madhe/Velika Hoc ࡊa 
have not been adopted (EC 2011, 22). 
 (Kosovo 
Assembly, 23.08.2011). During the second reading of the draft Law on Prizren, in 
April 2012, MPs denounced the government for interfering in parliamentary 
procedures by distributing instructions to MPs on how to vote for each amendment 
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proposed to the text.64
 
 Political conditionality was reiterated during the Prime 
Minister’s address during the final voting session at the Kosovo Assembly when 
Prime Minister Thaçi declared that “the closure of international supervision of 
independence depends on our adoption of the last laws deriving from the Ahtisaari 
package. [….] the ending of supervised Independence is on your hands today” 
(Kosovo Assembly, 20.04.2012). The central government repeatedly drew parallels 
to the adoption of the Ahtisaari Package stating that the passing the new legislation 
secured independence and international recognition (Kosovo Assembly, 2012). 
4.7. The politics of reforming heritage governance 
The trajectory of the legislation drafting process was marred by centralized decision-
making and lack of transparency. Instead of a reinforced role of central state 
institutions securing a stronger emphasis on accountability and oversight of heritage 
governance, the drafting process solely stressed national political interests 
overriding those of local interest groups. This was further damaged by the Kosovo 
Assembly procedures in force. Compared to the procedures used to pass the set of 
new legislation following the Declaration of Independence in 2008, the Law on 
Prizren did not fit within the urgent process of adopting the Ahtisaari legislation. 
Yet, the Kosovo Assembly again applied accelerated procedures to speed up the 
adoption of the Law on Prizren, as requested by the executive. The new law 
proposal did not have to follow the expedited process and would have benefited 
from an open dialogue with non-state actors and a broader inclusion of other 
interest groups. To avoid a prolonged public discussion about the Prizren law, and 
its possible rejection, the central government raised the urgency of adopting the 
legislation. The Kosovo Assembly thus utilized Rule 61 when dealing with the 
proposed Law on the Historic Center of Prizren.  
From a local point of view, complaints on the process from the municipality of 
Prizren were wide ranging. In September 2011, after the Government initially 
passed the draft Law on the Historic Center to the Kosovo Assembly, the Prizren 
Municipal Assembly released a declaration against the current version of the draft 
law. This revealed a clash between the legislative branch of the municipality and the 
officials from the Department of Urban Planning, which had participated in the 
Working Group in Prishtina and were involved in drafting the Law. This lack of one 
unified voice for Prizren harmed their arguments with the line ministries and the 
ICO. According to an interviewee from the Prizren administration ‘municipal 
                                                 
64 During his speech in the Assembly, the Prime Minister recognized the existence of these instructions 
and referred to them as government suggestions to MPs concerning the amendments to the draft law 
(Kosovo Assembly, transcript of Assembly session on April 20th 2012). 
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officials were marginalized and their comments to the Inter-Ministerial Working 
Group were often not respected’65
Research conducted suggests that municipal officials tend to be submissive towards 
Ahtisaari matters and many of them renounced any opposition towards the central 
government initiation for a new law for Prizren. Interviewees failed to mention that 
since 2008, the Law on Special Protective Zones already granted an important role to 
the Serbian Orthodox Church and required the municipality to seek the latter’s 
consent in matters concerning Orthodox heritage. This was a result of a lack of 
information on the Ahtisaari requirements. Officials from the municipal Urban 
Planning Department accepted the necessity for introducing the new legislation 
specifically for the Historic Center due to the country’s obligations to fulfill 
Ahtisaari requirements. Interviewed municipal officials assert that ‘the central 
government ministries were obliged to follow Ahtisaari guidelines and it is the 
municipality’s obligation to implement the law once it is adopted’ (Official from 
Prizren Department of Urban Planning, Interview June 2012). Other officials suggest 
that the Law was prioritized simply to fulfill Ahtisaari requirements even if it did 
bring “new layers of structures upon existing structures” (Prizren Department of 
Urban Planning, Interview August 2012). These new layers, however, may obstruct 
an efficient government. Notwithstanding their key role of implementing the 
technical aspect of the new Law on the Historic Center, municipal officials from the 
Department for Urban Planning acknowledge the pressure of politics:  
 (Prizren Department of Urban Planning Official, 
Interview 2012). On the other side, members of the Ministerial Working Group 
declared many comments received from the municipality did not properly address 
issues of the Law and were not included in the draft (MESP Interview 2012). The 
latter’s stance coincides with reports on weak municipal capacities in drafting by-
laws and integrating municipal policies. The previous experience of the Municipal 
Urban Planning Department in developing the 2008 Conservation and Development 
Plan for the Historic Center did not cover politically sensitive issues such as the 
involvement of the Serbian Orthodox Church. 
Whilst the Municipal Assembly conducted politics, our requests 
concerning the draft Law were cut short. We worked for two years on the 
draft Law, yet in the end an older version was sent to us (Interview, June 
2012). 
Threats and other forms of pressure from affected parties also had a direct influence 
on the work of the municipal administration. According to the Director of Urban 
Planning Department, during his participation in the drafting of the Law on the 
                                                 
65 According to a municipal official the drafts received from the working group came back to the 
municipality without any changes to reflect the municipality’s concerns, stating “the drafts we received 
came back unchanged” (Prizren official Interview 2012). 
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Historic Center he was sued seven times with the objective ‘to obstruct his work’ 
(Director of Department of Urban Planning, Interview, June 2012).  
From a national point of view, clashes between institutions existed in Prishtina as 
well. New  legislation is broadly accepted by the central government, which 
criticizes municipalities for failing to implement their current regulations and spatial 
plans (MESP Interview 2012). The national Kosovo Council for Cultural Heritage 
took the contrary position, arguing in a report, that new legislation was not 
necessarily the solution. The KCCH criticized the lack of transparency in the 
drafting process. This reaction demonstrated a public rupture of this national 
institution with the Ministry of Environment and Spatial Planning (MESP) and ICO. 
The KCCH maintains that the said Law does not derive directly from the Ahtisaari 
Proposal. The Proposal does not specify it in the list of legislation required from the 
document. Instead the Ahtisaari proposal requests a Law on Selection of Protected 
Zones. Secondly, the decision-making authority is given to a Committee 
representing religious institutions instead of a professional body. Thirdly, the Law 
on Special Protected Zones discriminates in its definition of cultural heritage worthy 
of protection by favoring cultural heritage monuments and sites belonging to the 
Serbian community. The KCCH rightly acknowledges that cultural heritage 
deserves protection as national treasures, protected by the state. Yet, they argue, 
demarcating exclusive rights of the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) violates the 
principle of heritage as a public good by discriminating against certain types of 
heritage as ‘undeserving’ of protection. The KCCH opposition does not denote a 
refusal of additional legislation or regulatory means to manage cultural heritage. It 
is rather a denunciation of the exclusion of certain areas of cultural heritage and the 
current focus on the interests of the Serbian community. At the outset, the ICO 
invited the KCCH in the drafting process (KCCH Interview, January 2013) however 
after the KCCH opposition to the content of the draft Law, it was excluded from the 
process. 
The role of the KCCH in the drafting process seems to have been curtailed by three 
factors. First, cultural heritage did not become a priority on the political agenda 
until 2011 – 2012; consequently, establishment of the KCCH was delayed. Although 
the Law on Cultural Heritage was adopted in 2006, which required the 
establishment of the Kosovo Council for Cultural Heritage, the latter was officially 
mandated in 2009. The President of the KCCH stated that she learned of her 
appointment to the Council through the newspapers instead of via a formal 
notification by the Assembly (KCCH Interview, January 2013) points to the red tape 
in Kosovo’s administration. Extensive layers of bureaucracy and lack of 
communication are apparent in the collaboration process between political and 
professional staff across institutions in heritage management. Timely 
functionalization of existing agencies would strengthen the role of the Center and 
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successfully increase its power through implementing legislation. Second, the 
KCCH declared its objection to the draft Law on the Historical Center of Prizren and 
was not involved by other institutions.  This relates to the third factor pertaining to 
the KCCH role in heritage governance. The ICO points to the KCCH as an advisory 
body to the Kosovo Assembly (ICO, 2011) whereas the KCCH maintains that it is 
mandated with executive and oversight powers over other institutions working in 
heritage management (KCCH Interview, 2013). Nevertheless, considering it is the 
highest-ranking professional institution in the field, and the duration of the drafting 
process, the KCCH plays a significant role in legitimizing the new law. The KCCH 
presence during meetings of the Assembly Committee once the draft law reached 
the Assembly was rather a symbolic acceptance of its role without serious 
considerations of its criticism. In disregarding the opinion of the KCCH, the Kosovo 
government and Kosovo Assembly clearly violate the authority of a state institution 
and weakened the legitimacy of the process. 
The challenging drafting process of the new legislation on Prizren combined with 
the political pressure exercised throughout the institutional hierarchy, tests overall 
accountability in local governance. At the national level, exclusion of the Kosova 
Council on Cultural Heritage, mandated by law to oversee all matters on cultural 
heritage, inhibits oversight of the decision-making process from the Kosovo 
Assembly. Furthermore, it weakens cooperation between the legislative and 
executive branch. At the local level, providing religious institutions with veto 
powers within decision-making bodies, such as the local Council on Cultural 
Heritage is an obstacle to local decision-making. According to civil society 
representatives, the double representation of the Serbian Orthodox Church in the 
local Council as well as higher ranks of institutions overseeing the implementation 
of the Law inhibit functional local institutions and weaken accountability lines (Civil 
society representative, Interview 2012). According to local officials, assigning veto 
rights for religious communities in the city is a paradox considering that ‘Muslim, 
Catholic and Orthodox communities are responsible for the biggest illegal 
constructions damaging areas of heritage’ (Director of Prizren Department of Urban 
Planning Interview, June 2012).66
Adding to the existing heavily bureaucratic system, the Historic Center of Prizren 
has a series of institutions and actors monitoring and protecting it. This includes an 
Urban Planning inspection team and inspectors for culture from the central 
 These conditions imply an enhanced risk that 
religious communities in Prizren misuse their power within the Council. The lack of 
clear oversight mechanisms of the work of the council further enhances these risks. 
                                                 
66 Similar acts have occurred in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well where illegal religious objects were built 
to demonstrate dominance of one ethnicity over the other fortifying tension between the ethnic groups 
(United States Department of State, 2010). 
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government whereas inspectors for construction work on behalf of the municipality. 
The Council for Cultural Heritage and the Implementation Monitoring Council will 
be in charge of oversight of the historic zone as will be the regional Institute for 
Protection of Monuments. This existence of several layers of institutions might incite 
citizens to bypass the Urban Planning Department in the municipality and reach 
directly the Council further weakening the local authorities’ link with citizens. 
Municipal administration, the mayor and the Municipal Assembly were all 
confronted with a challenging political environment to approve the new law. 
Municipal officials view their concessions to the draft Law as a bargaining tool to 
secure central government funding for implementing the Law. According to the 
Urban Planning Director, “the Ministry of Environment and Spatial Planning is 
sponsoring the Law, they are obliged to secure financial costs as well” (Director of 
Prizren Department of Urban Planning Interview, June 2012). However, financial 
resources and their significance in implementing the new legislation did not receive 
sufficient attention from either party. Despite the ‘outcry’ of the central government 
to pass the new legislation on the Historic Center of Prizren, it failed to allocate 
financial means to the municipality of Prizren to implement the new competences 
and set up the institutions. The lack of local financial resources also challenges local 
budgeting for the establishment of the Committees and Councils foreseen by the 
new Law on the Historic Center of Prizren. Prizren officials blame the central 
government for weak planning abilities due to the lack of a financial plan when the 
law was drafted. On the other hand, the ICO maintains that fines listed in the Law 
on Spatial Planning and Law on Construction should be doubled for any violation 
within the Historic Center of Prizren (ICO 2011b). The latter stance is problematic 
considering the limitation of municipalities to set new taxes. The ICO utilized its 
oversight authority again in August 2012, issuing a Memo to the Minister of Finance 
raising the issue that “adequate funds have not been transferred to the municipality 
of Prizren” (MESP, Interview 2012). 
 
4.8. International agency involvement 
Involvement of international agencies in issues of cultural heritage in Kosovo is a 
fundamental part of heritage governance. Professional organizations such as 
UNESCO were fundamental in drawing attention to the damaged heritage 
especially in the immediate post-war phase. However, due to the lack of recognition 
of Kosovo’s independence by the UN, UNESCO’s role was further limited and 
under the shadow of Serbian institutions or the UNMIK administration.67
                                                 
67 UNESCO’s intervention in Kosovo dates back to 2003 with preliminary reports on a ‘Multi-ethnic 
 Kosovo’s 
sites registered on the World Heritage List still figure as Serbian properties. 
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Since the Declaration of Independence in 2008 the ICO took a steering role at the 
outset of the process, setting itself as a principal actor in the heritage discourse. The 
ICO represents a norm-setter due to its political clout to interpret the Ahtisaari 
Proposal and monitor its implementation. It utilized its authority as an oversight 
institution guarding Kosovo’s independence to drive the process. Its mandate in 
overseeing Kosovo’s state institutions became the highest condition over Kosovo 
authorities to adopt legislation deriving from the Ahtisaari principles. However, as 
its mandate drew to a close in 2012, the ICO interpretation of its role became subject 
to the success of Kosovo institutions adopting the ‘final’ obligations towards the 
international community. The ICO mandate includes monitoring the 
implementation of the Ahtisaari package yet in the process of adopting the Law on 
the Historic Center of Prizren, the ICO maintained that its main role was to secure 
the adoption of the Law (ICO Interview, 2012) with its implementation monitoring 
being a task for the remaining European Union Representative in the country. This 
showcased the ICO focus on norm setting rather than establishing sustainable 
mechanisms of cooperation between the fractured parties.  
Foreign embassies in Kosovo also took a role in this particular matter with the Greek 
Ambassador serving as spokesperson and interlocutor for the Serbian Orthodox 
Church. The SOC does not recognize the Kosovo-led institutions and therefore did 
not participate in direct communication with the central government authorities. 
The Greek Ambassador in Kosovo was strongly opposed by domestic stakeholders 
for upholding requests that every activity affecting the property of the Serbian 
Orthodox Church should require a request to the SOC and the latter’s consent.  
The previously adopted Law on Special Protective Zones reiterates the Ahtisaari 
provisions requiring consultations with the Serbian Orthodox Church regarding 
activities concerning Orthodox heritage. Bearing in mind the ICO promoted the 
Ahtisaari Proposal as the basis for proposing a new specific Law on the Historic 
Center for Prizren, it failed to clarify to all interest groups that the provisions of 
Special Protective Zones stipulated certain requirements for Prizren heritage 
management. Considering the political sensitivity of the issue, a national law 
regulating heritage management in the Historic Center of Prizren was considered 
necessary and legally binding for all state institutions rather than a municipal by-
law. Nevertheless, considering the lack of authority of both central and local 
government to enforce legislation, newly adopted legislation does not ensure its 
successful implementation. 
                                                                                                                              
culture in danger’ (UNESCO 2003) assessing the nature and extent of damage to buildings of heritage 
value during the UNMIK administration (Dumper & Larkin, 2012). Dumper and Larkin (2012) studies of 
Jerusalem’s divided heritage also show limitations of UNESCO’s mandate with state political sensitivities 
hindering its praxis. 
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Immediately after the war the Kosovo International Management Group carried out 
damage assessment for the European Commission issuing the ‘Kosovo Damage 
Assessment’ report with evaluations for repair on listed and public buildings. 
Technical projects in cultural heritage were numerous and included foreign 
universities and governments, various professional organizations such as Cultural 
Heritage without Borders as well as the experts from the Council of Europe and 
European Commission. The latter institutions included Kosovo in their ‘Integrated 
Rehabilitation Project Plan / Survey of the Architectural and Archaeological 
Heritage’ (IRPP/SAAH) for countries of South East Europe. Their Kosovo program 
focuses in prioritizing a list of monuments and sites requiring immediate attention. 
The report was finalized after the March 2004 riots and called on the European 
agencies to restore and protect cultural heritage in Kosovo. Through its cooperation 
with UNMIK and the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports, the Council of Europe 
was continuously involved in establishing the legal framework on heritage and 
remained a key institution in this sphere. However, due to the increasing 
involvement of the ICO and the political pressure to finalize the Ahtisaari-based 
legislation, the CoE was excluded from the drafting of the new Law on the Historic 
Center of Prizren. This showcased the political power of the ICO to lead the reform 
process and the drawbacks of the existing decision-making system. Nevertheless, 
government institutions, both at central and local level, bear responsibility for 
refusing to give civil society a role in the drafting process, thereby widening the gap 
in  trust between state and non-state actors. 
 
4.9. The civil society opposition 
Criticism from civil society organizations and experts led to a public schism 
between the ICO and the central government on one side and the civil society in the 
other. An activist states, “We received information about the drafting process 
through informal channels, as the ICO and the central government completely shut 
us out” (Civil society representative, Interview March 2012). Utilizing all 
institutionalised mechanisms, civil society organizations in Prizren organized and 
posed a strong opposition to the new legislation being drafted. Criticizing the lack 
of transparency in the drafting process, the Civil Society Coalition in Prizren 
gathered ten thousand signatures of Prizren inhabitants and submitted a request to 
the Kosovo Assembly for recognition of the ‘citizen’s voice’. According to the leader 
of the Civil Society Coalition: 
An entire society has declared itself against this law. Civil society, citizens, 
business community of Prizren, Municipal Assembly of Prizren, Kosova 
Council for Cultural Heritage, Institute for Protection of Monuments, 
Architects Association of Kosovo, opposition parties, Kosovo Assembly 
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Spatial Planning Committee, intellectuals and experts of cultural heritage 
have all voiced their strong opposition to the law. (Civil society 
representative, Interview March 2012).  
However, with the exception of publicized letters of opposition from the KCCH and 
the Islamic Council of Kosovo, opposition from other institutions was often mild. 
According to the ICO, due to political constraints, government representatives often 
altered their stance outside of the Working Group meetings when discussing with 
media (ICO interview 2012). In the later stages of the drafting process, comments 
received from the civil society were considered beneficial to the drafting process 
although they were received informally and outside of the official Working Groups. 
Officials from the Ministry of Environment and Spatial Planning maintain that this 
criticism of the draft law brought certain sensitive issues on the discussion table of 
the Working Group (MESP Interview 2012). Although this suggests a minor success 
of civil society, it nevertheless demonstrates the exclusive and centralized decision-
making mechanisms in force. 
Failure to involve citizens during the drafting process was also evident in the lack of 
public meetings organized by the Ministerial Working Group. The ICO maintains its 
stance that it is the government’s responsibility to include citizens in the decision-
making process and that “the national level government should have done more to 
go out and talk to the people, not the ICO” (ICO Interview, August 2012). According 
to the latter, publication of the draft Law on the Historic Center of Prizren was 
delayed because of the lack of internal agreement within members of the Working 
Group (ICO Interview, August 2012). A few meetings were organized at the local 
level, however they were restricted to solely invited guests thereby distorting the 
meaning of public meetings. This further limited the broader participation of 
citizens. The ICO presence at the meetings held in local communities demonstrates 
attempts to influence the citizens and symbolizes the political importance and 
international backing of these laws (KCCH Interview, 2013). Furthermore, public 
hearings were organized while the draft law was in the Assembly thus prohibiting 
any further comments as a result of the public hearings.68
The most organized local opposition came from the Prizren Ad-hoc Coalition on the 
Protection of the Historic Center, composed of a dozen non-governmental 
organizations working in the municipality. These included EC Ma Ndryshe 
(Different Emancipation), Fondacioni për Trashëgimi Kulturore (Cultural Heritage 
Fund), Forumi për Trashëgimi Kulturore (Forum for Cultural Heritage), Academy 
for Training and Technical Assistance, NGO, the Prizren branch of Kosovo 
Democratic Institute, GreenArt, X40, EUIRC, Ura e Artit (Art Bridge), Durmish 
 
                                                 
68 One public debate was hosted by Ministry of Environment and Spatial Planning in Prizren on October 
20th, 2011. 
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Asllano, ICEC, Old Timer Club Prizren and Shoqata e Bjeshkatarëve Sharri (Hiking 
Association). Half of the organizations involved are professionally engaged in the 
cultural heritage field or conduct activities related to culture in Prizren. These 
organisations mainly represent the Albanian majority population and the Turkish 
community. The majority of member organizations work with encouraging citizen 
participation in local decision-making. The professional expertise on cultural 
heritage issues is based on the few organizations which have worked on the field. 
The coalition member organizations working on cultural heritage promotion and 
informed on heritage issues were already active in the city during the development 
of the municipal Conservation and Development Plan. The leading organization of 
the Ad-hoc Coalition, EC Ma Ndryshe, is an active local organization in Prizren civil 
society especially engaged in monitoring the work of municipal authorities. Its role 
in heading the coalition was important in raising the interest of the broader public 
and involving the national media in the discussion on the Prizren Law. The Ad-hoc 
Coalition received support from Prishtina based NGOs and think tanks and was 
widely represented in national media debates. 
Civil society members of the Prizren Ad-Hoc Coalition initially accused the ICO of 
imposing its false interpretation of the Ahtisaari provisions and rejected the ICO 
claim for a new legislation regulating specifically the Prizren Historic Center. Their 
position altered during the course of developments calling on both local and central 
governments to open the decision-making process and improve the possibility of 
properly implementing the new law. Coalition member NGOs informed on cultural 
heritage issues led the petition process and organized protests in Prizren to show 
dissatisfaction on the exclusion of local civil society during the drafting process. The 
petition signed by ten thousand Prizren citizens was delivered to the Kosovo 
Assembly on September 19th, 2011. It was organized immediately after the Kosovo 
Government resubmitted the draft Law on Prizren to the Kosovo Assembly a week 
after the latter had rejected the first draft. The petition’s main clause stated the 
following: 
The drafting of a Law on the Historic Center of Prizren must be an 
inclusive process involving all interest groups. This type of law may not 
grant privileges to specific groups, specifically to religious communities 
(FES 2011). 
The Kosovo Assembly disregarded the petition signed by Prizren inhabitants on the 
draft Law and the petition was not mentioned in the two plenary sessions of 
discussions on the draft Law on Prizren. Whilst organizations monitoring the work 
of the Assembly Committees were present during the Committee meetings on the 
draft Law, there was lack of communication between civil society organizations 
working on this particular issue and the Assembly Committee. The Prizren civil 
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society Coalition addressed the Kosovo Assembly through an open letter appealing 
to the Assembly for ‘inclusion of the interested organizations in the drafting process 
from beginning to end’ (EC Ma Ndryshe, October 2011). 
Similarly, civil society representatives argue that the Presidency ignored the civil 
society and the voice of the people stating, “we hoped the President will not sign the 
new Law, as a recognition of the will of society” (Interview 2012). Despite this 
opposition, the law was finally adopted in the Kosovo Assembly in April 2012. Due 
to the Law’s adoption as part of the Ahtisaari Package, its status was elevated into a 
‘fundamental’ law requiring a double majority in the Kosovo Assembly for its 
amendment. This is a critical benchmark difficult to meet considering the lack of 
inter-ethnic cooperation in the Assembly.  
 
4.10. Conclusion 
Discussion on heritage governance in Kosovo is not limited to conservation 
mechanisms and schemes for integrating heritage protection with local development 
plans but rather includes a political economy dimension, highlighting it as a 
politically contentious issue in Kosovo’s transition. The long legacy of conflict 
between Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo Albanians has harmed cultural heritage in the 
country through neglect and deliberate attacks. The expectations of the Kosovo 
Serbs and the Kosovo Albanians concerning cultural protection differ significantly. 
Clashing meanings of this heritage have also undermined most attempts to portray 
a common culture and identity. UNMIK advertisements promoting reconciliation 
often used cultural heritage sites as means to draw attention to a common culture 
and common identity. As the Kosovar scholar Edi Shukriu argues, monasteries and 
Orthodox churches require political solutions instead of programs solely directed to 
increasing visits to these sites (Shukriu 2008). The refusal of the Serbian Orthodox 
Church to cooperate with Kosovo-led institutions, including the local government in 
Prizren, has further undermined progress towards inclusive mechanisms of 
decision-making and further solidified the involvement of international agencies as 
mediators. 
The drafting process for the new Law on the Historic Center of Prizren was a 
centralized decision-making process. With limited information sharing amongst 
both central and local actors and exclusive towards non-state actors, this process 
developed an environment in which state institutions are increasingly viewed as 
unresponsive to citizen demands. Prizren citizens consider themselves as an 
inclusive community, taking pride in the cultural landscape noted for linguistic and 
religious diversity. The process leading to the adoption of the new Law on the 
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Historic Center of Prizren damaged state-society relations and polarized the local 
and central government actors. 
Overall, the governance process was flawed due to a series of factors. ICO acted as 
an imposing agency and utilized its authority as an oversight institution guarding 
Kosovo’s independence to drive the process and pressure domestic institutions. The 
international community insistence on a centralized decision-making process goes 
against their strong advocacy for decentralization in the last years and undermines 
the role of the local in the process. In addition, the previously adopted Law on 
Special Protective Zones reiterates the Ahtisaari provisions requiring consultations 
with the Serbian Orthodox Church regarding activities concerning Orthodox 
heritage. Bearing in mind the ICO promoted the Ahtisaari Proposal as the basis for 
proposing a new specific Law on the Historic Center for Prizren, it failed to clarify to 
all interest groups that the provisions of Special Protective Zones stipulated certain 
requirements of consultations for Prizren heritage governance. Considering the 
political sensitivity of the issue, a national law regulating heritage governance in the 
Historic Center of Prizren was valued necessary and legally binding for all state 
institutions rather than a municipal by-law. However, the establishment of new 
structures and institutions, such as the Council for Cultural Heritage within the 
Historic Center of Prizren, without a functional Implementation Monitoring Council 
at the central level can have dire consequences for the municipality of Prizren. 
Lastly, the ICO promoted Special Protective Zones for providing a necessary link 
between the Serbian Orthodox church and municipalities. However, it resorted to 
facilitating SOC negotiations only at the central level considering the latter’s refusal 
to recognize municipal authorities. 
The absence of a central government direction for the cultural heritage policy holds 
back reforms at the local level. Furthermore, the Ministry of Environment and 
Spatial Planning and the ICO established themselves as the main gatekeepers in the 
entire process. As leading members of the Inter-Ministerial Working Group in 
charge of drafting the legislation, their lack of transparency and centralized 
decision-making deepened the divisions with local stakeholders including political 
groups and civil society organisations. The central government, including the 
Ministry of Environment and Spatial Planning failed to include civil society actors 
as well as the Kosovo Council for Cultural Heritage. Their role as leaders of the 
Ministerial Working Group was pivotal in setting the tone for the draft Law on 
Prizren. Their decision to maintain a centralized Working Group without access to 
information from outside agencies stirred opposition from non-state institutions.  
Other barriers to improve the decision-making process were weak institutional 
capacities at the local level. This concerns the failure to protect heritage sites in 
Prizren according to existing municipal urban planning and development 
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regulations. Failure to implement proper protection against illegal construction 
damaged their role in exercising local autonomy and efficiently implementing their 
competences. Municipal authorities lacked sufficient understanding of the role of 
the SOC as a specific actor in Kosovo’s post-Independence political landscape. 
Opposition to the new Law on Prizren’s Historic Center was heavily based on the 
premise that it gave the SOC privileged rights in the management of the Historic 
Center. However, these rights were already requested with the 2008 Law on Special 
Protective Zones in which Prizren heritage is listed. The final adopted Law on the 
Historic Center enhanced the decision-making role of other religious communities, 
by establishing membership of three main religions in the new municipal Cultural 
Heritage Council. 
The exclusion of important institutions such as the Kosova Council of Cultural 
Heritage and the Council of Europe from meetings of the Working Group, is a clear 
display of the centralized mode of decision-making.69
During the legislation drafting process, political pressure became a norm and 
included ICO demands on the government to finalize the draft law as well as 
pressure from the central government on the municipality of Prizren to accept the 
new legislation. Its reserved right to interpret the Ahtisaari Comprehensive Status 
Proposal fortified the ICO’s influence. In promoting a new law specifically for the 
Historic Center of Prizren, the ICO in fact supersedes the Ahtisaari principles, which 
put the Prizren municipality in charge of establishing the historic zone. Pressure to 
push forward policies and legislation reform does not leave room for broad 
discussion and public involvement. According to a member of the Working Group, 
the prevailing concern was “to approve the law because it is our obligation towards 
the international community, regardless if we implement it or not” (CHwB 
Interview, September 2012). Instead of using these shifts as opportunities to 
strengthen protection of cultural heritage, this stance perpetuates a state of limbo 
and ex-ante sets the new legislation up for failure. 
 There was a broad perception 
among domestic stakeholders that the ICO was responsible for the success or failure 
of this particular set of Ahtisaari-based laws. However, this argument is utilized for 
the political benefit of Kosovo authorities. Domestic stakeholders are able to resign 
their responsibilities and “blame” the ICO for any failures. Consequently, the lack of 
accountability for failing to implement the new legislation weakens local 
governance and impairs successful reforms in heritage management. 
                                                 
69 A similar example of this practice is the government’s refusal to acknowledge the Kosovo Assembly 
authority when it resubmitted the draft Law, unchanged, to the Assembly in mid 2011. The draft Law 
was returned to the government requesting changes a week before its resubmission (Civil society 
representative, Interview March 2012). 
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Integrating local responses in decision-making has the significant benefit of 
restoring trust in institutions. Partnering with subnational actors benefits the 
implementation of reforms as well as knowledge flow. Particularly in cultural 
heritage management, the central government may benefit from the local materials, 
skills and know-how (Barakat 2007). However, both central government and 
international actors often fail to build partnership with local initiatives and thereby 
decrease chances of successful reform. In the Kosovo case, this partnership was 
difficult to form and communication between different institutions was very 
problematic due to differing interests. Excluding key institutions from the 
legislation drafting process risks the potential for successful implementation of the 
law once it is adopted. The civil society leaders refuse the new legislation and have 
clearly stated their readiness to block the implementation by advocating the boycott 
of the new Council by civil society representatives (Civil society representative, 
Interview March 2012). 
This environment constrained full cooperation and damaged trust in institutions 
and overall transparency. In an already burdened bureaucracy and weak state 
capacities these shortcomings inflict lasting damage especially in relation to local-
central cooperation. The process of drafting legislation on heritage management in 
Kosovo exhibits a paradox of governance reforms. Pressure from international 
agencies to enhance regulation in fact harmed transparency and accountability. 
Weak cooperation between local and central authorities as well as between state and 
non-state institution undermined the progress of functional and inclusive heritage 
governance, which includes the Serbian Orthodox Church. Attempts to strengthen 
state authority without opening up the process of decision-making risks led to the 
implementation of the new legislation failing thus perpetuating the state’s 
weakness. 
Cultural heritage is understood as the process and relation between people and their 
environment and thus entails an aspect of cultural continuity. As such, heritage 
governance must allow for flexibility and adaptability over time in order to adapt to 
and reflect the changes that occur within society. The requirement of a double 
majority to change the national legislation on the Historic Center of Prizren limits 
the adaptability of heritage protection mechanisms and their relationship with the 
citizens of Prizren. 
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Appendix 4A. Chronology of drafting process events 
 
2008    Inter-Ministerial Working Group established  
2010 Kosovo Assembly establishes Kosovo Council for Cultural 
Heritage 
2011   Implementation Monitoring Council is established 
27 July 2011  Kosovo Government approves Draft Law on Prizren and 
submits it to Kosovo Assembly 
10 August 2011   Kosovo Government votes on Draft Law on Village Hoca e 
Madhe (this is declared as the last Law required by the 
Ahtisaari package) 
22 August 2011  Assembly Committee for Agriculture, Forestry, Rural 
Development, Environment and Spatial Planning 
recommends to the Assembly the Draft Law on Historic 
Center of Prizren not be adopted and is sent back to the 
government for revisions. 
23 August 2011  Kosovo Assembly votes on first reading of draft Law on 
Historic Center of Prizren. MPs voted 44 for the law and 46 
against. Draft law is rejected and goes back to Government. 
1 September 2011  Kosovo Government Meeting, Prime Minister approves the 
Draft Law on Prizren and (re) submits it to Kosovo 
Assembly 
9 September 2011 Municipal Assembly of Prizren declaration against the 
(current version of) draft Law on the Historic Center of 
Prizren  
19 September 2011  Prizren Coalition of NGOs for Prizren submits petition 
results to Kosovo Assembly. 
January 2012   Prizren Coalition organized protest in Prizren 
20 April 2012  Kosovo Assembly approves Law on Historic Center of 
Prizren with a series of amendments 
09 July 2012  Law comes into effect after being signed by the Kosovo 
President. 
17 August 2012  Government approves Concept Note on new Draft Law on 
Cultural Heritage 
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Appendix 4B. Institutional structure of cultural heritage management 
 
 
 
118 
 
 
 
119 
 
 
5.  The young (unemployed) Europeans: enabling 
youth participation in local decision-making 
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5.1.  Introduction  
This chapter explores the structure and agency of state authorities and civil society 
organisations promoting youth engagement in local decision-making. Focusing on 
youth policy allows us to examine the vast evidence of new interaction between 
national and local state institutions and non-state structures established to promote 
youth engagement. This policy area helps articulate the extent to which the 
formation of new mechanisms for civic participation has enhanced youth 
engagement. The chapter explores how these new processes of collaboration have 
transformed the government stance towards youth policy and their representative 
structures and vice-versa. The youth sector is explored because of the high degree of 
variation between municipalities regarding how local authorities and civil society 
organisations respond to change.  
The chapter investigates the potential that the externally driven initiative of 
establishing Youth Action Councils in municipalities has in engaging young citizens 
in local decision-making processes. It evaluates the various factors enabling such an 
engagement including the significance of close relations between civil society 
leaders and the municipal leadership for effective cooperation. Furthermore, it 
explores the assumption that political leadership support to the cause of youth 
participation is more likely to secure strong partnerships with youth organizations. 
Lastly, effective collaboration is contingent upon an active approach of civil society 
organizations as well as an openness of civil servants towards non-state agencies. To 
enable an in-depth study of the factors influencing relations between government 
institutions and civil society actors, a series of municipalities were selected with a 
varying degree of cooperation between youth structures and municipal authorities 
and varying levels of efficacy of local institutions.  
The first section of the chapter explores the key policies on youth and provides an 
institutional mapping of the most important structures in youth participation. This 
is followed by an analysis of the role of Youth Action Councils as a new local 
endeavour for engaging young citizen in local activities. The final section offers in-
depth information on three case studies showcasing the work of Youth Action 
Councils in various municipalities with differing results. 
The legal framework supports youth engagement in decision-making processes. 
New legislation and regulations present opportunities for youth organisations to 
engage and address their concerns with state institutions. The establishment of 
municipal youth councils is a novel approach to recognizing the power of a 
significant part of the population in the country. However, weak enforcement and 
implementation were one of the biggest challenges throughout the municipalities. 
Over the recent years, various initiatives to promote youth engagement have been 
introduced yet the effectiveness of these initiatives is contingent upon various 
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factors. Central government attention to the youth sector is important in aligning the 
interest of domestic and international agencies working with youth. Local 
leadership and political support from the municipal mayors proves important in 
advancing new mechanisms of cooperation in local decision-making. In addition, 
the drive of local civil servants and youth organisations to collaborate across the 
state/non-state realm are also crucial for embedding a new culture of collaboration 
between youth and municipal authorities. 
 
5.2.  Case study: engagement of young Europeans 
According to the Kosovo Statistics Agency, half of the Kosovo population is under 
the age of 25. Kosovo has the largest youth share of total population in Europe. The 
2011 elected central government is also marked by the young age of its cabinet 
members. Adversely, Kosovo has the highest unemployment rate in Europe and 
Central Asia at 45 % with youth particularly vulnerable to unemployment and 
poverty (World Bank 2008). The workforce belonging to the age group 15 – 24 who 
are part of the workforce, 55.3% are unemployed. In addition, 35.1 % of the same 
age group are not active in education, work or training. Finally, young Kosovars are 
twice as likely to be unemployed when compared to older citizen (KSA 2011, 9). 
This data points to an emergent situation affecting a particularly vital part of the 
population. With approximately 30.000 Kosovar young adults entering the work 
force annually, in practice, this means they enter the ranks of the unemployed 
(UNDP 2006). Lack of practical work, including internships or seasonal jobs makes 
them inexperienced for work. In addition, there is no regulated recognition for 
voluntary work, whether in the community, non-government organizations, 
associations or the like. The international promotional campaign for Kosovo 
launched in late 2009, to promote Kosovo in the international media, sought to 
brand Kosovo as a newly independent, democratic nation, focusing on the power of 
its young population. The slogan ‘Kosovo: The Young Europeans’ seemed 
disingenuous and was criticised by civil society considering the dire role of youth in 
the country and their lack of education and employment opportunities. 
According to UNICEF studies in Kosovo, the young population has a limited impact 
on the decision-making processes for to two reasons, namely that institutions rarely 
feel obliged to respect youths’ right to participate, and young people do not 
consider participation a civic responsibility (UNICEF/IKS 2010). This is 
accompanied by the young population’s perceptions of their own weakness and 
inability to have an impact on their socio-political environment. Data from 2006 
public opinion polls show around 80 percent of young citizens surveyed declaring 
they cannot have any impact on the affairs and issues happening in their 
municipality (UNDP 2006). Youth eagerness to participate is also dependent on 
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Kosovo institutions establishing channels to engage youth to advocate for their 
interests. For a decade after the 1999 war, youth activism was not particularly 
regulated. The Kosovar Youth Council (KYC) was founded in 1999 as an attempt to 
revive a culture of voluntarism (CoE 2011). The 1990s was a period when so-called 
institutional voluntarism did exist in Kosovo. Throughout that decade, a parallel 
government provided various services to the Albanian population through a large 
volunteer movement in the country. The extent and type of volunteering changed 
significantly after 1999. International organizations began providing many of the 
services that volunteers had been responsible for and a large number of local NGOs 
were established to help increase effective service delivery (UNDP 2006).  
 
5.3. Policies and institutions working on youth participation 
With the establishment of the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports (MCYS) in 2002 
a central government institution was given the role of adopting policies to empower 
youth. The Youth Department, within MCYS, is the leading institution in the field, 
responsible for policy development and coordination of all institutions working on 
youth. The Youth Department works closely with five Youth Directorates in the 
largest municipalities and maintains links to municipal-level Directorates of 
Culture, Youth and Sport. Many of the municipal youth programs are implemented 
through youth NGOs. The Department is also responsible for the regulation of 
youth organizations, youth networks and Youth Centers in municipalities. 
Throughout the years, some donor agencies have agreed to fund activities of Youth 
Centers through the Ministry’s Youth Department.  
The Kosovo government addressed specific youth policies at the national level in 
2003. The Department for Youth within the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports 
developed a series of policy papers delineating basic activity areas. These included 
issues such as youth employment and participation in decision-making, which were 
later incorporated into youth policies promoted by the Ministry. In 2003-2004, the 
Department of Youth, supported by the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) 
and the German Development Cooperation Agency (GIZ), in cooperation with the 
International Council on National Youth Policy (ICNYP) and a team of local lawyers 
in Prishtina, started working in the first draft of the Law on Youth Empowerment 
and Participation. Based on the results from both these processes, the Ministry’s 
Department of Youth proposed the development of a Kosovo Youth Strategy and 
Action Plan (KYSAP) in order to meet the needs of the young population.  The new 
policy was finally adopted by the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports in May 
2009. Its design and development involved various youth organizations such as the 
Kosovo Youth Network (KYN). A number of conferences were organized at the 
regional and local levels to ensure an active role for young people and their 
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organizations in the process of drafting and implementation of the KYSAP. The 
drafting stage included a number of events, conferences and roundtables. In 
particular, there were continuous consultations with youth and youth organizations. 
During the drafting stage of the Kosovo Youth Strategy and Action Plan there were 
also consultations with the members of the Kosovo Assembly and the process was 
also presented to the Committee for Education, Science, Technology, Culture, Youth 
and Sports. Meetings were held with representatives of youth forums of political 
parties in Kosovo.  
The lack of an institutional framework for youth participation was identified as a 
key factor in the first conference on KYPAP held on November 2005. According to 
participants, many of whom represented youth NGOs, there is insufficient 
cooperation between youth NGOs and the Government of Kosovo. They argued 
that Kosovo youth is excluded from the decision-making process and youth groups 
and organizations are not regularly invited to relevant discussions that affect their 
lives (UNICEF/IKS 2010). 
The KYSAP policy aimed to ensure support for the youth sector at a local level by 
enabling collaboration between municipal authorities and youth organizations in 
drafting and implementing local youth policies and action plans. The strategy 
addresses six subject areas that affect the lives of the young population including 
youth participation, education, employment, health, human security and culture, 
sports and leisure time activities. It aims at improving the situation of young people 
from 15-24 years of age by involving all relevant governmental and non-
governmental institutions in exploring and meeting the needs of youth and by 
finding ways and mechanisms to increase youth participation in the decision 
making process in Kosovo. KYSAP encourages cooperation between youth 
organizations and the Government, between all the Ministries dealing with youth 
related activities and between central and municipal bodies to strengthen youth 
policies and programs. The Youth Statement in the KYPAP strategy addresses the 
impact of unemployment as follows:  
Unemployment and its impact on young people are serious issues that 
affect the development and wellbeing of Kosovo youth. In a region where 
there is high youth unemployment, young people must be recognized as a 
resource for progressive economic development; therefore, the 
Government should create mechanisms to ensure that young people are 
involved in the economic development strategies, and that youth issues are 
considered as a priority (KYSAP 2009, 12). 
To facilitate the work between line ministries, the Inter-Ministerial Council on Youth 
was established. The primary role of the Council is advising the KYSAP 
implementation body (Article 7.1 KYSAP). Line ministries, members of the Council 
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(including the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology, the Ministry of Labor 
and Social Welfare, the Ministry of Health, and others) are obliged to meet 
periodically to give advice and supervise the KYPAP implementation phase. Upon 
successful establishment of all Youth Action Councils in the country, the Inter-
Ministerial Council will be transformed into a co-management council where the 
Kosovo Youth Action Council representatives will sit together with ministries’ 
representatives. In practice, the Inter-Ministerial Council did not convene with the 
main collaboration functioning directly between the national Youth Action Council 
and the Ministry.  
Drafting of the Law on Youth Empowerment and Participation (Nr. 03/L-145) 
started in 2003; however, the process dragged on for many years. The Law on 
Empowerment and Participation of Youth was finally adopted in September 2009 
and represented the strongest commitment by the government to youth inclusion to 
date. Kosovo is one of only a few countries with a Law on Strengthening Youth 
Participation. Addressing citizen of ages between 15 and 24, the law encourages the 
setting up of formal mechanisms to empower youth participation regular 
participation of youth, in particular by drafting and implementing sectional policies 
related to the interests of young people. The law was an important step in 
supporting youth participation in decision-making processes, outlining central and 
local government responsibilities towards youth and organizations representing 
their interests and promoting the importance of voluntary work. The law also 
outlined obligations for institutions in recognizing Youth Centers. The Kosovo 
Youth Strategy and the Kosovo Youth Action Plan adopted in November 2009 
complemented the new Law. In addition, the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports 
adopted a series of Administrative Instructions (AI) in 2010 to facilitate the 
implementation of the new law. These include the Administrative Instruction On 
Responsibilities and Procedures of Establishing and Functioning of Youth Action 
Councils in Kosovo (9/2010), Administrative Instruction on Youth Voluntary Work 
(10/2010), Administrative Instruction on licensing of Youth Centers (11/2010) and 
Administrative Instruction On Non-formal Education for Youth. 
At the local level, youth policy falls within the competences of the Directorate in 
charge of education, culture, youth and sports. Competences of the Municipal 
Directorate for Culture, Youth and Sports include organizing public debates on 
development of culture, youth and sports, and supporting local groups, clubs, 
associations or other forms of organizations. It is required to closely cooperate with 
other institutions within the municipality as well as link with other regions. The 
Directorate reports to the mayor and may also be asked to report to committees of 
the Municipal Assembly. Within the Directorate, the Sector for Youth normally 
employs only one official in charge of youth policy. The youth sector is responsible 
for counselling, information dissemination, developing local policies, strategies and 
 
125 
 
actions plans for youth. In most municipalities, municipal officials working on 
youth policy have been engaged with the administration for many years. Thus 
officials have established relations with leaders of youth organizations, particularly 
organizations that have been active for many years. This relationship proves 
important in maintaining contact and developing collaboration. The leadership of 
many non-governmental organizations remains the same thus enabling a lasting 
relationship between municipal officials and certain civil society leaders. 
Existing public surveys suggest those young citizens are not knowledgeable 
regarding the existing legal framework and policies on youth. Survey data from 
2010 shows that the overwhelming majority of Kosovo citizen, of 64% are not aware 
of the Kosovo Youth Action Plan (UNDP 2010). At the local level, municipalities 
differ not only in setting up structures of cooperation between authorities and civil 
society organisations, but also in the efficacy of exercising their mission and 
conducting activities. Among those young citizens aware of the work of their 
Municipal Youth Offices, the municipalities of Gjilan, Prizren, Prishtina and Peja 
enjoy the highest number of young people satisfied or very satisfied with their work 
(38%, 33%, 31.5% and 30% respectively)70
The international community has contributed in developing the country’s youth 
policy through its technical assistance and financial contributions for youth projects, 
organizations and the functioning of Youth Centers. There are several international 
organizations engaged in youth empowerment and working towards strengthening 
the role of youth in decision-making. Throughout the last 13 years, active 
organizations in the field of youth policy have included UNICEF, World Bank, The 
German Society for International Cooperation (Gesellschaft für Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit - GIZ), the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency 
(SIDA) and OSCE. A two-year project from SIDA focused on capacity building and 
aimed at specializing municipal staff on youth issues. UNICEF was an important 
agency in assisting the drafting of the Law on Youth Empowerment, developing the 
strategy and action plans and drafting of the Ministry’s Administrative instructions. 
In recent years, USAID has also addressed the policy field with specific projects 
such as Youth and Education (USAID Kosovo, n.d.). In 2010, the British Council also 
initiated its “Active Citizens” project to strengthen youth participation in the 
country. It focuses on six municipalities including Hani i Elezit, Kamenica, Gjilan, 
Podujeva, Gjakova and Viti (British Council, n.d.). During this period, the OSCE 
Mission in Kosovo assisted the establishment of thirteen Municipal Youth 
Assemblies as a mechanism to mobilize youth in activities of importance to them. 
The OSCE Mission in Kosovo is mandated with human rights protection and 
 (UNDP 2010). 
                                                 
70 The key areas in which young people want to see their Municipal Youth Office focusing on are: 
trainings for youth (80%) and employment and education for youth (63% each). 
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promotion, democratization and security and public safety sector development. The 
OSCE hosted its first conference on youth empowerment in 2011 to support the 
establishment of central- and local youth action councils in Kosovo. The main aim of 
the OSCE initiative is enabling democratic institutions and increasing youth 
participation in decision-making. The OSCE, with the largest presence at the local 
level amongst the international organizations working in Kosovo, was already 
extensively involved in strengthening capacities of local institutions. According to 
the OSCE, their engagement aims at “involving young people in the actual decision-
making processes by giving them a say in the long-term planning and the creation 
of policies” (OSCE Senior Official, Interview June 2012).  
Initially, GIZ commenced the establishment of local Youth Action Councils (YACs) 
in a number of municipalities as well as the establishment of the National Youth 
Action Council (NYAC). The national and local YACs invited the OSCE to provide 
their assistance after the initial phase of cooperation with the GIZ. The OSCE 
involvement was based on offering technical assistance, providing trainings and 
capacity building activities. In 2010 the OSCE got involved with establishing YACs 
in municipalities where they didn’t exist and their collaboration at national level 
followed in 2011. The establishment of the YACs in 31 municipalities as consultative 
bodies was an accomplishment of the project (OSCE Democratization Official, 
Interview June 2012). The OSCE commitment in each municipality is facilitated by 
the organization’s presence in the field and familiarity with municipal 
administrations and youth community. Most importantly, establishing cooperation 
with the municipal Directorate of Education, Culture and Youth set up a formal 
channel of communication between the parties. 
 
5.5.  Youth Action Councils 
Youth Action Councils are registered as NGOs operating in their respective 
municipalities and they represent a network of active local youth organizations. 
They are interest groups representing youth interests in their municipalities. The 
Councils are advisory bodies on youth issues for all local institutions (AI 9/2010). 
According to the OSCE, these types of structures are more effective in presenting a 
unified stance before municipal authorities, given that the municipal mayor may call 
upon the YAC when there are requests for advice on the youth sector (OSCE official, 
Interview May 2012). For these relations to take place, municipal authorities must 
formally recognize the YAC as a partner to enable their cooperation. The official 
recognition by the municipality is valid for 2 years. According to the OSCE, 
recognition by mayors brings about some responsibilities towards YACs and 
enables the survival of these structures. Official recognition of the Youth Action 
Council established in the municipality obliges local authorities to invite the YAC to 
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meetings of committees and debates relating to youth issues. The municipality’s 
official Activity Plan is often drafted with the help of YAC members. According to 
OSCE officials, ‘the OSCE has helped by getting state institutions to recognize these 
new structures’ (OSCE official, Interview 2012). To increase citizen participation and 
invite youth organizations to join these structures, public awareness campaigns 
were held throughout the country. 
In this initiative, particular attention was given to newly established municipalities 
where YAC members complained that municipal officials lack capacities and 
knowledge on youth rights and legislation. Kosovo authorities do not commonly 
recognize a process of knowledge transfer from non-state actors onto municipal 
authorities. Having members of successful Youth Action Councils provide 
municipal Youth Officials with training would present a novel approach in the 
country. According to the OSCE Head of Mission, “the fact that the Councils are 
now regularly meeting with the municipal representatives and that many 
municipalities were willing to finance at least some youth-related activities, are 
positive signs […] local and central level institutions have started to address their 
concerns and respond to their initiatives and requests” (OSCE, 2012). There are 22 
Youth Action Councils in the country. Some of these structures have not yet 
received their official certificates from the Ministry of Public Administration and 
thus do not figure as legal entities. All YACs are required to register as NGOs to 
apply for formal recognition by their respective municipalities. Municipalities such 
as Kamenica and Viti do not have certificates yet. The YAC of the new municipality 
of 	³Ȧ	°anica has already been established and received its recognition 
from the municipality (Interview National YAC, April 2013).  
One of the challenges in exercising activities in the youth sector is the lack of 
facilities preventing municipal authorities in exercising youth activities, inhibiting 
cooperation between youth organisations themselves as well as impeding young 
citizen from accessing institutions. Once the municipality fails to deliver the services 
it is legally obliged to provide, it depends on youth organizations themselves to find 
the necessary facilities. In some instances the local Youth Action Councils signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoUs) with the municipal Education Directorate 
to utilize schools for activities. This encourages sharing facilities to cut costs and 
pushes municipalities to allow new actors to use existing municipal resources. 
Youth Action Councils in towns have more access to resources whereas villages 
have limited access to resources as well as municipal officials. Only nine 
municipalities in remote areas have youth clubs and these are used by the local YAC 
for their activities. 
Data from interviews suggests that the lack of financial sustainability for YACs is a 
significant challenge for enhancing youth participation. The formal recognition by 
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the municipal government, and the approval of the Youth Action Plans by the 
Municipal Assembly, do not necessarily secure financial resources for local YAC 
functions. Once financial assistance is secured from local government, this is 
restricted to funding the YACs counselling and advising activities. Local Youth 
Councils, as well as YACs in general, are not permitted to receive funding from 
municipalities to implement projects.71
Despite the challenges, positive outcomes from YAC activities have emerged. 
Throughout Kosovo, many local YAC adopted their Action Plans in 2012 and 
achieved approval from their respective Municipal Assemblies. Considering the big 
differences between the levels of capacities in YAC in different municipalities, 
especially urban and rural, ‘stronger’ YAC are encouraged to help weaker ones. 
According to the OSCE, YACs are encouraged to share documents, translations and 
strategies with each other (OSCE Senior Official, Interview June 2012). This instils 
horizontal cooperation and knowledge transfer amongst municipalities. An active 
approach by municipal officials to develop their own capacities and expertise on 
youth engagement is important for the municipality’s success and a continuous 
improvement of local youth policies. The Gjilan case shows the importance of this 
 During 2012, the Ministry of Finance, 
Ministry of Local Government Administration and Ministry of Culture, Youth and 
Sports initiated discussions for a separate code for YAC and Youth policies 
specifically. This would raise the importance of youth policy at the national level 
and grant higher budgets and allow for better budget planning in municipalities. 
Furthermore, it would enable YAC in municipalities to lobby more concretely for 
budget allocation for their activities. At the central level, the Ministry of Culture, 
Youth and Sports has offered to take over financial assistance for capacity building 
of Councils to ensure sustainability of the YAC structures. However, their concrete 
actions in this direction are to be verified after the OSCE decrease in their assistance 
(OSCE Interviews, June 2012). Furthermore, the World Bank with its Kosovo Youth 
Development Program has also been actively involved in capacity building of 
existing Youth Centers offering grants for establishing new resource Centers in the 
country (CoE, 2011). Whereas these large donor organizations channel their funds 
through the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports, at the local level budgeting 
support for youth activities and support for Youth Action Councils in municipalities 
is not regulated through a separate budget code. Allocating a budget for youth 
depends on the success of the Municipal Youth Officer advocating for a higher 
budget within the municipal Directorate for Youth. 
                                                 
71 According to OSCE interviewees local organizations belonging to YAC are mistakenly applying for 
project implementation assuming that “counseling’ and “advising” are insignificant activities thus they 
want to implement larger projects as well. This is more a sign of their lack of understanding of 
procedures and of their own role (OSCE Interviews, June 2012). 
 
 
129 
 
active approach, which resulted in exchanging information and experience with 
other municipalities. In 2012, the Gjilan Youth Official hosted a regional conference 
inviting eight municipalities to discuss youth policies and exchange ideas on 
mechanisms for engaging youth in decision-making. In cooperation with UNDP, the 
same official also organized conferences at the national level to enable collaboration 
between municipalities. Participants in these events included mayors, Directors of 
the Municipal Directorate for Culture, Youth and Sports, representatives of youth 
organizations etc. According to the Youth Official, colleagues from other 
municipalities are not creative and lack initiative, and stating “they have to come up 
with ideas on how to engage youth (Interview, April 2013). The Gjilan Youth 
Official also participated in and competed a certified program on youth 
engagement. Out of the 25 other participants included, there were representatives 
from the Ministry of Culture, USAID, SIDA, UNDP and NGO representatives 
working on youth (Gjilan Youth Official Interview, April 2013). 
Other examples of successful activities include engaging youth volunteers in 
various YAC. One example is the YACs involvement in the countrywide initiative 
“Let’s Do It Kosovo (Clean Up)”. This helped in raising awareness and promoted 
the image of YAC throughout the country. “People now recognize YAC. Now 
they’re recognized as a force, a movement” (OSCE Official, Interview June 2012). 
Other notable cases of cooperation include the municipality of Podujeva where the 
Youth Action Council was very active in 2011 when harsh winter conditions led to a 
state of emergency. The municipal mayor, together with YAC activists, cleaned the 
streets of the municipality. In comparison, the capital of Prishtina has shown the 
highest resistance in opening up its meetings and collaborating with YAC. The 
Policy and Finance Committee in Prishtina refused permission to NGOs to 
participate in its meetings, despite this being a legal requirement of all municipal 
authorities (INPO Interview June 2012). 
At the central level, the national YAC cooperates with the Ministry of Culture, 
Youth and Sports. OSCE officials describe the Department of Youth, within the 
MCYS, as very cooperative, who have ‘helped as much as they could’ (OSCE 
Official, Interview June 2012). The Ministry contributed with financial resources to 
cover expenses for the offices of the National YAC. In 2012, the national Youth 
Action Council adopted a development strategy. However, the OSCE argues, the 
YAC still lacks experience considering its recent establishment. This weakens their 
role as partners for local authorities, which is necessary to influence government 
institutions. Similar to civil servants in the executive branch, new MPs in the Kosovo 
Assembly are not informed about youth issues nor about the work of Kosovo 
National Youth Action Council. According to the OSCE, the YAC must engage and 
direct its activities towards informing and influencing the work of these institutions. 
One of these activities concerns the age definition of young in the existing 
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legislation. YAC in Kosovo are lobbying to change the law to increase the age and 
enable guardianship of existing capacities. As one OSCE interviewee states, 
‘capacity building is going to waste since older members of Councils can no longer 
contribute after they reach the age-limit” (OSCE Official, Interview June 2012). 
Another type of local institution developed for engaging youth is that of youth 
centers. From 2000 until 2010, 31 municipal-level youth centers in Kosovo were 
established and financially supported by donors, which included GTZ, OSCE, 
UNDP and UNICEF. They have played an important role in the informal vocational 
education of youth by organizing courses in foreign languages, information 
technology, journalism, tailoring and other subjects, as well as seeking to increase 
employment opportunities. In a few municipalities, new buildings were built to 
house youth centers or existing buildings were modified to enable activities. In 
many cases the centers were established without cooperation with central 
institutions, often bypassing local authorities. They faced structural problems that 
challenged their work of reaching out to young people. Without their own budget, 
they relied on funds from MCYS and international organizations and depended on 
municipal support for free use of facilities and utilities. Very few of the 
municipalities offered them office space and funded certain expenses like electricity 
and water (UNICEF/IKS 2010). This led to many youth centers becoming 
dysfunctional due to the lack of facilities and funding for activities. Renewed efforts 
by youth organisations and municipal authorities were required to reactivate youth 
centers. The capital of Prishtina, as the biggest municipality and the highest 
concentration of civil society organizations, the absence of space for youth activities 
was a major constraint. As the municipal Youth Official declares, the lack of a 
designated space for the municipal youth center was a big challenge for many years 
(Prishtina Municipal Youth Official Interview, April 2013). 
Youth centers offer facilities for programs and activities for young people. Youth 
centers also require an official license from the municipal Directorate for Culture, 
Youth and Sports, as stipulated by the Administrative Instruction No. 11/2010. In 
2011 there were 25 youth centers operating throughout 36 Kosovo municipalities. 
Youth centers are usually hosted in building facilities allocated by the local 
government and are run by NGOs. The Centers focus on matching their programs to 
the interests of high-school students, who may also be willing to pay for additional 
educational skills such as computer and language skills (CoE, 2011). The youth 
centers also serve as a meeting point for youth organizations to coordinate their 
work. Youth centers enable municipalities to identify active youth organizations in 
the municipality more easily. To what extent this contact is further developed into 
partnerships and closer collaboration depends both on the initiative of the youth 
organizations and the interest of the municipal Youth Official. 
 
131 
 
Consistent with the Law on Youth, local Youth Action Councils are responsible for 
exploring available facilities for youth centers as well as seeking financing from the 
municipality to fund their activities (Article 12.5).72
After the licensing, the Municipal Assembly takes an obligation based on 
article 7 of the Law on Youth Empowerment and Participation [….] to 
ensure space, human and financial resources for at least one youth public 
Center that enables continuous activity of the youth Center in the 
implementation of the above-mentioned paragraphs. 
 The AI outlines the municipality 
competence in licensing the youth centers and their obligation to finance the Center. 
The licensing process involves the municipality evaluating the capacities of 
applicant NGOs, providing support and issuing the license for the operation as a 
youth center with the purpose of providing and ensuring quality of youth services 
in the relevant municipalities. All NGOs working mainly on youth and registered 
with the Ministry of Public Administration have the right to request licensing as a 
youth center. Each municipality must license and fund at least one public youth 
Center. Based on the requests received, and the needs evaluated in the municipality, 
authorities can license other youth centers as well, but are not obliged to ensure 
their sustainability. Municipal obligations are further stipulated under Article 10 of 
the Administrative Instruction, stating as follows: 
Under this legal framework, municipalities are obliged to provide financial 
resources for the youth center. However, the financial sustainability of youth centers 
remains a big challenge as the centers struggle to fund their activities from a 
combination of municipal budget allocations and donor grants. Few youth centers 
were functionalized after the adoption of the Administrative Instruction on 
Recognition of Youth Centers. The MCYS is a leading actor and has authority over 
municipal counterparts that may be used to convince municipalities to offer these 
services. 
Over the last few years, international organizations have increased attention in 
establishing youth centers in municipalities that still lack them. The World Bank is 
leading this endeavour with its long-lasting project on youth development and 
financing of 14 youth centers throughout the country. This initiative, including 
running costs for operating a building, relieve the municipality of financial burdens 
on its budget and should therefore serve as a boost for municipal administration 
attention on youth policies and an increase in youth projects. Notwithstanding the 
adoption of initiatives and policies on youth participation, in practice they fail to 
reach the desired outcomes by reaching the Kosovo youth and increasing their 
                                                 
72 Article 1.4 of Administrative Instruction on Licensing of Youth Centers, defines Youth Centers as the 
functional space for the exercising of youth actions licensed by the Municipal Directorate responsible for 
the youth. 
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participation rates. The legislation fails to effectively specify when participation is 
necessary and clearly delineate how participation could be achieved. These 
decisions are left to the subjective judgment of institutions and their employees 
(OSCE Official, Interview June 2012). In addition, lack of youth willingness to 
engage and actively participate defies existing attempts to change their relations 
towards state institutions. Surveys throughout the least years continue to show a 
significantly low number of young people actively participating in some form in 
their municipality. A 2011 study shows donor organizations specifically dedicated 
to youth declaring that Kosovo youth organizations lack capacities in writing 
successful project applications and thereby fail to gain financial support for their 
activities. For those already engaged in the process, there is a lack of opportunities 
to strengthen their role and participation whereas others argue the young 
population does not sees existing opportunities. A lack of interest amongst young 
people is a broader challenge throughout the country. A 2010 UNDP survey reveals 
that 80% of young Kosovans do not belong to a youth organization or a youth 
project or initiative with less than 20 % with volunteer work experience. The main 
ways youth engage and participate include taking part in public discussions, being a 
beneficiary of NGO initiatives and being involved in implementing NGO projects 
(UNDP, 2010). A lack of recognition for their activities and engagement is 
discouraging to an already alienated youth (KAHCR 2011). Few YAC were 
attending public sessions of municipal assemblies, municipal security-council 
meetings etc.  The YAC are not utilizing existing mechanisms of participation. 
Kosovo youth still feel that they have very limited influence on decision-making 
processes. Empowering youths’ greater participation in decision-making processes 
remains a long- term development challenge facing Kosovo society. Those engaged 
and active in their communities are often set back by the lack of support from 
municipal authorities and perceived lack of understanding from politicians in their 
municipality (UNICEF/IKS 2010). Examples of this include municipal authorities’ 
refusal to act upon signed petitions organized by young citizens or municipal 
officials’ statements that decisions over their municipality are not the job for youth 
organizations (Focus Groups data in UNICEF/IKS 2010). These actions discourage 
young citizen from engaging in local organizations. However, these examples 
showcase only part of the picture as they focus on visible capital investments for 
particular youth interests. Less visible outcomes resulting from collaboration 
between youth organizations and state authorities may receive less attention. 
Prioritizing policies benefiting the interest of young citizen also constitutes a 
considerable achievement. 
The absence of clear institutional obligations for the municipal government in the 
current legislation leaves policy implementation subject to their political will. This 
undermines the opportunity to shift towards new the decision-making norms. In 
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addition, lack of information amongst the youth sector on existing mechanisms of 
participation remains a barrier to pass for a group of young citizens who are not 
completely aware of their rights. It remains challenging to change the decision-
making norms in a traditional and patriarchal society, where the voice of young 
unemployed citizens is not valued. 
Political pressures from municipal leadership directed towards youth leaders 
account for a major constraint in developing a balance of power and fostering 
democratic relations between state and non-state actors. Municipalities of Skenderaj 
and Deçan, led by the biggest political parties in the country are similar cases of 
political pressure. According to the National YAC, the Deçan Youth Official 
attempted to exercise political pressure on the YAC leader through attempts to 
convince the YAC to join the political party leading the municipality. These attempts 
to politicize the cooperation are a challenge for youth engagement and risk for 
deterring other youth activists and organizations from getting involved. Instead of 
promoting a culture of policy feedback from non-state actors to ensure continuous 
improvement of municipal services, officials may benefit from more ‘silent’ 
mechanisms of partnership. This secures a state of uncontested power of municipal 
authorities and the leadership amongst non-state institutions remains unchallenged. 
Interviewees from the National YAC confirm this when evaluating Prishtina as a 
non-active municipality maintaining the status quo by not engaging with other 
youth organizations and not pushing for changes within the leadership of YAC; ‘it 
suits them to have followers’ (Permanent Secretary of National YAC Interview, 
April 2013). 
There are a series of best cases, in which local Youth Action Councils have 
established strong cooperation with municipalities and the latter have responded 
with support. These include the municipalities of Gjilan, Lipjan, Kaçanik, Podujeva, 
Hani i Elezit and Istog (OSCE Senior Official, Interview June 2012; Permanent 
Secretary of National YAC Interview, April 2013). The Gjilan region of 11 
municipalities was quick to establish youth Action Councils. The OSCE highlights 
Gjilan as the most successful case in working with youth. The Gjilan municipal 
Youth Official is recognized as ‘one of the best in Kosovo’ (OSCE Democratization 
Official, Interview June 2012). The municipality of Gjilan is the first one in Kosovo to 
adopt a regulation on voluntarism. During annual regional conferences held in the 
country, which gather civil servants in municipalities who deal with youth, the 
Gjilan Youth Official trained colleagues from other municipalities. This established a 
broad cooperation between municipal civil servants. On the other side, Ferizaj, 
Prishtina, Deçan and Dragash are considered unsuccessful cases in establishing 
strong collaboration between municipal authorities and Youth Action Councils 
(Interviews with National YAC, April 2013). 
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According to representatives of the National Youth Action Council, the initiative of 
youth organizations is detrimental to their success in promoting youth participation 
in decision-making. Government officials and the political leadership may be 
supportive of developing and implementing youth policies, however, in the absence 
of an active youth organization network, these policies will fail to reach the desired 
target group. 
Leadership of Youth Action Councils in various municipalities has been challenged 
by municipal administrations. The latter refuses to formally recognize the local 
YACs, accusing them of being politically biased. According to the OSCE, similar 
allegations exist of the local YAC leadership supporting opposition parties rather 
than parties leading the municipality (OSCE official, Interview May 2012). Peja 
municipality struggled to establish cooperation due to allegations of political bias of 
YAC leader. Furthermore, disparities in capacities and expertise on the policy issues 
have also contributed to a sense of rivalry between local authorities and civil society 
organizations, each arguing about the others’ deficiencies. According to the National 
YAC, local YACs have higher capacities in than Youth Officials working in 
municipalities. The latter are not aware of the new law and the four accompanying 
administrative instructions regulating the work of Youth Centers, Youth Action 
Councils and work with volunteers. Considering the workload, Youth Officials 
rarely work solely on youth policies. However, these relations sometimes lead to 
challenges in recognizing the other’s power to influence the decision-making 
process. According to the National Youth Action Council, local YACs with more 
capacities and information ‘believe they are more powerful than the official and do 
not necessarily need the municipal administrations approval and support for their 
activities’ (NYAC Interview, April 2013). 
According to the leader of the National Youth Action Council at the central level, an 
active approach of lobbying is utilised to promote youth interests and ‘as a result of 
this lobbying, the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports included the National YAC 
in its budget lines. The National YAC is thus in the Ministry’s budget for the next 5 
years’ (Interview, April 2013). The National YAC as the highest structure 
representing youth interests in the country receives recognition from the Ministry of 
Culture. The Ministry’s formal recognition of the National YAC was completed on 
12th August 2012. According to the Head of the National Youth Action Council, the 
date for recognition, the International Day of Youth, was coordinated with the 
MCYS in order to raise awareness for youth participation. The formal recognition is 
valid for 2 years and the YAC structures do not need to apply for another process of 
recognition. According to the YAC, Council representatives are invited to all 
meetings of the Ministry, including the drafting of the Ministry Strategy 
development for 2013 – 2015 (Interview, April 2013). 
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In recognition of the leadership shown in his municipality, the Gjilan YAC leader 
was elected to head the National Youth Action Council in 2011. To promote youth 
engagement at the central level, the Head of the National YAC declared that 
continuous lobbying has resulted in signing Memorandums of Understanding with 
a series of Ministries in the central government. In the last two years the National 
YAC met with 15 Ministers and established Memoranda of Understanding with the 
Ministry of European Integration and the Ministry of Diaspora. The National YAC is 
invited to ministerial meetings when youth is discussed and does participate in 
developing policies relevant for youth (National YAC Interview, April 2013). These 
actions resulted in several positive outcomes for the work of the National YAC, 
most importantly of which was a stronger partnership between the YAC and the 
central government. The cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs resulted in 
funding, enabling the National YAC to join the European Youth Council. In 
addition, the National YAC cooperates with the Ministry of Environment to secure 
provision of access to buildings for people with wheelchairs. This active approach is 
also visible with regards to broadening international cooperation of the National 
YAC. According to the National YAC, cooperation with other countries such as 
Lithuania, Norway and Turkey were realized to further expand the recognition of 
Kosovo institutions amongst international partners (National YAC Interview, April 
2013). 
Within the National YAC, there are clear attempts to build the organization based 
on an inclusive approach by selecting the leadership to represent different groups 
within the youth sector. The leadership structures include one Deputy President 
from the ranks from the public University of Prishtina to represent student interests; 
one Deputy President for Diaspora, a Deputy President for Communities and one 
Deputy for overseeing the work of local Youth Action Councils in municipalities. In 
addition, one member of the Board represents the interests of organizations for 
people with disabilities. 
To increase the outreach to a larger number of young citizens, the National YAC is 
lobbying to change the age group defined as young. The limited age group targeted 
by the Law on Youth Participation addresses youth as aged 15 to 24. The 
amendment proposal is to include citizens up to the age of 30. This would enable a 
longer usage of the knowledge accumulated on young citizens. Furthermore, the 
National YAC is working in amending the legal framework on youth, which is 
ambiguous on municipal obligations for supporting YACs. Efforts are underway to 
explicitly state municipal obligations to financially support the local YAC (National 
YAC Interview, April 2013). 
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5.6.  The Gjilan model 
The municipality of Gjilan has been actively involved in engaging the youth sector 
since 2003, when the municipality utilized employment application forms to match 
young citizen with employment opportunities. In 2004, a decision from the Gjilan 
mayor launched the Active Volunteers Form for young individuals giving ID cards 
of volunteers to 25 young citizens allowing them to participate in municipal 
administration meetings and to communicate with municipal administration to get 
an experience on how the administration works. The volunteer work was rewarded 
with various vouchers for entertainment activities as an incentive to encourage 
broader participation. Since 2010, this process is regulated through the 
Administrative Instruction on Voluntary Work. The Municipal Assembly approved 
the regulation in 2012 making Gjilan the only municipality with such a program. 
The Gjilan Youth Action Council has 27 youth organizations and represents the 
largest youth organizations under its umbrella. The local YAC has a General 
Assembly with representatives of these 27 active organizations. The Council 
structures include a President, 2 Deputies, and 15 members of the Board. The 
structure of the YAC depends on how the YAC President organizes the Council.  
In the Gjilan municipality case, close relations with the municipal mayor prove to be 
one of the most important factors in the success of the YAC. In other municipalities, 
Youth Action Councils mainly communicate with municipal Youth Officials, Heads 
of Directorate or Municipal Assembly members. In the case of Prishtina, the local 
YAC communicates occasionally with the deputy mayor. By contrast, in Gjilan, a 
strong cooperation exists between the local YAC leader and the mayor. According to 
the Gjilan YAC leader, the municipal mayor was an example of cooperation, 
supporting all activities organized by the YAC and responding to YAC requests 
(Interview, April 2013). Whereas the Gjilan Youth Official reports to meeting youth 
organizations on a monthly basis, the head of the YAC and the mayor have more 
frequent informal meetings. The YAC leader states,  
I received the Mayor’s approval for every activity organized, more than the 
Director’s [approval]. I met the Mayor every weekend. In addition to the 
municipal Youth Official and the Culture, Youth and Sports Director, the 
Mayor was almost always present at our activities (Interview, April 2013).  
Other counterparts in the municipal administration are the Youth Division/Sector, 
the municipal Directorate for Culture, Youth and Sports, the Municipal Assembly 
Committee on Youth and Culture. This mutual understanding is evident as the 
leader of the Gjilan YAC declares ‘During my mandate, the municipality gave as 
much as they had’ (Interview, April 2013). A bleaker picture is presented by the 
municipal Youth Official who states that ‘the municipal leadership did not have 
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political interest in supporting youth. Extensive lobbying was necessary to gain their 
support’ (Interview, April 2013). 
According to local YAC interviewees, representatives of the YAC are invited to 
participate are invited to participate during municipal assembly meetings. Openness 
towards inclusion of youth organizations also exists in the municipal administration 
which formally invites the YAC for municipal meeting dealing with youth. In other 
municipalities, such as Prishtina, this is not the case, thus formal mechanisms 
established to secure youth participation are not equally enforced in different 
municipalities. Implementing the formalities as requested by the current legislation, 
allows for the municipality to embed the new decision-making process into the 
daily working process of the administration. In municipalities that do not exercise a 
formal recognition of partnership with the YAC, this partnership is subject to the 
will of municipal officials, which may change and thus does not constitute an 
institutionalised form of cooperation. 
The close cooperation between the YAC and the political leadership resulted in 
further success stories with the re-functionalization of the municipal youth center in 
Gjilan. According to the YAC leader, the Council formally requested the mayor to 
reinstate the youth center which functioned briefly in 2006. Due to lack of funds and 
the absence of a facility to operate in the youth center did not continue its services 
for many years. However, with the leadership of the YAC, the lack of a designated 
facility for the municipal youth center did not deter youth organizations from 
meeting and organizing activities. The Youth Action Council offered its offices for 
the services of the youth center to avoid losing funding from the World Bank, which 
was specifically earmarked for youth centers. According to the YAC leader, the 
support of the municipal mayor was important for the successful completion of 
these activities (Interview, April 2013). The resulting outcome in gathering funds 
from donors and approval by the municipal mayor come as a result of the pressure 
from non-state actors rather than the municipal administration improving their 
services due to internal objectives of improving efficiency and fulfilling their legal 
obligations. 
Another important factor influencing the success of YAC in Gjilan is the active 
approach of both the YAC leadership and the municipal official. In this case, both 
state and non-state actors actively engaged to connect with other stakeholders and 
to further develop a partnership between them. Through cooperation with various 
donor organizations, the YAC leader used the relationship with the municipal 
mayor to gain funds for youth organizations and ensure these funds benefit the 
youth. In addition, the municipal Youth Official has reached out to youth 
organizations to ensure continuous support for civil society, improving trust in 
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formal institutions and consequently helping secure the sustainability of youth 
participation mechanisms in the municipality. 
According to the YAC in Gjilan, the initiative and cooperation of local youth 
organizations in Gjilan has helped develop capacities of youth organizations 
through successful implementation of various local projects and increased 
participation in the municipality decision-making process (Interview, April 2013). 
The YAC in Gjilan has also strengthened its role amongst its members through an 
inclusive approach including a variety of youth organizations in the network. These 
include the association representing blind people, persons with disabilities, the 
association of deaf persons and minority communities of Roma, Turkish and Serbian 
ethnicity. In cooperation with OSCE, the YAC conducted a survey in Gjilan 
municipality to gauge the awareness of YAC activities amongst young citizen. 
Amongst youth in Gjilan, 40 % of respondents are aware of the existence of the YAC 
and have heard about youth activities suggesting a fair presence of YAC and its 
activities amongst young citizen. To the credit of the municipal administration, it 
must be noted that even before the adoption of the new legislation, Gjilan fairs best 
in opinion pols in informing citizen about its youth activities. In 2010 the municipal 
youth office was ranked highest in a poll documenting citizen awareness of 
municipal youth activities (UNDP 2010). This active approach by local officials 
benefits the municipality in further advancing youth policy. Efforts to develop new 
mechanisms for youth engagement are also underway in Gjilan. The municipal 
Youth Official also engaged in developing a program on youth in the community, 
which addresses issues such as communication, conflict mitigation, cooperation etc. 
The aim is to establish a formal licensing mechanism for youth workers and to 
promote this as an occupation or a job in the community. Reaffirming their role in 
the governance structure, municipal government representatives state that ‘the 
municipality is the connecting bridge between youth organizations and donors, the 
central government Ministries’ (Gjilan Youth Official, Interview April 2013). The 
municipality also lobbies for funds for youth NGOs in Gjilan from international 
donor organizations. 
At the time of this research, the municipal administration did not have funds to 
implement the municipal Action Plan 2013 – 2015. According to municipal officials, 
the lack of a specific budget code for youth within the municipal budget program 
demands extensive lobbying within the Directorate to secure funding for youth 
activities. A separate budget code specifically designed for youth would secure 
long-term funding and thus allow for better planning and implementation of 
policies. Whereas in other municipalities, government institutions may be reluctant 
to accept obligations towards the local Youth Action Councils, in the case of Gjilan, 
obligations towards the local YAC are a direct consequence of the formal process of 
recognition. As this process is delineated in the Administrative Instruction on 
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Recognition of Youth Action Councils, there is no uncertainty in the legal 
framework. Within the municipal administration itself the legal obligations are 
recognizes through the statement that ‘with the formal recognition from the mayor 
the municipality is obliged to fund the local YAC’ (Gjilan Youth Official interview, 
April 2013). 
 
5.7.  The case of Prishtina and Ferizaj 
The municipalities of Prishtina and Ferizaj are cases in which a strong partnership 
between local government and non-state youth institutions has not been successful. 
Several interviewees highlight Prishtina municipality for its centralized decision-
making and lack of information sharing with citizen and NGOs (EURED Interview, 
2011; INPO Interview 2012; INPO 2013). Civil society organizations monitoring the 
work of the municipality have reported on the failure of municipal authorities to 
inform citizens about Municipal Assembly meetings.73
In 2013, the municipal budget for subsidies and transfers of the Directorate of 
Culture, Youth and Sports was 250.000 Euro (GAP, 2013). Due to the lack of a 
separate budget code for the Directorate within the municipal administration, the 
funds are distributed as subsidies for youth organizations. According to both the 
municipal administration as well as representatives of the Youth Action Council, 
insufficient financial resources have challenged their work (Prishtina Youth Official 
Interview April 2013).  
  
The Prishtina Youth Action Council was established in November 2008 supported 
by Prishtina municipality officials, the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports, the 
Director of the municipal Youth Directorate and the GIZ Program Representatives. 
The Prishtina YAC includes 17 organizations and informal groups represented in 
YAC involved in the youth sector.74
                                                 
73 Article 38 of the municipal Statute requires the municipality to inform citizen through public 
announcements in venues highly frequented by citizen and through use of media. However, the only 
announcement for a municipal assembly meeting was published on the web-site one day before the 
event. During 2012, no citizen attended Municipal Assembly meetings of Prishtina municipality (INPO 
2013). 
 It also organizes youth groups in 20 villages of 
Prishtina municipality. The YAC has a President, Board and YAC Members 
Assembly. In addition to the YAC, there is also a Youth Center in Prishtina. Until 
2013, this functioned on private property rather than a municipal assigned property 
but the municipal authorities covered the expenses. The Administrative Instruction 
74 In the municipality of Prishtina 17% of citizens are aged between 15 and 24 (KSA, 2013). The 
municipality of Prizren has a similar demographic structure with 19% of its young population belonging 
to the age group 15 - 24. Own calculations based on Kosovo Statistics Agency results of 2011 Census. 
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on Youth Centers provides the framework for bigger municipalities to designate 
more than one facility as youth sub-centers if required to serve a larger territory. 
In 2011 the Prishtina YAC registered as an NGO according to the new legal 
requirements. The Administrative Instruction on Recognition of YAC obliges the 
latter to register as NGOs. Despite the YAC registering as an NGO in 2011 
municipal authorities did not provide formal recognition for the local YAC until late 
2013. Prior to the registration as an NGO, the local Council received funding from 
municipal authorities on the accounts of one of its member organizations. Since 2011 
the municipality has funded them directly using the YAC account as an NGO. 
Institutional support from the municipality was in the form of financial support for 
YAC projects and exchange of ideas. According to the YAC, their activities entail 
mostly discussions, roundtables, debates with youth and information dissemination. 
The YAC also conducted an opinion poll research to gather information on youth 
needs in communities in Prishtina. The research was undertaken by YAC Prishtina 
and the results are used by the Prishtina administration. 
According to the leader of the Youth Action Council, since its inception in 2008, the 
YAC and Prishtina municipality have had excellent relations (Interview, March 
2013). In 2013, the municipal Directorate for Culture, Youth and Sports supported 
the reorganization and re-election process in the YAC leadership. The previous 
leadership was re-elected and continues to head the Prishtina YAC. However, the 
fact that there has been no change in leadership of the youth organisations poses the 
risk that the youth sector is being monopolized by certain non-governmental 
organizations. The lack of change in leadership harms the process of establishing 
broad cooperation between state and non-state actors and risks power capture by 
civil society actors which have the resources and have already established links with 
municipal authorities. The requirement within the Youth Action Structures obliging 
youth organisations to hold periodic elections would bypass such power capture. 
This deficiency is criticized by the National Youth Action Council, which maintains 
that change is needed within each YAC in the country. According to the Permanent 
Secretary of the National YAC, ‘a rotation of responsibilities should be enabled 
within each YAC; more youth organizations must get the chance to learn from the 
process and lead others’ (Interview, April 2013).  
Nevertheless, according to interviews from both sides, mutual trust and cooperation 
can be observed from Prishtina officials and the Local Youth Action Council. 
According to the Prishtina Youth Official, the municipal administration has 
benefited from the local Youth Action Council, which has “contributed in drafting 
municipal youth policies as well as reviewing youth projects” (Prishtina Youth 
Official, Interview April 2013). Regular consultations between municipal officials 
and the YAC have thus become the norm in the work of Prishtina administration 
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and these new structures are consulted on issues pertaining to youth. Amongst 
achievements in youth policy, municipal officials cite the promotion of voluntarism, 
integration of marginalized groups and capacity building activities for youth 
organizations (Prishtina Youth Official Interview April 2013). However, these close 
relations do not amount to numerous projects or youth activities. In addition, the 
municipal government did not formally recognize the local Youth Action Council. 
In December 2012, the Municipal Assembly of Prishtina adopted the Local Youth 
Action Plan for the years 2013 – 2015. The foreseen budget for youth policies is a 
total of € 253.000 until 2015. The municipal Directorate for Culture, Youth and 
Sports plans its medium-term activities and support for youth NGOs based on this 
budget recognizing its limitations. 
In contrast to Gjilan municipality, where the YAC was more active in setting up 
activities and lobbied for municipal administration approval and support, “the lack 
of capacities and absence of initiatives from youth organizations made the [Ferizaj] 
YAC a weaker partner” (Ferizaj Youth Action Council Interview, April 2013). In this 
case, municipal institutions utilize the YAC for their own plans and activities. In the 
municipality of Ferizaj, the YAC consists of 20 members consisting mainly of 
individual young activists as opposed to youth organizations. The local YAC was 
established in 2008 at the initiative of Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports during 
a one-year project to initiate the establishment of YACs throughout Kosovo. In the 
absence of instructions on how to register the youth councils, the Ferizaj YAC 
initially functioned as an informal group serving as an umbrella network for a 
group of activists. It registered as an NGO in 2011 and received formal recognition 
by the municipal authorities in 2012. 
In June 2008, the municipality of Ferizaj supported YAC with offices and logistics. 
Municipal authorities also offered the facilities to establish a Youth Center, which 
together with the YAC network is used by the municipality to organize youth 
activities. The Youth Center in Ferizaj was under the management of the 
municipality. This centralized approach to limiting the resources available for the 
youth sector prevents openness of governing institutions and fails to empower 
youth organisations. Whilst activities were organized by the YAC, the management 
remained with the municipality. Small-scale projects in the amounts of 1000 – 2000 
euros were available to hold activities in the youth center. The YAC developed its 
Action Plan whilst the municipality adopted the Youth Action Plan for 2010 – 2013. 
Frequent meetings between the actors were possible due to the YAC working in 
office facilities within the municipal administration. The former YAC leader 
accounts that ‘daily meetings were possible since the office was in front of the 
municipal Youth Official at the municipal administration’ (Interview, April 2013). 
Despite these frequent meetings, the former YAC leader declares that municipality 
staff was insufficient to realize its mandate on youth policy and the local YAC lacks 
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capacities in project management (Former Head of Ferizaj YAC Interview, April 
2013). 
Similar to Prishtina municipality, limitations of the current mechanism promoted in 
municipalities include the failure to facilitate a change in leadership of YAC where 
key actors within YAC usually win projects. A rotating system of leadership within 
existing YAC is necessary, as it would allow change and development (Former 
Head of Ferizaj YAC Interview, April 2013). The Central YAC maintains that the 
municipal administration in Ferizaj is cooperative however the lack of unity of 
youth organizations has hindered their cooperation (National YAC Interviews, 
April 2013). According to representatives of the National YAC, the legal framework 
provides young people with plenty of opportunities to access decision-making. 
These past years have been important in advancing youth policy and pushing 
forward youth participation (National YAC Interviews, April 2013). It is up to youth 
organizations themselves to understand their role in the community and impact 
decision-making in their society.  With the current legal framework, voluntary work 
is also recognized as work experience. Thus activities to increase volunteer work in 
communities must be utilized to attract more youth participation. 
 
5.8.  Conclusion 
Kosovo’s large young population faces the overwhelming issue of unemployment. 
Reforms in the youth sector must be integrated within national strategies addressing 
this larger policy issue. The case studies explored in this chapter highlight the 
challenges in achieving progress in youth participation in an environment of limited 
capacities of local authorities and a broad detachment from local decision-making 
processes. The case studies reveal instances of success in which several factors align 
to achieve progress in youth empowerment at the local level. 
Despite a fluctuating approach towards youth policy throughout the last decade, 
this chapter illustrates the existence of opportunity structures for local agents 
working in the youth sector. Obligations set in the new national legislation and 
adopted regulations at the local level present a first step towards increasing 
participatory initiatives and ultimately influencing the power distribution among 
actors. The legal framework promotes a process of collaboration requiring decision-
making processes to open up towards non-state actors. These developments 
contribute to a new cooperative approach towards state institutions and enable an 
inclusive system in which the agency of non-state actors is formally recognised and 
supported. 
What makes youth engagement in local decision-making processes a particularly 
interesting field is that its advancement depends on a series of factors coming into 
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play. The country’s demographics, with half of the population under the age of 25, 
made youth a pertinent topic amongst a variety of actors. In recent years, the 
Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports (itself headed by a young politician), placed 
youth policy as an important issue at the top of the agenda giving it higher attention 
than previous governments. Drafting and adoption of new legislation specifically on 
youth as well as a national strategy addressing youth issues such as education, 
employment and participation, advanced youth onto the political agenda. 
International agencies, whose programs on youth were sporadic and addressed a 
variety of sectors, made their resources available and responded to the need to 
establish and build new structures at the local level solely for advancing youth 
interests in the local agenda. Amongst local governments, some municipalities 
displayed leadership and support in implementing mechanisms for partnership 
with civil society organisations working on youth. Due to the interplay of these 
factors, youth policy achieved momentum in favour of advancing youth 
participation and establishing mechanisms for young citizens to address their 
municipalities; making this case study a particularly interesting paradigm. 
Nevertheless, as the case studies in this chapter suggest, weak enforcement and 
implementation are amongst a series of constraints in achieving successful youth 
engagement throughout all municipalities. In addition to lack of financial resources, 
cited as a hindrance to implementing youth projects, the lack of proper oversight is 
also a challenge. The central Inter-Ministerial Committees are not effective, thus 
failed policy implementation at municipal level is not monitored. This lack of 
oversight deepens the weakness of the local administration. Lack of capacities 
extends an absence of oversight from Municipal Assemblies as well. Without proper 
expertise on environmental policy, social service provision and youth engagement, 
members of the Municipal Assembly fail to hold the local executive accountable. 
In addition, the risk of politicization is evident in the case of youth engagement. 
Political cleavages and a politicized environment hamper the development of a 
culture of collaboration across institutions and social groups. In addition to breaking 
rules of impartiality within municipal administration, these processes put pressure 
upon citizens to align themselves with political parties in order to achieve change in 
their communities. The politicization of the partnership between non-state actors 
and municipal authorities obstructs the development of a sustainable cooperation 
based on institutional lines. 
The willingness of local authorities to accept new mechanisms of coordination and 
collaboration with non-state actors varies between municipalities. Some 
municipalities are inclined to accept enhanced participation by civil society 
organizations when recognizing their expertise and resources in a policy area. Best-
case models presented above suggest willingness by certain municipal officials to 
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collaborate with civil society actors and promote shared decision-making. As youth 
interests are channelled through formal structures such as the Youth Action Council, 
municipal officials can easily identify partners for implementing municipal youth 
projects. Formal recognition by municipal authorities also enables youth 
organisations to utilise the formal process of collaboration and approach municipal 
officials to address issues of concern. 
To secure attention from municipal authorities, and increase their impact on local 
decision-making processes, effective collaboration with local authorities is 
contingent upon an active approach of civil society organizations. Persistence of 
organizations, such as the Youth Council in Gjilan to engage in communication and 
build relations with municipal authorities was necessary for successful cooperation. 
The case of Gjilan also suggests that close relations between civil society 
organisations and the municipal mayor are more likely to secure a strong 
partnership 
Interviewees present a conviction that ‘the other’ partner lacks capacities and 
resources to advance youth engagement in decision-making. This perception is held 
on both sides, with municipal officials arguing that civil society organisations are 
incapable of successfully managing and implementing projects whilst youth 
organisations stress that local authorities lack expertise in drafting adequate 
regulations concerning youth. In some municipalities, the perception amongst the 
youth organisations is that their organisations are more equipped to analyse and 
develop programs to engage youth than their municipal counterparts who, by their 
very nature, must deal with a broader variety of issues and are consequently not 
able to concentrate solely on youth. 
The presence of international agencies also serves as an incentive for municipal 
authorities to accept opening up discussions and sharing the spotlight with civil 
society organisations. However, these incentives are unsustainable as donor 
agencies relinquish the responsibility to local authorities to fund local structures as 
obliged by the new legislation or seek other financial resources.  
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6.  Developing local partnerships in environment 
and welfare services 
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6.1.  Introduction 
This chapter explores the cooperation between state and non-state actors in the 
field of environment and welfare services. It investigates how the channels of 
cooperation were established and evaluates to what extent these have enabled a 
changing dynamic of power at the local level. The chapter reviews the extent to 
which there has been a change in the approach of local institutions towards non-
state actors and vice-versa. The case studies presented here highlight the 
importance of active civil society organizations to instil change at the local level. 
Civil society organisations, when mobilized, can present a strong interest group 
lobbying for change at the local level. Persistence of civil society organizations to 
build channels of cooperation with local authorities showcases their leadership and 
drive to improve local conditions. However, successful implementation of projects 
initiated by civil society organisations depends on a number of factors amongst 
which is the openness and cooperation of local authorities and the capacity to 
influence policies. The impact of civil society organisations is challenged, as their 
capacities are limited, due to insufficient funds and lack of qualified experts. 
During Kosovo’s decentralization process, social services were the latest 
competences to be decentralized to lower tiers of government. An intricate system 
of devolution and decentralization of authority, with some decisions still taken at 
the central government, has made governance of welfare schemes extremely 
complex and difficult for local institutions. New modes of cooperation between 
local authorities and non-government organisations show a shift towards state 
institutions accepting a more open approach towards non-state actors in ‘helping’ 
to deliver services to persons with disabilities. This marks a considerable 
achievement towards broadening the scope of actors responsible and active in local 
governance. In this policy sector there are a series of factors in place, which 
enabled the emergence of a partnership in service delivery between municipal 
authorities and non-state actors. These include the importance of an active civil 
society organisation with expertise on the needs of Persons with Disabilities taking 
initiative and approaching local authorities for cooperation and the support of 
donor organisations. 
In the environment sector, extensive efforts have been undertaken to adopt new 
legislation influencing the lines of authority and accountability between central 
and local government. However, weak implementation of the legal framework at 
the local level has stalled progress in the sector. Throughout municipalities, new 
initiatives driven by international agencies promote formal channels of inclusion of 
civil society organisations in the local decision-making processes. To explore to 
what extent these initiatives have an impact in fostering a partnership between 
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local authorities and non-state actors, four municipalities are explored with 
varying results. 
Throughout the two policy sectors, external assistance proves an extremely 
important factor in getting the commitment of local stakeholders and ensuring 
their participation in the process. For the implementation of new deliberative 
participation mechanisms in environmental governance, the technical and financial 
assistance of the Kosovo based organisation Regional Environmental Center (REC) 
was vital whereas the partnership with Save the Children proved important in 
securing collaboration between HandiKOS and local authorities in offering services 
for the disabled. 
In the first part, this chapter focuses on environmental governance delineating the 
process of drafting municipal plans for environmental protection. The Local 
Environmental Action Plan is a new mechanism established to prioritize local 
policies and projects in environment. The second part of the chapter focuses on 
welfare services and presents an analysis of collaboration between local authorities 
and a non-governmental organisation in service provision. In this sector, several 
municipalities have established cooperation with the organisation HandiKOS to 
provide free services for Persons with Disabilities. 
 
6.2.  Case Study on Environmental Governance 
According to UN-Habitat, Kosovo faces serious social and economic impacts ‘from 
poorly managed polluting activities and could make huge gains from remedial 
actions to protect and restore the quality of the environment’ (UN Habitat, 2012, 
15). Within broader environmental problems in the country, smaller scale issues 
within municipalities do not receive much attention. Kosovo has made several 
important strides in drafting and issuing laws and administrative instructions on 
general environmental protection, nature protection, energy, mining, agriculture, 
and forestry; drafting environmental standards on air emissions and liquid 
effluent, as well as drinking water quality; and enhancing its environmental 
institutional capacity, such as setting up the Ministry of Environment and Spatial 
Planning (MESP) as well as the Kosovo Environmental Protection Agency 
(KEPA).75
                                                 
75 KEPA is an agency established under the authority of the Ministry of Environment and Spatial 
Planning. It is responsible for professional, supportive, scientific, and research tasks including 
environmental monitoring, environmental information management, and research. KEPA also runs 
KHMI as well as the Institute for Nature and Environmental Protection of Kosovo, and has three 
environmental directorates: for monitoring, for information systems, and for programs and reports 
(World Bank 2012). 
 Despite these achievements, the 2008 Functional Review of Kosovo 
institutions, showed the huge volume of work required to bring Kosovo in line 
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with the EU directives, especially issuing administrative instructions. According to 
the European Commission, enforcing environmental legislation also remains a 
steep challenge (European Commission 2011).  
The main responsibility for environmental protection and management lies with 
the Ministry of Environment and Spatial Planning (MESP) responsible for setting 
the country’s environmental policy. MESP was established in 2002 and consists of 
an Environment Department for nature protection, waste management, air 
protection, and industrial issues and a Water Department. The environmental 
inspectorate is under the MESP responsibilities as well. According to the European 
Commission Progress Report, the MESP has few resources, however, and its 
already low budget has been further decreased in 2011, presenting heavy 
challenges to its role in environmental management and policy setting (EC 2011). 
Professional weakness in the inspectorate, lack of implementation and enforcement 
of rules for environment protection further weaken its role leading to accusations 
from Kosovo think-tanks that licensing had produced more harm to the 
environment instead of serving as a protecting shield (Forum 2015 2012).  
 
6.3.  The legal framework 
During the past decade, Kosovo adopted a broad range of legislative measures 
regulating environmental protection. The legislation delineates state obligations 
towards resource management and involves central government and local 
authorities to exercise their role in planning, conservation and protection of 
resources. This includes the Law on Environmental Protection (No. 03/L-025), 
which promotes a healthy environment for Kosovo’s population gradually 
aligning it to EU standards for environment. The Law tasks the Ministry for 
Environment and Spatial Planning with main responsibilities for drafting 
environmental protection strategies, whilst municipalities are responsible for 
applying the basic principles of environmental protection. The Law on 
Environmental Protection also promotes public access to information and citizen’s 
right to participate in decision-making processes. In order to stimulate public 
participation on activities related to environmental protection, the Law stipulates 
provisions for public access to information, and participation of public in decision-
making processes in strategic impact assessments, Environment Impact 
Assessments, processes for water license and integrated license issuance, and 
issuing legislation. The Law on Environmental Impact Assessment (No. 03/L-024) 
regulates procedures for identification, assessment, reporting, and administration 
of the environmental impacts of a proposed project, to provide all relevant 
information on the environment for decision making by MESP for issuing its 
environmental consent. Other pieces of the legal framework include the Law on 
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Waste Management (No. 02/L-30), Law on Water (No. 2004/24), Law on Air 
Protection (No. 2004/30), Nature Conservation (No. 02/L-18) and Law on 
Agricultural Land (No. 02/L-26). The legal framework aims to improve resource 
management, setting standards for use and administration of the various sectors 
assigning responsibilities to central government institutions and local authorities. 
In addition to the legislation, the government adopted a Kosovo Environmental 
Strategy (KES) and a National Environmental Action Plan (NEAP) 2006–10 aiming 
to improve the quality of the environment in Kosovo by setting up priority 
activities for the environment sector. Both policies were updated and approved in 
2011. The Kosovo Environmental Strategy 2011–21 identifies priorities and sets 
goals for environmental sustainability in Kosovo. The government also adopted a 
national Strategy on Waste Management 2011 – 2020 prepared and issued by the 
Ministry of Environment and Spatial Planning in 2011 and including the first waste 
management strategy in Kosovo (World Bank 2012). 
Despite these actions, according to the European Commission, the adopted 
legislative framework still remains far from European standards in the area of 
environment and climate change. Implementation and enforcement of existing 
legislation is poor as environment and climate change continue to be a low priority 
in the policy agenda (European Commission 2011). Kosovo’s functional budget 
classification does not show environmental protection as a separate category, 
unlike the EU. Despite the rise of government spending at both central and 
municipal level on environment during 2007–10, the budget devoted to the sector 
is insufficient to meet Kosovo's huge environmental challenges, in particular the 
considerable investments needs in infrastructure (European Commission 2011). 
Furthermore, World Bank studies over the years report on weak accountability 
stipulating that, in addition to insufficient financial resources at municipal level, 
weak planning and execution of environmental projects are inhibiting progress 
(World Bank 2012). 
The central government has made efforts to assign several environmental 
protection responsibilities to local administrations. Municipalities are responsible 
for environmental protection, monitoring, and management of natural resources 
within their boundaries (SIDA 2009). Each municipality has an environmental unit, 
typically within the Directorate of Urban Planning, usually consisting of only one 
or two officials. For example, the Directorate of Urban Planning, Construction, and 
Environmental protection has responsibilities for pollution reduction, protection of 
natural resources within municipal boundaries, monitoring, issuance of 
construction permits and ensuring compliance, as well as the administrative 
functions on ensuring proper land use. The range of municipal obligations now 
include fully applying the principles of environmental protection, as well as to 
 
150 
 
ensure cooperation with MESP for preparation of plans for protection of the 
environment and sustainable development within their territory; enforce laws and 
inspect enforcement of the laws related to the protection of environment and 
sustainable development within their territory; prepare and provide information 
related to the protection of the environment and sustainable development for 
citizens; and plan for the protection of the environment and sustainable 
development within municipality territory. Municipal institutions are responsible 
for issuing municipal authorizations and municipal environmental permits. 
Permits target industrial development, infrastructure projects, urban construction, 
mining, and agriculture and forestry. Considering the already limited municipal 
resources, the transfer of responsibilities to local authorities added to the burden of 
local officials. 
According to the Regional Environmental Center, there is political will at central 
government level, to place rules and standards on environment protection. The 
challenge, nevertheless, remains at the local level in getting municipalities to draft 
and enact local spatial plans and ensure environment protection (REC, 2011). To 
assist local governments in enacting their responsibilities, a variety of international 
agencies are engaged in improving municipal environmental governance. Local 
officials report a series of successful projects implemented in cooperation with 
international organisations. These include annual evaluations on environment 
impact (accomplished with the assistance of World Health Organisation); initiating 
standards for performance measurement (USAID); developing urban and 
municipal development plans (MIGROS); increasing green space within 
municipality (UN-Habitat); developing the sewage management plan etc. 
(Mitrovica Environment Official, Interview June 2012). New working groups 
established with international assistance facilitated the development of new plans 
such as the Service Improvement Action Plan and the Local Waste Management 
Plan. The aforementioned external initiatives have also supported the work of 
environmental organisations. 
In 2010, the DFID funded Functional Review and Institutional Design of Ministries 
(FRIDOM, 2010) identified approximately 30 nongovernmental, community and 
civil society organisations active in Kosovo with around 2,800 members, working 
on issues of environmental education and awareness, environmental legislation, 
nature protection, rural development, and sustainable development. As is the case 
throughout the country, the work of environmental nongovernmental 
organisations remains donor driven, though in some instances there has been 
cooperation between these organisations and MESP. Environmental organisations 
are scattered throughout municipalities with some concentrated in larger cities 
where more resources are available and enable an environment of establishing 
NGOs. Environmental NGOs are more visibly active in municipalities with critical 
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environmental issues such as Obilic, or where an active citizenry is more common 
in the local culture as in Prizren. Smaller municipalities lack an active civil society 
working on environment issues. In instances where local governments do exhibit 
readiness to involve non-state actors, they choose to cooperate with Youth Action 
Councils and active youth organisations in the absence of environmental 
organisations. Whereas this is a constructive approach to open up the municipal 
decision-making by reaching out to civil society organisations, it does not 
substitute the need for developing non-state actors with a specific profile on 
environmental issues. Furthermore, collaboration with organisations not 
specializing in the field of environment may enable civil servants within municipal 
Directorates to exercise more power due to their knowledge and expertise on the 
policy sector. 
 
6.4.    REC collaborations and developing of Local   
Environmental Action Plans 
The Regional Environmental Center (REC) focuses on supporting government 
institutions for efficient environmental management, building capacities of 
government officials in environmental governance and promoting transparency. 
REC also works in providing information and education for civil society actors and 
organisations and organizes capacity building mechanisms for local environmental 
organisations. Its focus is on assisting mobilization and development of non-
governmental environmental organisations. REC established a specific fund 
scheme to assist local environmental organisations in building their capacities, and 
developing projects on urban environment. As an incentive for participation, 
grants of up to 5000 euros are awarded to organisations to enable their activities. 
REC focuses on establishing cooperation channels between civil society and central 
government authorities. As a result of this work, REC facilitated a Memorandum 
of Understanding signed between the Ministry of Environment and Spatial 
Planning and environmental organisations. According to REC officials, the low 
number of specialized organisations working on environment is an obstructive 
factor in establishing sustainable relations with the government stipulating the 
absence of environmental organisations in the signing of the MoU itself (REC 
Interviews, June 2012). REC maintains that existing organisations are disorganized 
and often present diverging interests despite working in the same field, stating, 
“This lack of strong networks weakens their role in the eyes of local government 
officials; advocacy for the particular policy issues becomes dependent on a few 
CSOs who continue to carry on the torch” (REC Expert on Local Initiatives and 
Civil Society Support, Interview June 2012). On the ground, REC argues that 
government support is scarce, with “both the government and civil society 
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organisations calling upon the MoU when necessary for their own interests” (REC 
Expert on Local Initiatives and Civil Society Support, Interview June 2012). This 
weakens the impact of the Memorandum of Understanding revealing its lack of 
obligations towards the signing parties. 
In efforts to maintain contact with civil society organisations, the Ministry of 
Environment compiled a list of CSOs for contact according to Ministerial needs. 
Yet, these relations are based on individual cases. According to REC officials, 
government officials and certain organisations can have “very good” relations, 
which benefit the latter in obtaining support letters or approved projects (REC 
Project Officer, Interview June 2012). A new initiative amongst environmental 
organisations is the request for a Ministry official designated specifically for 
cooperation with civil society. This would clarify the point of contact for all actors 
and facilitate the work of the Ministry in keeping information of active 
environmental organisations. REC officials argue this would also ensure the 
professionalism of the staff by concentrating capacities instead of continuing with 
the current method of vague responsibilities amongst staff.  Lack of capacities 
includes lack of knowledge and professional expertise on environmental issues. 
REC Interviewees report cases when Ministry officials in charge of environment 
were not aware of existing regulations adopted by the Ministry (REC Interviews, 
June 2012). According to REC, administrative neglect also present challenges in the 
Ministry exercising its role effectively. This includes the Ministry’s current 
database of civil society organisations working in environmental protection and 
their contacts, which remains limited and does not include updated information on 
organisations, occasionally leading to new representatives of civil society 
organisations missing opportunities of meeting Ministry officials due to invitations 
being sent to former leaders. As stated by REC, similar problems exist elsewhere in 
the central government administration, as line ministries are uninformed about 
profiles of civil society organisations (REC Interviews, June 2012). This leads to an 
inconsistent approach towards civil society organisations as those working in 
environment are left out of important Ministerial discussions, even though the 
latter are open for broader participation. 
At the Ministerial level, according to REC officials, MESP officials consider civil 
society organisations as intruders to their work. In 2010, upon a REC invitation to 
MESP to join the organisation in fieldwork, Ministry of Environment officials 
rejected the offer expressing the claim, “You have taken this job from us; otherwise 
we would have done it ourselves” (REC Expert on Local Initiatives and Civil 
Society Support, Interview June 2012). A similar approach of disapproval towards 
the role of civil society exist at the local level as well where civil society 
organisations are confronted with a preconception amongst municipal officials that 
the later is being used to extract information and they don’t benefit from anything 
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(REC Interviews June 2012). These declarations show a wide gap between the two 
sides. On the other hand, there are successful cases of cooperation where positive 
outcomes are clear, as in the case of developing the National Environmental Plan, 
for which the Ministry of Environment cooperated with REC. As part of this plan, 
REC cooperated with the Environment Protection Agency, in implementing the 
Water Pollution Cadastre project. 
REC has established programs in assisting local authorities to develop their 
environmental policies. In a new effort in this field, REC signed Memorandums of 
Understanding with ten municipalities to develop their Local Environmental 
Action Plans. The aim of this initiative is to broaden the public inclusion and 
ensure participation of civil society organisations, businesses and active citizen in 
the decision-making process. Specific attempts are made to invite citizens with 
different backgrounds to public hearings of municipal authorities.  REC has placed 
one coordinator in each of the ten municipalities to help establish close 
collaboration with local actors. 
Issues such as unclear division of competences and roles within government 
agencies, are visible in the municipal Directorate in charge of the environmental 
sector. Establishing relations with the municipal Directorate in charge of 
environment is challenging for civil society organisations as information regarding 
the Environment Official is undisclosed. Citizens lack information on where they 
can address their concerns regarding environmental issues. As one REC official 
declares, “I had to use my own personal networks and connections to reach the 
Mayor of Prishtina so he can help us contact the administration” (REC Expert on 
Local Initiatives and Civil Society Support, Interview June 2012). Relying on 
personal networks to reach municipal administration is a hurdle for any 
organisation and prevents establishment of formal links between state and non-
state agencies. In 2007, REC started a broad initiative to enhance collaboration 
between the various institutions involved in environmental governance. Drafting 
of the Local Environmental Action Plan was announced as the LEAP project. The 
Local Environmental Action Plan is a strategic document at the local level, which 
brings together the interests and values of community members, and defines 
priorities on environmental protection. The LEAP initiative’s prime objective is to 
achieve collaboration between institutions and encourage citizen participation in 
decision-making processes. It intends to develop local capacity, both of the local 
authorities as well as other stakeholders working on environmental issues. LEAP 
goals include improving environmental planning at the local level through an 
inclusive approach and wide citizen consultation as well as increasing 
transparency with the LEAP document approved by municipal government and 
municipal assembly. To achieve its goal in improving environmental management, 
LEAP will contribute to ensure central government directives; strategies and action 
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plans get implemented at the local level. The LEAP drafting process thus includes 
joint efforts from all actors to increase coordination about implementing existing 
and new policies. Lastly, LEAP aims to enable the municipal administration to 
address and channel investments in environment protection. The initiative was 
implemented in two rounds during 2007 until 2010 and the second round, which 
continued until 2013. REC Regional Coordinators worked directly with 
municipalities to facilitate the Working Group responsible for drafting the LEAP 
policy. 
For the LEAP initiative at the local level, municipalities identify concrete objectives 
including defining and prioritizing environmental problems in the municipality, 
raise public awareness on environmental issues, increase the engagement of the 
municipal office in charge or environmental protection, capacity building of local 
NGOs in developing and leading projects in environmental protection, ensure 
financial resources for environmental protection at the local level and strengthen 
local economy to enable implementation of ecological standards (Klina 
municipality LEAP 2011). Developing Local Environment Action Plans is a 
municipal legal obligation deriving from the Law on Environment Protection. The 
LEAP initiative started with five beneficiary municipalities including Ferizaj, 
Gjakova, Gjilan, Klina, Peja. In July 2011, ten beneficiary municipalities signed 
Memorandums of Understanding with the Regional Environment Center in 
Kosovo. The ten municipalities were chosen based on recommendations from the 
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), based on an 
assessment of their environment circumstances as well as inclusion of newly 
established and minority municipalities. Municipal authorities established 
Working Groups on Environment as well as a Coordinating Group to facilitate the 
work of municipal staff and civil society organisations. The Coordinating Group, 
as the highest level in the municipal administration hierarchy, reported to the 
mayor. The role of the Working Group was to prioritize actions in the 
municipality. Members of the Working Group include a municipal representative, 
an official in charge of gender issues, one municipal official for European 
integration, an NGO and a public enterprise representative. The role of CSOs also 
included surveying community members to evaluate their opinion on 
environmental issues and their priorities. 
The challenge of drafting and implementation of environment protection plans is 
in finding the way not to destroy existing ecosystems, to advance economic 
stability of the community and to enable a better quality of life of local citizen. To 
address these challenges at the local level, joint work in development is necessary. 
Participation of all parties from the local community, local institutions, civil 
society, public and private enterprises, media and communities in drafting of 
LEAP have a decisive importance in its subsequent implementation. 
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Representatives of local government are obliged to enable participation in local 
decision-making. According to the facilitator, LEAP is an inclusive process and a 
democratic forum in which parties represent their interests (REC 2011). However, 
REC interviewees declare that not all members of the forums were equally 
acceptable of other actors. In some instances, municipal coordinators had 
tendencies to overrule other members in the Working Group demonstrating power 
over the issues at hand (REC Expert on Local Initiatives and Civil Society Support, 
Interview June 2012). 
LEAP is prepared with data from a wide public, including municipal working 
groups and finalized by experts on environmental governance. It determines short 
and medium-term environmental priorities. Opinion polls of communities and 
engagement of Civil Society Organisations – REC selected nine CSOs from the 
participating municipalities to cover the process of drafting the Local Environment 
Action Plan. Data gathered through opinion polls of citizen in the municipalities is 
distributed to the Working Group members to clarify the public perception on 
environmental issues. REC promotes this approach as an inclusive mechanism 
proposing projects for environmental issues that address diverse community 
segments. 
Successful completion of developing the Local Environmental Action Plan was 
followed by investment projects in each municipality, co-financed between the 
donor organisation Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) and the 
municipalities. The closing Regional Conference LEAP for Sustainability in South 
East Europe included a call to sign the Aalborg Commitments (for local 
sustainability). The municipality of Klina became the first Kosovo local 
government unit to sign the Aalborg Commitments. Overall, successful completion 
of the first LEAP project, triggered high interest amongst municipalities and 
further promoted environmental governance and management at the local level. 
The initiative raised local interest in putting environmental issues in the policy 
agenda. The second round of the LEAP project covers ten municipalities which 
include Deçan, Fushë Kosovë, GraçanicaȦ	°, Hani i Elezit, Istog, Junik, 
Mitrovica, Obiliq, Partesh/Parteš and Podujeva. At the central level, REC 
cooperates with the Ministry of Environment, Spatial Planning and the Ministry of 
Local Government Administration to facilitate the work of the LEAP 2 project.  
Cooperation with REC was beneficial as it facilitated the work of municipalities in 
setting priorities in environmental issues and provided training for the 
Environment Working Group and the local Coordinating Group in developing 
projects. Highly valuable was also the financial assistance, through the co-
financing grant provided for the irrigation of municipal green space, chosen as 
highest priority project. Establishing and successfully completing cooperation 
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between the Environment Working Group members is highlighted as a positive 
outcome of the REC – LEAP initiative (Mitrovica Environment Official, Interview 
June 2012). 
In cooperating with newly established municipalities, REC officials recognize the 
lack of capacities in municipal administration. New municipalities also show 
greater interest for cooperation with external agencies than bigger municipalities. 
However, accepting mechanisms of cooperating with local civil society 
organisations was a challenge in these institutions.  Municipalities showed own 
initiative to develop their Local Environment Plans but there was no 
representation of other actors. After effective lobbying by the REC partner, 
municipal authorities agreed to draft the document together with civil society 
representation (REC Official, Interview June 2012). 
Power struggles exist within municipal authorities as well as between government 
and other agencies. According to REC officials, inside the local government 
structure, the Directorate for Environment is marginalized (REC Interview June 
2012). Lack of capacities within municipal administration and unclear division of 
responsibilities between inspectorate and administration staff are most apparent in 
Prishtina municipality (Interview June 2012). Despite the largest population and 
the widest areas of competences it exercises, Prishtina municipality does not posses 
the financial resources to provide all the services requested by its citizen and by 
law. Hence, the municipality would greatly benefit from allowing more 
information sharing with civil society organisations, especially in the area of 
environmental governance where specific expertise exists and is willingly shared.  
The following section investigates several municipalities with a varying degree of 
cooperation with civil society in developing the Local Environmental Action Plan. 
Whereas Podujeva and Obiliç municipality are chosen as best cases, municipalities 
of Mitrovica and Gjakova entail a more challenging environment prohibiting 
effective cooperation between state and non-state actors. Interviewees include 
officials from the local government administration that cooperated with REC in 
designing the Local Environmental Action Plan as well as representatives of 
environmental NGOs or other active civil society organisations working in the 
municipality. In the case where municipalities do not have environment officials, 
interviews were conducted with heads of Directorate of Urban Planning which 
oversees environmental policy. 
 
6.5.  Podujeva: An example of cooperation 
The municipality of Podujeva is hailed as a best case of cooperation between 
municipal institutions and environmental organisations (REC Interviews, 2012). 
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The municipal Environment Official comes from a civil society background once 
heading the local environmental NGO ‘EkoVizioni’. This should provide 
municipal authorities with an advantage to communicate and reach out to non-
state actors, promoting a culture of openness in decision-making processes. For the 
design of the Local Environmental Action Plan in Podujeva, municipal authorities 
established cooperation with several local environmental NGOs including the 
Local Action Group76
In general, cooperation with civil society actors is mostly based on activities such 
as debates, discussion roundtables, public cleaning campaigns and development of 
local policies and reports on environment. The municipal Environment Official 
refers to a prolific civil society contribution, which is ‘extremely important for local 
governance’ (Interview, April 2013). Mechanisms to improve existing modes of 
cooperation include increasing financial assistance for local NGOs and support for 
their projects on environmental protection (Podujeva Environment Official 
Interview, April 2013). According to the municipal official, a challenge of efficient 
implementation of projects is the lack of human resources and professional 
capacities of local environmental NGOs. However, their motivation to contribute 
to the municipality receives high regard in the municipal administration 
(Environment Official Interview, April 2013). 
 as well as the Associations of Local Businesses ‘Llapijan”, 
Association of Beekeepers ‘Llapi’ etc. Adopting the LEAP document in June 2012 is 
cited as one of the latest achievements in the municipality (Municipal Environment 
Official Interview, April 2013). Other achievements include increasing green space 
in the municipal territory, implementing existing local regulations on environment 
protection as well as executing programs for citizen awareness on environment 
protection. The municipal Directorate for Environment employs an Environment 
Official and an Inspector for Environment to cover the responsibilities. 
The municipality faces a set of environmental challenges including inefficient 
wastewater management and waste collection systems and lack of citizen 
awareness on environment protection. Similar to all other municipalities examined, 
Podujeva officials also consider lack of funds one of the biggest challenges in 
implementing environmental policies. As the Environment Official states, ‘the 
municipal budget is far from fulfilling municipal requirements and we realize that 
many projects are unfeasible’ (Interview, April 2013). Financial incentives are also 
used in the partnership with REC to ensure that local authorities adopt the Local 
Environment Action Plan. Adoption of LEAP policy is conditioned with a grant of 
                                                 
76 The Local Action Groups are another type of non-governmental structures established in 2005 and 
2006 with the initiative of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and the assistance of UNDP to 
enable rural development. The groups are registered as NGOs and belong to a National Network for 
Rural Development. 
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40.000 EUR from REC enabling the implementation of a high priority environment 
project. Municipal co-financing is another condition for the grant (n.n., 2012). To 
increase financial resources available for environmental projects, Podujeva 
municipality has established cooperation with international agencies considering 
donor contribution extremely important in improving local environmental 
governance (Environment Official Interview, April 2013). 
 
6.6.  Obiliç 
According to REC assessments, Obiliç municipality, one of the municipalities with 
most environmental problems in the country, is also a successful case in 
establishing cooperation with environmental organisations in the municipality 
(REC Interviews, 2012). The municipality deals with a list of environmental issues 
in its territory, including pollution caused by housing the biggest power plant in 
the country. Issues include air and noise pollution, endangerment of forests and 
agricultural land, degradation of land, lack of clean water and treatment of sewage 
etc. However, the Environmental Protection Directorate has managed to achieve 
successful implementation of programs in the environment sector which include 
an increase of green areas in the municipality, efficient management of waste and 
citizen education on environmental protection (Director Interview, April 2013). The 
Directorate for Environment Protection is in charge of developing and 
implementing environmental policies, promoting environment protection, 
conducting research and evaluation of risks to the environment, developing 
strategies and budgets for raising citizen awareness and education of the public on 
environmental issues as well as coordinating work with donor agencies investing 
in environment. The Directorate is in charge of cooperating with other 
stakeholders including central government line ministries, the private sector and 
civil society actors with the aim of promoting environmental protection policies. 
Cooperation with civil society organisations has mainly focused on community 
outreach and information dissemination to citizen on environmental issues, 
organisation of public debates and education and awareness raising campaigns on 
environment protection through manifestations such as Earth Day. According to 
the head of Directorate, the municipality has been open in inviting local NGOs to 
meetings during the policy development stage as well as during preparation of 
environmental reports and design of strategies on environment protection (Head 
of Directorate Interview, April 2013). Considering the inclusion of a number of civil 
society organisations, the Local Youth Action Councils are also invited to 
participate in discussing local policies of education, health, environment etc. In the 
case of Obiliç, the local YAC was a member of the working group developing the 
Local Environmental Action Plan. As said by the municipal Director of the 
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Directorate for Environmental Protection, their participation was important in 
identifying environmental issues in the municipality that require attention 
(Interview, April 2013). The municipality adopted the LEAP policy in May 2012. 
Similar to the municipality of Podujeva, municipal officials in Obilic perceive 
environmental NGOs to lack human resources in providing a higher contribution. 
Obiliç municipal officials consider these organisations to require capacity building 
to improve their project management skills as well as increase their potential for 
contributing to develop local environmental policies. Whereas current cooperation 
with civil society is evaluated as good, more financial assistance should be made 
available for local NGOs to improve municipal cooperation with their civil society 
partners (Directorate Director Interview, April 2013). According to the municipal 
authorities, lack of resources within the administration is a major challenge in its 
work on environmental policy hindering a wider range of activities. Minimal 
access to international donor funds as another challenge for municipal authorities 
in successfully implementing policies (Directorate Director Interview, April 2013). 
According to the Directorate leader, good cooperation with the Regional 
Environmental Center contributed to facilitating the development of the Local 
Environmental Action Plan through the use of professional methodologies for 
policy design. Upon completion of the LEAP document, the municipality of Obiliç 
received financial support for a series of projects from the Regional Environmental 
Center including funding for the waste management program and increase of 
green spaces in the territory financed by REC and SIDA.  
 
6.7.  Mitrovica 
Drafting of the Local Environment Action Plan in Mitrovica included five civil 
society organisations. As reported by municipal officials, the cooperation between 
municipal authorities and civil society actors is exemplary and resulted in the 
municipality incorporating their ideas into the LEAP document (Mitrovica 
Environment Official, Interview June 2012). Environment is one of the key policy 
areas in which the local government has integrated collaboration with civil society 
actors into the local activities. Biggest challenges in further developing the 
municipality’s work in environmental protection, as outlined by municipal 
officials, include harmonizing local regulations with the national legislation. 
Additionally, lack of clear delineation of competences and responsibilities between 
central and local government continue to challenge development and successful 
implementation of local policies (Interview June 2012). 
In the case of Mitrovica, responses from civil society organisations contradict those 
of municipal authorities. According to interviewees from civil society, the 
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relationship between environmental NGOs and local government authorities 
contains many challenges. The local NGO participating in the drafting of the Local 
Environmental Action Plan, “EkoTrepça”, organizes activities primarily on 
environmental protection and argues that environmental policy is not a priority in 
the local policy-agenda (Director of NGO EkoTrepça Interview, April 2013). 
According to the NGO representative, municipal authorities are reluctant to accept 
proposals and initiatives from civil society due to their conviction that municipal 
officials posses higher expertise on environmental issues whereas in reality “the 
municipal Environment Directorate has insufficient human resources to design 
local policies (Director of NGO EkoTrepça Interview, April 2013). The LEAP 
drafting process also included disputes between the NGO representatives and 
municipal officials over priorities set out in the new Action Plan. The NGOs 
favoured selecting priority projects reflecting citizen needs, as observed through 
public opinion polls conducted during the design process. However, the final 
decision on selecting priority projects was taken by municipal authorities 
supporting other priorities of environmental governance. Demands of NGO 
representatives for more decision-making authority suggest an unrealistic 
approach towards the local policy-making process as the municipal officials retain 
the right to set up. On the other hand, the functioning of the Working Groups 
established to design similar policies may enable discussion over certain issues yet 
maintain a dominant role for municipal authorities. The vote of civil servants 
representing authority’s interests outweighs that of other members. Despite these 
challenges, the organisation cites the establishment of an Environmental 
Directorate within the Municipal Assembly of Mitrovica as one of the biggest 
achievements. This increases the attention given to environmental policy within 
the municipal administration and encourages Assembly Members to monitor the 
implementation of the LEAP policy. 
With regards to the capacities of the NGO EkoTrepça itself, the four members also 
include former employees of the Trepça mine in Mitrovica.77
                                                 
77 Only one member of the organisation has a University degree (Director of NGO EkoTrepça Interview, 
April 2013). 
 The organisation also 
engages volunteers for its activities in the municipality. Main activities done in 
collaboration with the municipal Environmental Protection Directorate include 
awareness raising campaigns and information dissemination for environmental 
protection and volunteer initiatives for street cleaning. To strengthen the impact on 
local decision-making, the head of NGO EkoTrepca argues that environmental 
organisations need to establish networks of cooperation and improve their 
expertise on environmental issues. 
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6.8.  Gjakova 
In the municipality of Gjakova, the main local policies on environmental sector 
include the Local Environmental Action Plan 2009 – 2015 and the Regulation on 
Environmental Protection. The municipality deals with a series of environmental 
issues, including the lack of systematic monitoring system for air, water and land 
pollution, a heritage of heavy industrial waste, land erosion, illegal logging and 
waste management. In the Gjakova case, REC collaborated mainly with the 
Director of the Urban Planning Directorate, which oversees the environment 
sector. Other counterparts include the Mayor and the Chair of the Municipal 
Assembly. The Working Group in charge of drafting the LEAP document included 
local civil society organisations. According to the REC Coordinator, cooperation 
with civil society organisations depends on the latter’s initiative and application 
for projects. Whilst the municipal administration is open to inviting organisations 
in meetings, debates and include them in the policy-design process, the latter’s 
involvement depends largely on the organisations’ capacities and initiative to 
collaborate. According to REC, environmental organisations must develop a joint 
strategy prioritizing their approach to local environmental issues and thus 
strengthen their potential to access decision-making processes and have an impact 
(REC Coordinator, Interview, May 2013). Another obstacle hindering the work of 
civil society is the lack of funding for environmental issues, which according to the 
REC Coordinator, prohibits the establishment of more environmental 
organisations. 
On the civil society side, we find a different outlook on rapports with municipal 
authorities. According to the MAR Kosovo Center for Sustainable Development, 
cooperation with municipal authorities has decreased in the last years, especially 
since the change of the political leadership in the last local elections. Contact with 
municipal officials remains rare considering the organisation is not invited to 
attend meetings, debates or discussions on environmental policy. The organisation 
was not invited to participate in the development of the Local Environmental 
Action Plan. In addition, the lack of projects and funds has also diminished the 
motivation of the organisation’s members and activists (Interview, May 2013). As 
stated by MAR representatives, municipal authorities have selective approaches 
towards civil society organisations and do not promote a broad and open approach 
for cooperation (Interview, May 2013). Cooperation with other civil society 
organisations has also decreased in the last years, considering the lack of funds for 
the NGO Forum established in Gjakova, which served as a facilitator between the 
various active organisations. 
MAR was established in 2001 as an environmental NGO profiling its work early on 
when civil society organisations were being established throughout the country. In 
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2005 it added sustainable development to its main activities and works primarily 
in sustainable economic development, environmental protection and social issues. 
The aim of the organisation is to promote issues of sustainable development, to 
impact local policies through representing citizen interests and lobby for the 
implementation of adopted regulations at the local level. It seeks to promote 
mechanisms of cooperation between local authorities, NGOs, the business 
community and citizen. With three permanent staff members equipped with post-
graduate degrees, and external collaborators, the organisation argues that its 
capacities and expertise are sufficient to contribute to local environmental policy 
(MAR Director Interview, May 2013). Before cooperation ceased in 2007, according 
to the interviewee, “MAR established good working relations with the Municipal 
Assembly during the development of business plans for the Business Incubator, 
which is part of the priorities foreseen in the Strategy for Local Economic 
Development in Gjakova municipality” (MAR Director, Interview, May 2013). The 
organisation also cooperated with the Directorate for Culture, Youth and Sports to 
develop an online platform to facilitate communication and information 
dissemination between the municipal Directorate and the Youth Center in Gjakova. 
Receiving project funding mainly from international donor organisations, financial 
assistance from local government is non-existent. According to the organisation’s 
leadership ‘the municipality has limited human resources and professional 
capacities to develop adequate environmental policies for the needs of the 
municipality’ (Interview, May 2013). 
Considering the limited number of environmental NGOs working at the local level, 
‘excluded’ organisations such as MAR which have been active for more than a 
decade constrain relationships that bridge state-society divides. Municipal 
authorities must change their approach towards civil society and ‘adopt a more 
proactive approach in establishing cooperation with NGOs, in particular with 
environmental organisations.  
 
6.9.  Case Study: Provision of Welfare Services 
Kosovo has three main social assistance programs including cash transfer systems 
to households, war veterans' benefits and disability pensions for working age 
people who have disabilities and are unable to work. The social assistance scheme 
attempts to fill the gap created by the absence of other types of benefits, such as 
child benefit, sickness benefit and unemployment benefit. The central pension 
system provides a minimal level of assistance to retired persons. Workers below 55 
years of age are mandated to place 10% of their wages into the Kosovo Pension 
Savings Trust. The European Commission reports on dire conditions of persons 
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with disabilities, who are faced with little access to employment, goods and 
services, transportation and education (European Commission, 2012b). The 
necessity for improving the coverage and efficiency of the social protection system, 
particularly in respect of the needs of children, persons with disabilities, and 
elderly persons, has been highlighted in the 2009 European Commission 
Communication “Kosovo – Fulfilling its European Perspective” and its 2011 
Progress Report. In addition, a major cross-cutting issue identified in the Multi-
annual Indicative Planning Document 2011-2013 is the requirement that equal 
opportunities and non-discrimination of minority and vulnerable groups 
(including children, disabled and elderly people) will find consideration in all 
aspects of EU-funded activities. The Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare has 
developed, with EU support, an Action Plan 2011 – 2012/13 for the implementation 
of the Sectoral Strategy. The operational objectives include an increase in the ability 
of central and local authorities to provide services based on EU practice, and 
development of alternative ways and means of service provision (MLSW, 2011). 
One of these alternatives is service provision in collaboration with civil society 
organisations. 
In the neighbouring countries, municipal social services to Persons with 
Disabilities (PwD) are delivered through contracting groups. In Kosovo, 
municipalities largely lack capacities to provide these services themselves. 
According to the national Strategy and Action Plan on Human Rights, there are 
approximately 150,000 people with disabilities in Kosovo who suffer from 
pervasive exclusion in their everyday life, whether it is in terms of access to health 
care, the right to equal education, equal employment opportunities, or 
participation in political and public life (OPM, 2008). The Kosovo Human 
Development Report published by UNDP in 2010 identified people with 
disabilities as one of the most marginalized social groups in Kosovo. The report 
warns that this group is “at great risk of becoming Kosovo’s invisible population 
unless they are moved quickly up the policy prioritization ladder and are made the 
primary focus of Kosovo’s development agenda” (UNDP 2010). A 2011 survey, 
commissioned by the OPM Office for Good Governance, shows that only 1 percent 
of the population identified as Persons with Disabilities receive support for 
children with the average amount being around 103 €, which suggests a call for 
effective implementation of the Law for Supporting Families with Children with 
Disabilities (OPM 2011a). 
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6.10. Policies addressing Persons with Disabilities 
Welfare services are listed amongst the five priority policy areas of the central 
Government Program 2011-2014 (OPM, 2011b). However, international monitoring 
agencies as well as local advocacy groups have criticized the government for 
failing to improve provision of services to Persons with Disabilities. Lack of 
financial resources for central government and municipalities has challenged 
welfare services for Persons with Disabilities. The process of decentralization of 
social services began in January 2009 based on the new Law on Local Self-
Government approved in 2008. According to the Ahtisaari Plan principles, adopted 
in national legislation, decentralization of social welfare services is foreseen to 
ensure efficiency and fair protection of all community members. Article 17 of the 
Law on Local Self-Government outlines municipal responsibilities to include 
provision of family and other social welfare services, such as care for the 
vulnerable, foster care, child care; elderly care, including registration and licensing 
of these care Centers, recruitment, payment of salaries and training of social 
welfare professionals. After the adoption of the legislation, in February 2009, the 
Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare signed a Memorandum of Understanding 
with the Ministry of Local Government Administration, Ministry of Finance and 
Kosovo municipalities to initiate devolution of authority in provision of social care. 
The MoU initiated a transfer of responsibility for Centers for Social Work (CSW) to 
municipal administration and provision of overall responsibility for social services 
to Municipal Directorates for Health and Social Welfare. However, this initial 
transition did not secure the transfer of all competences, including particular 
services provided to children, the elderly and to Persons with Disabilities (PwD). 
Examples include residential services, subsidies to NGOs, foster care allowances, 
allowances for children with disabilities and the Centers for Social Welfare in 
°ǰȱ ȱ k and Zveçan/Zve²an. The delivery of these services 
continued through institutions which are under the direct responsibility of the 
Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare (MLSW) (European Commission, 2012a). This 
partial decentralization of responsibilities complicated the policy-making process 
as financial decisions were taken at central level with implementation at the lower 
tier of government. Provision of residential services for persons with disabilities 
remained fully centralized whereas benefits for families with children with 
permanent disabilities were deconcentrated (Joshua & Dzhygyr, 2011). Municipal 
officials struggled with understanding the existing differences between delegated 
functions and deconcentrated tasks, which caused confusion over lines of 
hierarchy and accountability measures. Recognizing the need for clarifications and 
an improved delineation of duties amongst central and local government levels, 
the National Disability Action Plan 2009 – 2011 outlined a set of activities. These 
include placement of additional expert member within the local administration, 
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specifically for issues of inclusion of Persons with Disabilities, publishing of guides 
on municipal competences and capacity building activities for municipal staff 
(OPM, 2009). The varying types of decentralized tasks also made budget 
classifications complex as some staff salaries remained under the Ministry of Labor 
and Social Welfare and others covered by municipal budgets. Since 2009, a 
transitional intergovernmental financing scheme included a specific grant for 
social services allocated to municipalities. As of 2012, the Medium Term 
Expenditure Framework of 2012 – 2014 incorporated the specific funds in the 
General Grant. 
In 2001, the Kosovo non-governmental organisation, HandiKOS, developed a 
guide document for policymaking for Persons with Disabilities to serve the 
institutions and ministries especially during policy drafting. One of the main 
requests of the document was the establishment of an Advisory position to the 
Prime Minister concerning Persons with Disabilities in addition to a specific Office 
for People with Disabilities. Whilst the latter was not accepted, the Advisory 
position was set up and became functional. However, meetings between the 
Advisor and HANDIKOS, or other civil society organisations were not requested. 
Bar the establishment of a new function, this action, did not result in setting up 
formal cooperation with civil society organisations working with persons with 
disabilities. At the national level, the Kosovo Council of Persons with Disabilities 
(KCPD) was established in 2006 and represented an advancement of national 
policy recognizing the requests and needs of Persons with Disabilities. The Council 
is the highest state body representing PwD in charge of monitoring all laws that 
have to do with Persons with Disabilities to check the compliance with their rights 
and protections. The KCPD is co-chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister and a 
representative from Persons with Disabilities and includes members of 5 to 7 line 
ministries. The KCPD enables adequate representation of PwD and was an attempt 
by the government to expand opportunities for participation in decision-making. 
On establishing the KCPD, HandiKOS states, “We thought we have achieved quite 
a strong mechanism” (Director, Interview March 2012). The Disabled Persons 
Organisations (DPOs) network, an umbrella organisation representing PwD 
interests was part of the national KCPD demonstrating a well-organized network 
of civil society. However, consultations and inclusion of the DPO network was 
partial and fragmented as a result of government’s attitude that the issue of 
disability is a matter of social, educational and health policies (Coalition Equal 
Opportunity 2007). Overall, the Council failed to become completely functional 
holding only three meetings since 2006 without any concrete steps resulting from 
them.  
In 2011, the Prime Minister’s Office for Good Governance, Human Rights, Equal 
Opportunities and Gender Issue (OPM/OGG) reinitiated the establishment of the 
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Kosovo Council of Persons with Disabilities. The new structure was established 
without a clear break from the previous policy. Civil society organisations 
representing Persons with Disabilities expressed doubt that this government action 
will have an impact in their lives. As stated by HandiKOS, ‘the fact that protection 
is stated in the law, or that a Council exists, does not matter in reality’ (HandiKOS 
Director, Interview March 2013). Failure to implement existing regulations and 
enforce mandates of government structures, weaken the role of government in 
providing services and ensuring trust in state institutions. HandiKOS 
representatives emphasize that, at the central level, informal channels are the most 
important mechanisms of reaching government institutions. Adding to these 
challenges within existing mechanisms of work of central government officials, 
civil society contribution is challenged by administration delays such as late 
notifications for workshops with government officials (HandiKOS Director, 
Interview March 2012). 
In 2007, the Coalition of Organisations of People with Disabilities in Kosovo 
“Equal Opportunity” published a National Report for People with Disabilities in 
Kosovo declaring that Persons with Disabilities are united on their aim to mobilize, 
organize and create a powerful civil movement of organisations, controlled by 
persons with disabilities. In the movement for disability rights the main objective is 
the introduction of disability as a human rights and development issue in general. 
This leads to recognition and acceptance of the disability as a natural part of the 
life, and persons with disability as equal citizens who enjoy equal rights and 
responsibilities (2007, 12). However, despite these declarations and several 
initiatives of coalition building, in practice the biggest challenge in having an 
impact on current processes is the lack of cooperation between PwD organisations 
themselves. Civil society itself is not very strategic to convince municipalities to 
strengthen cooperation. The HandiKOS Director (Interview March 2012) states: 
We are not very clear on our requests and not organized as much as we 
should be. When looking to establish cooperation with us, local 
governments evaluate how organized we are. How strong is our internal 
strength. If they see we are fractions, they have reasons to avoid their 
obligations towards us. Municipal authorities (specifically Prizren Mayor 
told us) “come to us when you get organized. We can’t help each 
organisation separately. 
PwD organisations promote their own interests and lobby for fulfilling interests of 
specific communities. Organisation representatives believe this weakens their 
position when asking for cooperation with local authorities. Lacking a joint 
platform with main priorities for all organisations is a barrier to pushing forward 
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requests. This is harming a strengthening of rapport between CSOs and local 
authorities. 
The existing legal framework leaves the relationship between civil society and local 
government in a volatile state. There are no clear regulations adopted specifically 
for strengthening the cooperation. In the Persons with Disabilities issue, civil 
society can initiate the establishment of a Committee, a structure with civil society, 
directors of directorates etc. The committee role is advisory and their existence is 
sustained as long as there is interest of civil society. The Committee can present 
proposals to municipal organs (to executive side or the Municipal Assembly) to 
solve a particular issue. Municipalities have the possibility to establish the 
Committee for Persons with Disabilities to ensure implementation of local policies 
for PwD. It is the role of civil society to sustain the existence of these mechanisms 
with ideas, programs, and suggestions on issues (HandiKOS Drenas, Interview 
March 2012). 
The UK Department for International Development was a key institution 
providing guidance and assistance to the central government during the process of 
decentralizing social services. Support to the decentralization of social care services 
included strengthening the capabilities of municipalities and Centers of Social 
Welfare to meet priority needs. DFID helped establish a National Policy Advisory 
Committee to develop financial and administrative coherence for the 
decentralization of social care services. It also improved the capacities of the central 
government to develop an intergovernmental financing system and budget 
formula for social care services. Additionally, the project strengthened 
management systems by improving technical and organisational links between 
planning, policy and budgeting for social care services. Despite the series of efforts 
undertaken to facilitate the process, a DFID study of the transition process 
identified several challenges including weak coordination amongst institutions, 
insufficient financial resources for decentralized Centers for Social Welfare to 
provide services, excessive administrative and managerial demands placed on the 
Centers by the central authorities and weak coordination between municipal 
Directorates of Health and Social Welfare, Centers for Social Work and NGOs 
(Joshua & Dzhygyr 2011). 
 
6.11. Offering services at municipal level 
According to HandiKOS, a core of its activities differentiates them from other civil 
society organisations working with Persons with Disabilities, specifically its 
capacity to offer services for children and adults. In relation to state institutions, 
HandiKOS interviewees declare that ‘local authorities are reluctant to fully 
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recognize the services offered to PwD’ (HandiKOS Drenas, Interview March 2012). 
At the central level services provided by HandiKOS are not officially recognized. 
At the local level, HandiKOS is an exemplary case in pushing municipalities to 
accept free services from HandiKOS. Despite the long existence of HandiKOS, as a 
leading civil society organisation for Persons with Disabilities, assistance of 
international agencies was instrumental in establish cooperation between 
municipal authorities and HandiKOS. In the municipalities where HandiKOS 
established cooperation, this was achieved with the help of international agencies 
promoting that local authorities enact formal mechanisms of cooperation with 
CSOs. Interviewees argue, without the role of international donor agencies, “we 
would have not achieved this […] so we have used these advantages of having 
international backing to lobby for more attention from municipal authorities” 
(HandiKOS Drenas, Interview March 2012). HandiKOS provides assistive devices 
and primary physical and psychosocial rehabilitation services through its 14 
Community Based Rehabilitation Centers and 12 Local Offices located throughout 
Kosovo. Another important service offered is counselling for parents of children 
with disabilities on rights of PwD and providing assistive devices for children and 
adults with disabilities. HandiKOS maintains a database registering around 18.000 
children and adults with disabilities (with physical and combined disabilities) in 
the country. The HandiKOS Local Office in Drenas includes around 1350 members 
using the Community Based Rehabilitation Center for various services. 
Agreements for collaboration are established between HandiKOS and the mayors 
of municipalities of Drenas, Suharekë, Malisheva and Gjilan. Four Community 
Based Rehabilitation Centers are co-funded by the organisation in partnership with 
the local government. In these municipalities the Mayor recognizes the 
organisations’ role in delivering services for Persons with Disabilities. An 
important factor in establishing this collaboration was that HandiKOS services 
already entailed their own infrastructure, relieving the municipality of obligations 
to devote its own resources. According to the local HandiKOS Manager in Drenas 
“this assisted municipal authorities Municipalities get the idea to contract us since 
we already have our buildings, and we transport the children with our own 
vehicles’ (Interview March 2012). In these cases, municipalities agreed to recognize 
HandiKOS as a service provider under the umbrella of municipal welfare service 
provision. The Centers offers particular attention to children ages 1 to 16, 
providing them with extensive physical and psychosocial rehabilitation services. 
Parallel to this, HandiKOS has extensively lobbied for inclusion of children with 
disabilities in the regular schooling system. Advocating to the local government 
has reached success in establishing three additional classes in the Krajkova village 
primary school “28 November”. This is a considerable achievement. 
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In Drenas, HandiKOS maintains that the organisation offers better services than 
the municipal administration (Interview, March 2012). The agreement for 
collaboration is signed in the form of a one-year temporary Memorandum of 
Understanding between HandiKOS, Drenas municipality (Directorate for Health 
or in bigger municipalities they have Social Welfare Directorate) and partner 
organisations. HandiKOS reports to the Municipal Directorate. The municipality 
has allocated financial resources for operational costs whilst HandiKOS covers 
employee payments, transportation, building etc. In the case of donor financing, 
those external funds are used to cover staff salaries. The municipality contribution 
is limited to financing operating services of the facilities. Disagreements regarding 
execution of personnel salaries have complicated the implementation. According to 
HandiKOS, the personnel in charge of delivering the service must be compensated 
by the municipality (HandiKOS Drenas Manager, Interview March 2012). 
Municipal authorities have disagreed, arguing against payments for staff due to 
bureaucratic implications for their administration. According to municipal officials, 
hiring the staff requires approval deriving from a formal Municipal Decision. 
However, this remains a misconception from the local government’s side. 
Legislation regulating decentralized services at the local level allow for contractual 
relations between local authorities and other agencies. Organisations can apply to 
the tender and offer services. Objections by municipal staff may be mechanisms to 
avoid additional responsibilities to an already heavily burdened administration. 
According to HandiKOS, municipalities have the will to help civil society, but fail 
to fulfil their obligations in accordance with agreements or contracts signed. These 
failures render Memorandums of Understanding futile. For example, Prishtina 
municipal authorities failed to functionalize the Committee for Persons with 
Disabilities, despite its proclamations to enact the policy. In the case of Malisheva 
municipality, local authorities have agreed to cover service provision expenses in 
the amount of 5.000 EUR but later retracted their commitment declaring to have 
signed the agreement to keep the interest of the donors (HandiKOS Drenas 
Interview, March 2012). According to HandiKOS representatives, legal measures 
have not been taken in these cases stating, 
We have never chosen to go to court over these issues considering that we 
need to save the relations of cooperation with municipalities… we can’t 
ruin the little cooperation we already have (HandiKOS Interviews, March 
2012).  
HandiKOS officials argue that their persistence and intervention to offer services is 
important to establish cooperation with municipal authorities, using arguments 
that their organisation has capacities for offering better and cheaper services than 
the municipality (HandiKOS Drenas Interview, March 2012). 
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Other municipalities have shown the opposite results, as in the case of Ferizaj, 
where municipal authorities established a formal Committee dealing with Persons 
with Disabilities. The Committee is formally recognized with a decision from the 
Municipal Assembly. It is established to enable collaboration between members of 
political parties represented together with NGOs organisations for Persons with 
Disabilities. The Committee has adopted an Action Plan and serves as a formal 
mechanism through which the Committee has taken responsibilities. 
 
6.12. Conclusion 
The case studies examined here were chosen to investigate the factors determining 
progress in bridging state-society cooperation. They illustrate the existence of a 
variety of mechanisms and efforts to establish formal links between state structures 
and civil society actors. With a varying degree of success across policy areas and 
across municipalities, efforts are made to institutionalise mechanisms of 
cooperation between local government and civil society through establishment of 
Working Groups, Committees and Councils. The evidence suggests the 
requirement of institutionalising new networks in order to ensure their 
sustainability. The emerging result is a critical number of active agents, state and 
non-state actors, incrementally pushing forward change at the local level. These 
developments present the establishment of a new social structure which aims at 
integrating into the local political culture by engaging local politicians and 
decision-makers. 
  Nevertheless, a set of challenges is encountered in formalizing cooperation 
between government authorities and civil society organisations. In the case of 
environmental governance, failure to enforce existing legislation weakens local 
governance. With regard to service provision for Persons with Disabilities, weak 
implementation of existing mechanisms of cooperation inhibits further 
development of progress across state and non-state lines. Lack of implementation 
of Memorandums of Understanding; raise the question as to their validity and 
their wide use across policy areas in Kosovo.  
The lack of a clear delineation of competences and responsibilities between central 
and local government continue to challenge development and successful 
implementation of local policies. Implementation of new legislation remains a big 
challenge for local administrations due to institutional capacity and financial 
constraints. The case studies show that lack of human resources and significant 
financial constrains prohibit development of cooperation between municipal 
governments and civil society organisations. 
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Effective collaboration with local authorities is contingent upon an active approach 
of civil society organisations to secure attention from municipal authorities, and 
increase their impact on local decision-making processes. The various examples 
from municipalities suggest a weak network of civil society organisations, which 
weakens their advocacy role before municipal authorities. Persistence of 
organisations, such as HandiKOS in Drenas, to engage in communication and 
build relations with municipal authorities was necessary for the successful 
cooperation. Stronger networks of civil society organisations increase their chances 
of accessing municipal institutions and exercising an impact on the decision-
making process. These networks, however, required civil society organisations to 
prioritize good relations with local authorities against their mission to hold the 
local government accountable. 
In some municipalities, government institutions exhibit an open approach towards 
civil society inclusion and their contribution to local decision-making processes. 
However, civil society organisations still encounter a resistant environment in 
other municipalities where civil servants are reluctant to accept input from non-
state actors. In environmental governance and welfare service provision, the data 
suggests that civil society participation in the early stages of policy-making such as 
selecting priorities for the municipality, increased the latter’s chance in influencing 
the end result. This provides opportunities for these agencies to share the spotlight 
and shift local decision-making towards a more open and inclusive format. 
Municipal authorities become accustomed to collaborating with civil society 
representatives and discussing policy priorities in joint working groups. 
Conditionality set from international or external agencies, in establishing 
partnerships was a necessary factor for the cooperation between state and non-
state actors to occur. This suggests a lack of trust of local governments in the 
capacities of non-governmental organisations and a lack of commitment to change 
the mode of working at the local level. The presence of international agencies 
proves necessary in establishing the link between local government institutions 
and non-state organisations but insufficient in guaranteeing a successful 
implementation of cooperation. Financial incentives in the form of grants for 
municipal projects serve as a key motivate the local government. Technical 
assistance of international agencies accompanied by funding schemes and grants 
for implementing youth, environmental and social welfare projects remain a 
necessary condition for maintaining the parties interested in working together. Use 
of donor financial resources remained a key incentive for the interest and 
participation of municipalities. Co-financing schemes maintained the interest of 
local institutions and contributed to successful implementation of new projects. 
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7.  Conclusion 
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This research has analysed the process of transforming power and reforming 
decision-making at the local level in Kosovo. The empirical chapters examined the 
progress in establishing and implementing new mechanisms of cooperation 
between state and non-state actors in the field of heritage, youth, environment and 
social services and the extent to which these mechanisms have introduced and 
sustained a new decision-making process at the local level. This was undertaken 
through a series of case studies. The findings of the study are presented along two 
dimensions namely first to convey the changes that took place in Kosovo’s local 
governance structures and second to delineate what factors enabled those changes. 
The most important finding of the study is that local government in post-conflict 
Kosovo is changing and instances of good governance are occurring at the local 
level. Evidence from the case studies suggests a moderate achievement towards 
broadening the scope of actors responsible and active at the local governance. 
Developments at the local level in the last decade reveal an involvement of non-
state actors in the decision-making process for the first time. At the local level, 
there seems to be evidence of some reconfiguration of power enabling incremental 
change. The emerging result of local government reform in Kosovo is a critical 
number of active agents, state and non-state actors, incrementally pushing forward 
change at the local level. The data suggests that a moderate shift towards good 
local governance has occurred.  
Notably, the research suggests that the involvement of non-state actors and their 
relative empowerment vis-à-vis local state actors enables a new decentralized type 
of decision making at the local level. This is seemingly the case even when the 
capacities of state actors are low or negligible, and where the central 
administration is reluctant to transfer authority and reform. Where this is less the 
case is in instances in which the international community enforces a centralization 
of authority at the central level and systematically excludes non-state actors, as 
discussed on Chapter 4 on heritage governance. 
The empirical evidence presented in this study suggests that there are several key 
variables for explaining the changes in local governance in Kosovo. The interplay 
of these factors is particularly complex in Kosovo and there is much at stake in 
terms of success or failure of local government reform. The three most important 
variables concern the significance of international agencies’ resources and 
strategies on local reform, the mobilization of civil society efforts to strengthen 
networks with local authorities and the leadership of local elites and their 
willingness to pursue reforms. Local government reform in Kosovo is affected by 
the wider dynamic of statehood and nation-building and by the particular 
involvement of the international community in this process. Local government 
reforms have been predominantly an externally driven process. With regards to 
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the establishment of new networks at the local level, the evidence presented in 
Chapters 3, 5 and 6 suggest that the local level has partially embraced shifts 
towards open decision-making and a new approach towards collaboration and 
networking with non-state actors. Notwithstanding the importance of the 
leadership of civil servants to implement successful local governance reforms, 
evidence indicates that local civil society capacities and networks are vital in 
driving change at the local level. The research demonstrates that the power 
distribution at the local level varies across policy areas. In certain policy spheres, 
the local government is more open towards non-state actors whereas in other 
policy spheres higher centralization of authority is prevalent, despite the high 
decentralization measures taken. The case study on youth participation suggests 
that reforms only succeeded when a combination of external pressure and 
domestic leadership occurred together with active participation by civil society. In 
the case of heritage governance, a highly centralized legislation drafting process 
showcased the international community and central government dominating the 
decision-making process. 
What is striking from the evidence is the existence of opportunity structures for 
local agents, particularly those engaged in the policy sectors of regional 
development, youth participation and environmental governance. These 
opportunity structures are predominantly a product of international intervention 
and their initiatives at the local level. The empirical data points to a set of 
conditions that appear to enable the advancement of state and non-state networks. 
Evidence clearly points to a powerful role of highly mobilized civil society 
demonstrating their influence for mobilization and resisting imposition of policies 
either from domestic authorities or the international community. The active 
advocacy of civil society organizations and their persistent efforts towards 
establishing partnerships with local authorities advances their interests and puts 
policy issues on the local political agenda. Persistence of organizations, such as the 
Youth Councils and HandiKOS to engage in communication and build relations 
with municipal authorities is necessary for successful cooperation in different 
policy areas. Furthermore, civil society organisations, when mobilized, can present 
a strong interest group lobbying for change at the local level. What weakens the 
potential impact that civil society can have at the local level is the resources they 
possess. The more capacity and resources, the more pressure they can exert. One of 
the key capacities seems to be a clear leadership amongst organizations 
themselves. Responses from municipal authorities working on environment, 
welfare services and youth suggest that local officials find it easier to cooperate 
with civil society organizations when there is a leader to negotiate with. Along the 
same lines, stronger networks of civil society organisations seem to increase their 
chances of accessing municipal institutions and exercising an impact on the 
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decision-making process. In the case of heritage, networks of civil society 
organizations were active at the local level with the establishment of the NGOs’ 
Coalition for Prizren. This mandated the attention and reaction of government 
agencies to acknowledge the role of civil society in the heritage reform process. On 
the contrary, the lack of agreement and network between civil society 
organizations advocating for improved services for People with Disabilities 
weakened their position vis-à-vis government agencies. Organisations are thus 
reliant on their individual capacities to gain access to the decision-making cycle. 
Bearing in mind the complexity of actors and interests on the ground, the case 
study on youth empowerment, illustrates how progressive change is contingent 
upon a combination of external incentives, the active participation of civil society 
organizations, and the leadership or willingness of local elites. In addition, the case 
study of local service provision to Persons with Disabilities suggested that 
strengthening ties with local elites required civil society organisations to prioritize 
good relations with local authorities against their mission to hold the local 
government accountable. The civil society relationship with local elites and the 
way local politics operates seems to be an important variable. For civil society to 
exercise this pressure, however, their efforts must meet a local administration 
inclined to cooperate with non-state actors. Thus, notwithstanding the resources 
available for civil society organisations, their relationship with local elites is 
conditional upon local officials willing to share power. The leadership of local 
officials and the political will of municipal mayors determine the pace and 
outcome of progressive change.  
Overall throughout the case studies explored, conditionality set from external 
agencies in establishing partnerships was a necessary factor for the cooperation 
between state and non-state actors to occur. The case study research data in 
Chapter 6 reveals that even where international agencies are not at the forefront of 
reforms, their presence serves as a guarantee to engage stakeholders in reforms. 
Both the municipal administration and civil society members stated that 
international backing for certain programs was pivotal in embarking on new 
partnerships with state/non-state actors. 
The involvement of the central government in steering the process appears to be an 
intervening variable. When there are strong civil society organizations and the 
local administration is successfully implementing reforms, the central government 
role is necessary but not critical to drive change. However, if the policy reform is 
politically contentious, as in the heritage case, then the central government role 
becomes a key player in the reform process. This is manifested through their role in 
designing and enforcing modes of governance or in their role as gatekeepers in 
centralizing decision-making to the central level. The case of heritage suggests that 
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the leadership of the political elite in municipalities weakens with the pressure of 
central government and the international community. This pressure was absent in 
the regional development, youth, environment and welfare cases studied in 
Chapters 3, 5 and 6. 
Another significant finding is that from the perspective of the local, the central 
state has a limited reach in various policy areas. This is primarily a result of the 
weak implementation of existing legislation and the weak oversight mechanisms to 
ensure compliance of local authorities to the legal framework. The cases discussed 
in Chapters 3 and 6 concerning regional development, environmental governance 
and welfare services point to this limited steering role of the central government. 
By comparison, the case of youth empowerment discussed in Chapter 5 suggests 
that the moderate attention given to the youth sector by the Ministry of Culture, 
Youth and Sports aligned with the interest of local elites and civil society 
organizations as well as with the engagement of international agencies which 
made their resources available for the sector.  
The empirical data points to a weak implementation of legislation on local reform 
and instances of vague delineation of powers and authority between central and 
local governments. The ambiguities and omissions in the legal framework 
undermined the work of local authorities and diminished the potential impact 
these reforms can have on the local communities. Insufficient administrative 
capacities at the local level also hinder municipal authorities to implement reform 
programs successfully, particularly funding partnerships with non-state actors. 
Throughout the empirical chapters, the case studies suggest that the lack of human 
resources and significant financial constrains prohibit development of cooperation 
between municipal governments and civil society organisations. However, in some 
instances, local officials resist opening up decision-making processes to include 
civil society actors due to their assumption that the latter are incompetent and 
inexperienced to contribute to local policy. 
One of the most significant issues related to the work being done at the local level 
is the extent to which internationally led initiatives for local governance reform 
address institutionalization of new modes of governance. Evidence in the field of 
heritage and environmental governance, suggest that existing local structures were 
ignored and overridden during the implementation of new initiatives at the local 
level. This approach risks leading to a multiplication of structures at the local level 
and overburdens the local administration who deals with already limited 
resources. Complex bureaucracy and formal rules of local government institutions 
also deter citizens from approaching formal local decision-making (Pratchett 2004). 
With regards to sustaining participation in the decision-making system, there is 
evidence in the field of regional development and environmental governance that 
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civil society participation in the early stages of policy-making such as selecting 
policy priorities for the municipality, increased the latter’s opportunity to influence 
the outcome and strengthens the cooperation between these organizations and 
local authorities. Institutionalizing these practices and reiterating them over time 
ensures their integration into the daily politics at the local level (Skelcher and 
Torfing 2010). In an environment of ever-changing legislation and local leadership, 
it is important to ensure that other stakeholders have access to decision-making 
processes even after the support of international agencies ends.  
The case studies explored point towards a tendency for multiplicity of formal 
institutional structures and mechanisms enacted through legislation. This 
approach overburdens the local administration, already under limited capacities 
and struggling with fulfilling its increasing responsibilities. Parallel to strategies 
for putting in place mechanisms to improve decision-making, attention must be 
paid to functionalization of existing structures and enhancing capacities of local 
agencies to ensure implementation of policies. The impact on the local level thus 
also depends on how the initiative is framed and its substantive focus. 
Furthermore, the evidence shows that international initiatives on local governance 
pay insufficient attention to strengthening intergovernmental links between local 
and central government institutions and as such fail to empower central state 
agencies in exerting a shadow of hierarchy. This gap between the local and the 
central undermines implementation of policies. Despite decentralization policies in 
place, a clear division between local autonomy and national control is not 
established in Kosovo. As local governments remain dependent on financial 
support from the national budget, any initiative to reform the local must attempt to 
strengthen accountability mechanisms and oversight from the central government. 
This research challenges the existing view in literature that the local level is best 
left to develop once a strong core central government is secured and its effects 
‘trickle down’ to the lower tiers. It emphasizes that local governance change is 
critical when institutionalized mechanisms are in place securing accountability of 
the local level to higher hierarchical state structures thereby reinforcing the role of 
the state in steering broader social and economic development. 
Historic legacies of state authority remain a factor in the functioning of the local 
administration. The Yugoslav institutional legacy is still to be found in the local 
administration and the political culture. The changes introduced at the local level 
in the last decade and a half have undoubtedly confronted the expectations of the 
local administration in serving citizen and cooperating with non-state actors as 
well as the way citizens interact with local government agencies. Nevertheless, 
within municipalities, institutions of decision-making and policy-enforcement are 
slow to change. Institutional change is gradual and evolutionary, particularly at 
the local level (Easterly 2008, 95). 
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The case studies discussed in Chapter 5 and 6 on youth empowerment, 
environmental governance and services for Persons with Disabilities suggest that 
some municipalities are more likely to accept enhanced participation by civil 
society organizations when recognizing their expertise and resources in a policy 
area. In addition, the environmental governance case suggests that joint design of 
local strategies for action, where non-state actors are participants from the onset of 
the project, increase the commitment of all actors. This is also the case in the 
evidence discussed in Chapter 3 where the drafting of regional development 
projects by local authorities jointly with business representatives and non-
governmental organisations ensured their commitment in the process. 
The evidence presented throughout Chapters 3 to 6 suggests that local and central 
government authorities have not completely acknowledged the changes in their 
power resulting from decentralization. The central government addressed 
decentralization and local governance reforms under pressure from international 
community conditionality, rather than as a requirement for strengthening local 
participation and subsidiarity. At the same time, the influence of the discourse on 
minority rights and political settlements for minorities undermined attempts to 
promote good local governance as an objective on its own. Thus, despite structural 
and institutional opportunities and change, there is a time lag and a slow response 
coming from the local level. 
Another issue raised by the study concerns that as the international community 
exerts its external shadow of hierarchy on domestic politics, they also may capture 
power. Due to the multiplicity of actors, the lines between who should be 
exercising power is blurred. This weakens the legitimacy of actions taken by 
government authorities and the role of the international community. Furthermore, 
lack of legitimacy hampers implementation of new policies at the local level as 
citizen lack trust in these institutions. This was made evident in the case study of 
heritage governance in Chapter 4. External attempts to design and promote new 
institutional structures without opening the decision-making process lead to the 
loss of legitimacy of the proposed legislation which in turn perpetuates the state 
weakness. Considering the controversy and resistance to implement legislation 
resulting from the new Law on Prizren, the international agencies focused their 
efforts in getting the political leadership on board thereby neglecting other 
stakeholders. The ICO, in particular, did not respect the Council of Europe (2005) 
principles about involving society in the process of designing heritage 
management mechanisms. Despite this, within Kosovo, the ICO strengthened its 
role as a norm setter by maintaining an exclusive authority in interpreting the 
Ahtisaari Proposal and the legislation emanating from it. 
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In terms of relating the findings of this study to broader discussions within 
political science regarding the limits and impact of external initiatives on post-
conflict countries, this study does not argue against international intervention in 
building good local governance. Instead, it suggests that more attention should be 
given to ensuring the sustainability of new modes of governance at the local level 
and to reinforcing the role of the central government.  
Engaging with emerging democracies more effectively is the new frontier of the 
developmental challenge. Introducing and promoting new mechanisms of 
collaboration between local authorities and civil society organisations is a key 
advantage of externally steered initiatives at the local level. However, their 
successful completion depends on local authorities and civil servants accepting 
these mechanisms as a new way of doing politics. Long-term strategies of 
international agencies remain difficult to implement in a politically dynamic and 
often contentious environment. Nevertheless, successful implementation of local 
governance initiatives depends on their integration within local structures and 
durability after completion of donor assistance. As shown in the case studies, this 
is rarely the case in the municipalities examined. With the existence of 
international donors, ready to invest in programs and initiatives for enhancing 
good local governance, local authorities should advocate their own agenda and 
steer donations in particular issues which need attention. Accepting any and all 
donor projects does not lead to direct improvement of conditions at the local level. 
Local authorities must avoid situations cited by the European donors in Prishtina 
proclaiming that local partners “accept any project that comes from the EU” (ECLO 
interview 2012). 
Finally, this study does not argue against international assistance and intervention 
in policy reforms. Instead, it suggests that more attention should be paid to 
structural reform at the local level enhancing local conditions conducive to 
successful implementation of policies instead of merely funding short-term 
projects. Furthermore, a more balanced approach should be taken towards reforms 
improving both central and local governance through strengthening 
intergovernmental relations. Reinforcing the role of the state is crucial in enabling 
new governance at the local level. The role assigned to the central government 
must be one of safeguarding the rules of the game. Establishing formal 
mechanisms of communication and collaboration between state and non-state 
groups solidifies the structures and empowers both sides. When the state capacity 
to offer services is weak, the foundation of new reforms is volatile. At the central 
level, weakness of state authorities embodies the failure of the central government 
in regulating, guiding and incentivizing local stakeholders to advance local 
governance. 
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Nieuw bestuur onder beperkte soevereiniteit: 
de lokale regeringshervorming in Kosovo 
 
Samenvatting 
In dit onderzoek wordt gefocust op de lokale regeringshervorming in Kosovo. Het 
perspectief op de lokale besluitvorming, de toewijzing en afdwinging ervan, alsook 
de talrijke internationaal gedreven hervormingen om Kosovo's overgang naar 
democratische soevereiniteit te ondersteunen, weerspiegelen een complex en 
relevant onderzoeksportaal. De kernvraag van deze scriptie betreft de 
omstandigheid dat, terwijl het rijk van de lokale politiek sinds het uiteenvallen van 
Joegoslavië onderhevig is geweest aan structurele hervormingen, zwakke 
institutionele capaciteiten blijken te zijn blijven bestaan. Dit uit zich vooral in 
hardnekkige niveaus van ondermaatse implementatie van de wetgeving en de 
mislukte transformatie van bestaande structuren. Hoe kan dit verklaard worden? 
Welke factoren bepalen het verloop en het tempo van verandering? Wat zegt dit 
over de hervormingen, de internationale tussenkomst en het specifieke geval 
Kosovo? Wat de democratische transformatie van de lokale besluitvorming betreft, 
houdt het hervormingsproces meer in dan alleen de deconcentratie van macht. Wat 
ook vereist is, is het vestigen van toegangspunten waardoor ook niet-
overheidsactoren betrokken kunnen worden bij de besluitvorming. Daarom wordt 
er in deze scriptie geprobeerd te identificeren in welke mate er een opbouw van 
macht en autoriteit is geweest bij zowel statelijke als niet-statelijke actoren. Deze 
scriptie is gebaseerd op een verkennend onderzoeksontwerp van een casestudy en 
gebruikt een proces-volgende methode om ‘within-casestudies’ te verkennen. 
Primaire gegevens zijn verzameld door middel van diepgaande interviews met de 
belangrijkste betrokken partijen, die ter plekke uitgevoerd zijn in Kosovo.  
In hoofdstuk drie wordt een gedetailleerde achtergrond van Kosovo geschetst en 
wordt het traject van de lokale regeringshervorming in het land in de periode voor 
en na 1999 gevolgd. Volgend op de vestiging van een brede internationale 
aanwezigheid in Kosovo in 1999 is de lokale regering over de jaren onderhevig 
geweest aan een reeks hervormingsstrategieën. De hervormingen zijn verstrengeld 
met de politieke situatie en beïnvloed door de gevechten tussen de etnische 
Albanese meerderheid en de Servische minderheid. Moeilijkheden om gezag uit te 
oefenen en de rechtsstaat af te dwingen in de gemeentes met een Servische 
meerderheid hebben de succesvolle implementatie van decentralisiehervormingen 
ondermijnd. In de context van een zwakke centrale regering met beperkte 
capaciteiten en een betwiste autoriteit en rechtsbevoegdheid heeft de internationale 
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gemeenschap een externe schaduw van hiërarchie geworpen op het lokale niveau. 
Wanneer en waar ze plaatsgevonden hebben, zijn de decentralisatie en de 
hervorming van de lokale overheid in Kosovo het product van 
conditionaliteitsdruk van de internationale gemeenschap.  
In de vergelijkende analyse in het tweede deel van hoofdstuk drie wordt er 
gefocust op de hervormingsprogramma's van de lokale overheid die geleid zijn 
door de twee grootste donors in Kosovo, het Agentschap voor Internationale 
Ontwikkeling van de Verenigde Staten (USAID) en het Programma van de 
Europese Unie (EU) voor Regionale Economische Ontwikkeling. Uit de analyse 
blijkt dat deze initiatieven de nadruk leggen op participatie en het vestigen van 
formele autoriteitsmechanismen en daarmee voortdurend proberen om de kloof te 
overbruggen tussen statelijke en niet-statelijke instituten door horizontale 
samenwerkingsmanieren te verzekeren. In het hoofdstuk worden de twee 
belangrijkste nadelen van deze programma’s geïdentificeerd, waaronder het 
gebrek aan langetermijn-strategieën en de onvoldoende aandacht die wordt 
besteed aan de versterking van intergouvernementele relaties en verticale 
samenwerkingsmanieren. 
Van hoofdstuk vier tot zes worden casestudy's voorgelegd van vier 
beleidsgebieden die de impact van de hervorming van de lokale overheid 
onderzoeken door het vestigen van institutionele samenwerkingsmechanismen 
tussen statelijke en niet-statelijke agentschappen. In hoofdstuk vier wordt gekeken 
naar erfgoedbestuur, de laatste jaren een van de meest betwiste onderwerpen in de 
Kosovaarse politiek omdat het een proces van de herdefiniëring van de noties van 
soevereiniteit en de rol van de staat met zich meebrengt. Het onderzoekt de 
machtsstrijd binnen een uiterst ingewikkeld web van actoren, waaronder 
internationale agentschappen, de centrale regering, lokale autoriteiten, 
maatschappelijke en religieuze gemeenschappen, die allemaal proberen om de 
mechanismen van erfgoedbescherming te beïnvloeden. In dit hoofdstuk wordt de 
controversiële opstelling van de nieuwe stedelijke wet met betrekking tot het 
historisch centrum van Prizren onderzocht en wordt een wetgevingsproces 
aangetoond dat beïnvloed is door gecentraliseerde besluitvorming en een gebrek 
aan transparantie. De uitsluiting van belangrijke nationale en lokale actoren heeft 
ertoe geleid dat er weerstand is ontstaan tegen het hervormingsproces en heeft de 
legitimiteit van zowel de internationale betrokkenheid als van de centrale 
regeringsautoriteit geschaad. 
In hoofdstuk vijf wordt het geval van jeugdparticipatie op het lokale niveau 
gekozen om het potentieel van lokaal leiderschap te illustreren bij de bevordering 
van jeugdbeleid door een actieve aanpak. In dit hoofdstuk wordt geïllustreerd dat 
er opportuniteitsstructuren bestaan voor lokale agenten die in de jeugdsector 
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werken. In verband met de demografie van het land waarin de helft van de 
bevolking jonger dan 25 jaar is, prioriteert de centrale regering beleidsvormen die 
jeugdparticipatie in de lokale besluitvorming ondersteunen. Nieuwe wetgeving 
heeft de jeugd op de politieke agenda gezet en heeft beschikbare middelen 
aangeboden, ingezet door internationale agentschappen om nieuwe structuren op 
het lokale niveau te bouwen en daarbinnen de belangen van de jeugd te 
bevorderen. De gemeenten hebben blijk gegeven van leiderschap en ondersteuning 
bij de implementatie van mechanismen voor partnerschappen met 
maatschappelijke organisaties die met de jeugd werken. Door de wisselwerking 
van deze factoren heeft het jeugdbeleid vooruitgang geboekt ten gunste van de 
bevordering van jeugdparticipatie en het vestigen van mechanismen voor jonge 
burgers om zich tot hun gemeentes te richten. Dit maakt deze casestudy een 
bijzonder interessant paradigma. 
In het laatste empirische hoofdstuk worden het milieubestuur en de 
welzijnszorgverlening onderzocht. Bij het milieubestuur verleent een grondige 
analyse van de mechanismen van het opstellen van lokale milieuprogramma's 
inzicht in nieuwe samenwerkingsvormen tussen lokale autoriteiten en 
maatschappelijke organisaties. De hier gepresenteerde casestudy's benadrukken 
het belang van actieve maatschappelijke organisaties om verandering teweeg te 
kunnen brengen op het lokale niveau. Maatschappelijke organisaties kunnen, 
wanneer gemobiliseerd, een sterke belangengroep vertegenwoordigen die lobbyt 
voor verandering op het lokale niveau. De bereidheid van maatschappelijke 
organisaties om samenwerkingskanalen met de lokale autoriteiten op te bouwen 
toont hun leiderschapspotentieel voor de verbetering van de lokale 
omstandigheden. In het tweede deel van het zesde hoofdstuk wordt de 
welszijnszorgverlening bekeken en worden de factoren geïllustreerd die bijdragen 
tot succesvolle samenwerkingsprogramma's voor dienstverlening aan mensen met 
een handicap. Door te focussen op de specifieke diensten die aangeboden worden 
door HandiKOS worden in het hoofdstuk de uitdagingen onderzocht van het 
opzetten van partnerschappen tussen maatschappelijke organisaties en 
gemeentelijke autoriteiten. De door internationale of externe agentschappen 
gestelde conditionaliteit was bij de oprichting van partnerschappen een 
noodzakelijke factor voor het ontstaan van samenwerking tussen statelijke en non-
statelijke actoren. Dit suggereert een gebrek aan vertrouwen van de lokale 
overheden in de capaciteiten van niet-gouvernementele organisaties en een gebrek 
aan engagement om de manier van werken op het lokale niveau te veranderen. De 
rol van internationale agentschappen blijkt noodzakelijk te zijn om de link te 
leggen tussen lokale overheidsinstellingen en niet-statelijke organisaties maar 
niettemin onvoldoende om een succesvolle implementatie van de samenwerking te 
garanderen.  
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In het laatste hoofdstuk worden de belangrijkste bevindingen van het onderzoek 
en hun implicaties voor hedendaagse studies en de praktijk belicht. Wat vooral 
opvalt uit het materiaal dat in deze studie wordt voorgelegd is dat er 
opportuniteitsstructuren bestaan voor agenten, vooral voor die welke betrokken 
zijn in de beleidssectoren van regionale ontwikkeling, jeugdparticipatie en 
milieubestuur. Deze opportuniteitsstructuren zijn hoofdzakelijk een product van 
de internationale tussenkomst en hun initiatieven op het lokale niveau. Bovendien 
suggereert het onderzoek dat de betrokkenheid van niet-statelijke actoren en hun 
relatieve empowerment tegenover lokale statelijke actoren een nieuw 
gedecentraliseerd besluitvormingstype op het lokale niveau mogelijk maakt. Dit is 
kennelijk zelfs het geval wanneer de capaciteiten van statelijke actoren laag en 
verwaarloosbaar zijn en waar het centraal bestuur onwillig is om autoriteit over te 
dragen en aarzelend staat tegenover hervormingen. Dit is minder het geval in 
omstandigheden waarin de internationale gemeenschap de centralisatie van een 
autoriteit op het centrale niveau afdwingt en systematisch niet-statelijke actoren 
uitsluit. Het materiaal dat in de empirische hoofdstukken naar voren wordt 
gebracht, suggereert dat de lokale en centrale gezagsdragers de veranderingen in 
hun macht tengevolge van decentralisatie niet volledig erkend hebben. De centrale 
regering heeft de decentralisatie en hervorming van het lokale bestuur 
doorgevoerd onder druk van de voorwaarden van de internationale gemeenschap, 
in plaats van als een eigen vereiste om de lokale participatie en subsidiariteit te 
versterken. Ondanks de structurele en institutionele opportuniteiten en 
veranderingen is er dus een vertraging en trage respons van de kant van het lokale 
niveau.  
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